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Zusammenfassung
Die kollaborative Erstellung von Wissensartefakten hat sich zu einem weit verbreiteten
Phänomen entwickelt. Wikipedia und Linux sind nur zwei bekannte Beispiele für Wissens-
artefakte, die von virtuellen Gemeinschaften autonomer, gleichberechtigter Mitwirkender
(Peers) erstellt werden. Der dabei verwendete Produktionsmodus wird auch als Peer
Production1 bezeichnet. Es handelt sich dabei um einen dezentralisierten Prozess, der
ohne eine hierarchische Kontrollinstanz auskommt. Das Peer-Production-Modell vereint
die Vorteile der Skalierbarkeit, da sich einzelne Peers leicht hinzufügen lassen, mit der
der Robustheit, da sich einzelne Peers leicht ersetzen lassen.
Wenn eine Gemeinschaft von Gleichberechtigten ohne das Eingreifen einer zentralen,
übergeordneten Instanz Wissen erstellt und pflegt, stellen sich zwei wichtige Fragen:
(1) Wie lassen sich Peers zur Mitarbeit motivieren? Die Qualität vieler virtueller Gemein-
schaften leidet unter einer zu geringen Beteiligung. Insbesondere für kleine Gemeinschaften
ist dies ein Problem. Diese benötigen, im Gegensatz zu sehr großen Gemeinschaften wie
Wikipedia, eine verhältnismäßig hohe Anzahl von Beiträgen pro Mitglied, um die kritische
Masse für ihr Fortbestehen zu erreichen. (2) Wie lässt sich die Qualität des erstellten
Wissens feststellen und sichern? Die Abwesenheit einer koordinierenden Kontrollinstanz
darf die Datenqualität nicht negativ beeinflussen.
Beiträge und Vorgehen
Der Hauptbeitrag dieser Arbeit ist die Beantwortung der zwei oben genannten Fra-
gen innerhalb unterschiedlicher Einsatzgebiete von Peer Production, nämlich, (i) der
kollaborativen Erstellung von strukturiertem Wissen, (ii) der Genauigkeit von Klassifi-
kationsverfahren basierend auf Bewertungen und (iii) der Bewertung wissenschaftlicher
Peer-Reviews durch Autoren.
Die Kollaborative Erstellung Strukturierten Wissens
Unser Hauptfokus liegt auf der kollaborativen Erstellung strukturierten Wissens, am
konkreten Beispiel von Ontologien. Wir untersuchen dabei das folgende Szenario. Ei-
ne virtuelle Gemeinschaft von Gleichberechtigten erstellt eine Ontologie, welche eine
bestimmte Anwendungsdomäne konzeptualisiert. Zur Qualitätssicherung bewerten die
Mitglieder die Beiträge der anderen. Um die einzelnen Mitglieder der Gemeinschaft
zur Mitarbeit zu motivieren, belohnen wir sie mit Punkten. Die Anzahl der Punkte,
die ein Mitglied erhält, richtet sich nach der Qualität und der Quantität der erstellten
1 Zu deutsch etwa ‘Fertigung durch Gleichberechtigte’.
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Beiträge. Dabei berechnen wir die Qualität eines Beitrags anhand der Bewertungen, die
er bekommen hat. Da Bewertungen eine zentrale Rolle spielen, müssen auch sie von hoher
Qualität sein. Ein viel versprechender Ansatz, um qualitativ hochwertige Bewertungen
zu erhalten, sind so genannte Mechanismen für ehrliche Bewertungen (engl. honest ra-
ting mechanisms – HRMs). HRMs belohnen subjektive Ehrlichkeit in Situationen, in
denen kein objektives Wahrheitskriterium vorhanden ist. HRMs wurden allerdings bisher
kaum empirischen Tests unterzogen, insbesondere nicht im Kontext der kollaborativen
Erstellung von Wissen.
Ausgehend vom oben skizzierten Szenario beantworten wir unter anderem folgende
Forschungsfragen zur Erstellung strukturierten Wissens: (i) Wie beeinflussen bewertungs-
abhängige Belohnungen die Qualität und die Quantität von Beiträgen? (ii) Bewirkt ein
HRM eine höhere Bewertungsqualität als z.B. eine feste Belohnung pro Bewertung?
Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, haben wir eine Anwendung zur dezentralen, an-
reizbasierten Erstellung strukturierten Wissens namens Consensus Builder entwickelt.
Consensus Builder verfügt über feingranulare Bewertungsmechanismen, insbesondere
über einen HRM. Basierend auf den Forschungsfragen formulieren wir eine Anzahl von
Hypothesen und testen diese ausgiebig in einer Reihe von kontrollierten Feldexperimenten.
Im Gegensatz zu Laborexperimenten, sind die Bedingungen unserer Experimente nah an
Realwelt-Bedingungen und verfügen damit über eine hohe externe Validität. Im Gegensatz
zu einfachen Beobachtungsstudien erlauben uns die Experimente, Kausalzusammenhänge
durch die Variation verschiedener Parameter und den Vergleich ihrer Auswirkungen
nachzuweisen. Die Experimente zeigen, dass Bewertungen ein zuverlässiges Maß für
die Qualität von Beiträgen innerhalb einer Gemeinschaft zur Erstellung strukturierten
Wissens sind. Der Einsatz von Bewertungen und von bewertungsabhängigen Belohnungen
führt zu einer Steigerung der Qualität der Wissensbasis. Zudem können wir feststellen,
dass ein HRM die Qualität von Bewertungen in der Mehrheit der Experimente signifi-
kant steigert. Allgemein zeigen die Studien, dass Consensus Builder sich sehr gut zur
Erstellung strukturierten Wissens eignet. Damit leisten unsere Ergebnisse einen wichtigen
Beitrag zur bedeutenden allgemeinen Forschungsfrage, wie man qualitativ hochwertiges
strukturiertes Wissen im großen Stil erstellen kann.
Genauigkeit von Bewertungsbasierten Klassifikationsverfahren
Viele virtuelle Gemeinschaften müssen die von ihnen erstellten Beiträge klassifizieren. Das
heißt, sie müssen jeden Beitrag einer bestimmten Klasse aus einer vorgegebenen Menge
von Klassen zuordnen. Als Beispiel stelle man sich wieder eine Gemeinschaft zur Erstel-
lung von Ontologien vor. Hier müssen die Mitglieder etwa entscheiden, ob ein gegebenes
Element der Ontologie eine Klasse oder eine Instanz ist, oder ob der Name eines Begriffs
korrekt oder inkorrekt ist. Die Klassifikation wird dabei durch ein bewertungsbasiertes
Klassifikationsverfahren ausgeführt, z.B. durch einen einfachen Mehrheitsentscheid. Als
Eingabe für die Klassifikation bewerten die Mitglieder, ebenso wie im Szenario zur Erstel-
lung strukturierten Wissens, die Beiträge anderer. Die Bewertungen entsprechen dabei
den möglichen Klassen (im obigen Beispiel etwa ‘Klasse/Instanz’ oder ‘korrekt/inkorrekt’).
Zur Schätzung der Klasse von Beiträgen und zur Schätzung der Fehlerrate von Bewer-
iv
tern haben Dawid und Skene einen Algorithmus vorgeschlagen. Diesen bezeichnen wir
im Folgenden als Dawid-Skene-Algorithmus (DSA). Es gibt zahlreiche Vorschläge in
der Literatur, DSA und auf DSA basierte Algorithmen in Crowdsourcing-Umgebungen
einzusetzen.
Trotz seiner Beliebtheit hat DSA zwei Schwachstellen: (1) Seine Genauigkeit bricht
ein in Umgebungen mit einer hohen Fehlerrate der Bewerter. Diese können auftreten,
wenn das Thema der virtuellen Gemeinschaft inhärent schwierig ist. Ebenso können sie
entstehen, wenn die Gemeinschaft durchsetzt ist von einer großen Anzahl von Spammern,
bösartigen Bewertern oder Bewertern, die in ihrem Urteil voreingenommen sind und
deshalb verzerrte Bewertungen abgeben. (2) DSA ist anfällig gegen Kollusionsattacken.
In einer Kollusionsattacke koordinieren sich einzelne Bewerter, um bestimmte Daten-
objekte identisch zu bewerten. Eine Kollusionsattacke ist von Vorteil für Bewerter,
wenn diese abhängig von ihrer geschätzten Fehlerrate belohnt werden. Da DSA den
Bewertungen der Angreifer unfair hohe Gewichte zuordnet, können Kollusionsattacken
die Klassifikationsgenauigkeit von DSA extrem verringern.
Wir schlagen Goldstrategien vor, um die Genauigkeit von DSA in Umgebungen mit ho-
her Fehlerrate zu erhöhen und um Kollusionsattacken abzuwehren. Goldstrategien machen
Gebrauch von Goldobjekten, d.h. Beiträgen, deren wahrer Wert DSA bekannt ist. Wir
gewinnen Goldobjekte, indem wir ausgewählte Beiträge von vertrauenswürdigen Experten
bewerten lassen. Allerdings führt das in der Literatur übliche zufällige Auswählen von
Beiträgen als Goldobjekte nur zu einer unbefriedigenden Erhöhung der Klassifikationsge-
nauigkeit. Statt dessen nutzen unsere Goldstrategien den Grad der Übereinstimmung der
Bewertungen eines Beitrags als Selektionskriterium. Da Goldobjekte Kosten verursachen
ist es unser Ziel, ihre Anzahl so zu wählen, dass der Nettonutzen der Goldobjekte, d.h.
ihr Nutzen abzüglich ihrer Kosten, maximiert wird. Diese Anzahl an Goldobjekten a
priori zu bestimmen ist praktisch unmöglich. Wir schlagen einen adaptiven Algorithmus
vor, der sukzessive die Anzahl der Goldobjekte erhöht und automatisch entscheidet, wann
keine weiteren Goldobjekte mehr benötigt werden.
Unser Vorgehen ist wie folgt: Zunächst betrachten wir die Eigenschaften von bewer-
tungsbasierten Klassifikationsverfahren, wie die des einfachen und die des gewichteten
Mehrheitsentscheids. Anschließend evaluieren wir verschiedene Goldstrategien für DSA
mit Hilfe von Simulationsexperimenten. Wir demonstrieren, dass bestimmte Goldstra-
tegien die Performanz von DSA in Umgebungen mit hoher Fehlerrate stark zu steigern
vermögen. Ferner zeigen wir, dass Goldstrategien ein wirksames Mittel sind, um Kol-
lusionsattacken gegen DSA zu verhindern: Einerseits begrenzen sie den Schaden der
Kollusionen bezüglich der Klassifikationsgenauigkeit. Andererseits vermindern sie den
Vorteil, den die Angreifer aus der Kollusionsattacke ziehen können und machen somit die
Attacke unattraktiv. Schließlich zeigen wir, dass der adaptive Algorithmus die optimale
Anzahl von Goldobjekten für jede Kombination aus Goldstrategie und Simulationsszenario
mit hoher Genauigkeit findet.
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Die Bewertung der Bewerter – Autoren Bewerten Wissenschaftliche Gutachten
Die wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft ist der wahrscheinlich am längsten währende Einsatz-
bereich für Peer Production. Zur Qualitätssicherung benutzen die meisten wissenschaftli-
chen Disziplinen das Verfahren der Begutachtungen durch Gleichgestellte: Peer Review.
Das Verfassen eines Gutachtens für einen wissenschaftlichen Artikel erfordert einen hohen
zeitlichen und kognitiven Aufwand seitens des Gutachters. Die Anreize für das Verfassen
von qualitativ hochwertigen Gutachten sind vergleichsweise niedrig. Das liegt vor allem
daran, dass Gutachter in der Regel unentgeltlich arbeiten und zudem meist anonym
bleiben. Obwohl die meisten Gutachten durchaus von hoher Qualität sind, gibt es auch
einen nicht zu vernachlässigenden Anteil von Gutachten minderer Qualität. Dies zeigen
z.B. die zahlreichen Diskussionen über die Vor- und Nachteile des Peer-Review-Systems
in den Fachpublikationen verschiedener Disziplinen.
Wir meinen, dass die Autorenbewertungen von Gutachten potentiell den Peer-Review-
Prozess verbessern können. Sie könnten etwa dazu dienen, qualitativ hochwertige Gut-
achten zu identifizieren und die entsprechenden Gutachter dafür zu belohnen. Jedoch
sind die Kriterien für eine adäquate bewertungsbasierte Belohnung nicht offensichtlich.
Zum Beispiel ist anzunehmen, dass die Entscheidung über die Annahme bzw. Ablehnung
eines Artikels zur Publikation einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Bewertung durch
die Autoren hat. Daher sind direkt auf Autorenbewertungen basierende Belohnungen für
Gutachter höchstwahrscheinlich nicht objektiv.
Um empirische Erkenntnisse über die Wahrnehmung von Autoren zu Gutachten zu
gewinnen, haben wir eine Studie mit den Autoren einer Informatik Fachkonferenz durch-
geführt. Das Hauptziel der Studie war die Identifizierung von Kriterien zur Erkennung
qualitativ hochwertiger Gutachten. Um dies zu erreichen, haben wir Bewertungen für
Gutachten in den Peer-Review-Prozess der Konferenz integriert. Autoren konnten dazu die
Gutachten, die sie für ihre Artikel erhalten hatten, anhand einer Vielzahl von Kriterien
bewerten. Die Kriterien beinhalteten unter anderem die Nützlichkeit der Gutachter-
kommentare für die weitere Arbeit der Autoren oder den Aufwand, den der Gutachter
investiert zu haben schien. Außerdem konnten Autoren direkt die Noten (‘Originalität’,
‘Technischer Beitrag’ etc.) bewerten, die ihnen die Gutachter gegeben hatten. Auf Basis
der Studie haben wir eine umfangreiche Analyse durchgeführt.
Die Ergebnisse der Studie sind wie folgt: Interessanterweise bewerten Autoren die Noten
der Gutachten überwiegend als adäquat (zur Verfügung standen ‘zu niedrig’, ‘adäquat’,
‘zu hoch’). Wenig überraschend favorisieren Autoren Gutachten, die ihnen gute Noten
zuteilen. Dabei beeinflussen die Einzelnoten der Gutachter die Bewertungen der Autoren
jedoch in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß. Ferner bewerten Autoren Gutachten dann gut,
wenn sie diese als hilfreich für ihre weitere Arbeit einschätzen, wenn sie die Kommentare
gerechtfertigt finden und wenn sie den Eindruck haben, dass sich der Gutachter Mühe
beim Verfassen des Reviews gegeben hat. Interessanterweise bleiben diese Zusammenhänge
auch dann bestehen, wenn man den Einfluss der Gesamtnote des Gutachtens statistisch
ausschließt. Die Entscheidung über Annahme bzw. Ablehnung eines Artikels sowie die
Selbsteinschätzung der Kompetenz des Gutachters haben nur einen geringen Einfluss
auf die Bewertungen der Autoren. Ausgehend von diesen Ergebnissen diskutieren wir
vi
mögliche Ansätze zur Berechnung von Belohnungen für Gutachten.
Fazit
In dieser Dissertation haben wir die Fragen der Qualitätssicherung und der Motivati-
onssteigerung in Peer Production untersucht. Wir konnten mit Hilfe von umfangreichen
Feldexperimenten die Wirksamkeit der anreizbasierten Bewertungsmechanismen für die
Erstellung strukturierten Wissens nachweisen. Unsere eigens entwickelte Anwendung
Consensus Builder erwies sich in den empirischen Studien als sehr gut geeignet zur
Erstellung strukturierten Wissens durch virtuelle Gemeinschaften. Außerdem haben wir
auf Bewertungen basierende Goldstrategien entwickelt, mit deren Hilfe sich die Klassifi-
kationsgenauigkeit des Dawid-Skene-Algorithmus’ verbessern lässt. Dadurch lässt sich
die Qualität der Klassifikation von Beiträgen in Peer-Production-Umgebungen wesentlich
steigern, die durch einen hohen Anteil von Spammern und voreingenommenen Peers
gekennzeichnet sind. Die den Nettonutzen maximierende Anzahl von Goldobjekten pro
Strategie wird dabei mit hoher Genauigkeit durch den von uns vorgeschlagenen adaptiven
Algorithmus gefunden. Des Weiteren bieten die Goldstrategien einen wirksamen Schutz
gegen Kollusionsattacken. Schließlich haben wir umfangreiche empirische Ergebnisse
darüber gewonnen, wie Autoren die Qualität von Gutachten im wissenschaftlichen Peer-
Review-Prozess bewerten. Diese Ergebnisse haben wir genutzt, um mögliche Ansätze
zur Berechnung von Belohnungen für Gutachten zu diskutieren. Einer dieser Ansätze
vermag es, den verzerrenden Einfluss der Gutachternoten auf die Bewertungen größtenteils
aufzuheben. Dies könnte in Zukunft einen Beitrag leisten, die Qualität von wissenschaft-
lichem Peer Review zu verbessern. Zusammenfassend zeigt diese Dissertation, wie der
Einsatz von Bewertungsmechanismen und darauf aufbauenden Anreizmechanismen so-
wohl die Qualität als auch die Quantität von Beiträgen in Peer-Production-Umgebungen
maßgeblich steigern kann.
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1. Introduction
Peer (noun): a person of the
same age, status, or ability as
another specified person.
(Oxford English Dictionary)
The collaborative creation of knowledge artifacts has become a ubiquitous phenomenon.
Wikipedia and Linux are perhaps the best-known examples for knowledge artifacts created
collaboratively by a huge number of peers. Further well-known examples include the
news aggregator Slashdot, the movie database IMDB, the question and answer forum
Stackoverflow, the open learning community Peer to Peer University, and the digitization
of cultural works by Project Gutenberg. These projects use a mode of production known
as peer production [Ben02, Ben06]. Peer production refers to a decentralized production
process where individual contributors work on a common project without a hierarchical
organization. The peer-production model has the advantages that it is both scalable
when adding further users and robust because individual users can be replaced.
However, when a community of peers, instead of an organization with a coordinating
authority, creates and maintains knowledge artifacts, two questions arise: (1) How
to motivate the peer-production workers? For example, many online communities
suffer from under-contribution [BLW+04], i.e., only a minority contributes. In many
peer-production communities, the number of contributions per member is Power-law
distributed [Wil08, PHT09, MMM+11, Gil13]. In other words, a minority of ‘power
users’ does the lion’s share of the work – the vast majority of users free rides. This is
bothersome in particular for communities with few members, e.g., online communities
within corporations. Because of their small size, these communities need a high proportion
of active contributors to reach a critical mass [BPSW10, RMJ10, SW14]. In contrast to
large communities, they cannot easily tolerate a large proportion of free riders. (2) How
to ensure and assess quality? The absence of a coordinator must not compromise the
quality of the created knowledge.
In this dissertation, we investigate these questions within different settings of peer
production:
(i) Peer Production of Structured Knowledge. Our main focus is the collabora-
tive creation of structured knowledge, e.g., in the form of ontologies. We study how
peer ratings can ensure the quality of the knowledge created: peers review each
others’ contributions and rate them according to the quality they perceive. Further,
we analyze how incentive mechanisms based on the peer ratings can motivate the
peer-production workers in this setting.
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(ii) Accuracy of Classification Schemes for Peer-Rating Online Communities.
We investigate a setting, where a community uses the peer ratings to classify
contributions (in addition to using them for quality assurance and assessment). In
particular, we study how to increase the classification accuracy in the presence of
low-competence raters.
(iii) Reviewing the Reviewers – Author Perception of Scientific Peer Reviews.
We investigate a mechanism for quality assurance in the sciences: peer review.
Specifically, we analyze how authors rate the peer reviews they have received, and
how the authors’ ratings, in turn, can be used to increase the quality of the reviews.
In the following, we motivate the specific research questions of each setting in greater
detail. At the same time, we discuss the contributions of this dissertation.
1.1. Peer Production of Structured Knowledge
We envision the following scenario. An online community collaboratively creates struc-
tured knowledge for a given domain. (We use the term structured knowledge as referring
to any kind of interrelated, conceptualized information, ranging from a set of terms
with informal relationships, like a hierarchy of tags, to a fully axiomatized ontology;
cf. [NCA08].) For example, think of a project whose participants are geographically
distributed, and who all contribute to a common knowledge base. Members of the online
community review contributions created by the other members and rate the contributions
according to the quality perceived. To motivate the individual members to contribute,
we reward them with points corresponding to the quantity and the quality of their
contributions. We compute the quality of a contribution based on the ratings it has
received. Members can later convert the gathered points into external rewards. This
could be gift coupons as with Epinions, or system privileges as with Slashdot.
Since we use ratings to compute the quality of contributions, the ratings themselves
have to be of high quality as well. To gain high-quality ratings, honest rating mechanisms
(HRMs) have been proposed [Pre04, MRZ05, JF06]. An HRM rewards subjective truth-
fulness in settings where no objective truth criterion is available. However, empirical
studies on HRMs are rare. In particular, HRMs have not been studied in the context of
collaborative knowledge creation, to the best of our knowledge.
Based on the above scenario, we study the following research questions regarding the
creation of structured knowledge.
1. Are ratings a reliable measure of the quality of contributions?
2. How do rating-dependent remunerations for contributions affect the quality and
the quantity of contributions?
3. Does an HRM induce ratings of higher quality compared to a fixed reward per
rating?
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To answer these questions, we have developed a platform for the collaborative creation
of structured knowledge called Consensus Builder. It features fine-grained rating and
incentive mechanisms, in particular an HRM. Based on the research questions above, we
formulate a number of hypotheses and test them in a series of controlled field experiments
in six different online communities. We control the experiments to be able to gain insights
into causal effects of the tested mechanisms. Observational studies cannot achieve this.
The experimental setups are close to the real-world scenario envisioned. In particular,
participants in the experiments have used Consensus Builder from home or from their
workplace to create structured knowledge.
1.1.1. Contributions
We make the following contributions regarding the peer production of structured knowl-
edge:
• We have developed a platform for the collaborative creation of structured knowledge.
It provides functionality to browse the knowledge base and to add or manipulate
data items. Further, it features the rating-based incentive mechanisms discussed
above.
• We discuss how mechanisms that reward the quantity and the quality of contribu-
tions, as well as the quality of ratings, can be applied to the creation of structured
knowledge.
• To answer our research questions above, we formulate five hypotheses and we design
controlled experiments to test them.
• Based on our platform, we have conducted extensive empirical studies to test the
reward mechanisms w.r.t. the creation of structured knowledge. In these studies, we
test our hypotheses in a variety of settings that are close to real-world environments,
and with participants of different backgrounds.
• We show that the usage of rating mechanisms, and the usage of fully rating-
dependent rewards for good contributions, increase the quality of contributions.
Further, we show that an honest rating mechanism improves the quality of ratings.
1.2. On the Accuracy of Classification Schemes for
Contributions in Peer-Rating Online Communities
Many online communities must classify their contributions, i.e., decide to which class
of a set of predefined classes a contribution belongs. As an example, consider an online
community that creates an ontology. In addition to contributing entries to the ontology,
the community must classify the entries. That is, it must decide, e.g., if a given entry is
a class or an instance, or if a name of an item within the ontology is correct or not. As
input for the decision, the members of the community rate each others’ contributions.
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Ratings in this scenario correspond to the possible classes of an entry. E.g., ratings could
have values “class/instance” if the community must decide if an item is a class or an
instance in the ontology. Or, “correct/incorrect” if the community must decide about the
correctness of an entry. After the ratings have been submitted, the community classifies
the contributions by aggregating the contributions’ ratings.
One simple scheme for rating aggregation is the well-known majority vote, i.e., the
decision for the class that receives the majority of the ratings in its favor. Despite its
simplicity, majority vote can achieve a decently high accuracy but only if the quality of
ratings is sufficiently high. Aggregating ratings by means of weighted majority vote can
increase the classification accuracy compared to majority vote, provided that weighted
majority vote knows the individual competence of each rater, i.e., his/her probability
of rating correctly. Intuitively, weighted majority vote assigns a higher weight to high-
competence raters than to low-competence raters. Yet, rater competencies are unknown
in general.
For this case of unknown competencies, Dawid and Skene proposed an expectation-
maximization algorithm [DS79] to estimate the competencies of the raters and to classify
the contributions accordingly. In the following, we refer to this algorithm as the Dawid-
Skene algorithm (DSA). DSA has originally been developed to combine opinions of
multiple physicians for medical diagnosis. With over 450 citations, DSA is one of the
most widely-cited algorithms for classifying items based on ratings by raters with unknown
competencies. In recent years, there have been a lot of proposals to use DSA – and
algorithms based on or closely related to DSA – in particular for crowdsourcing settings
[WRW+09, WIP11, RY12, WIP].
However, DSA has two major shortcomings: (1) It performs rather poorly if the mean
competence of the community is low, in particular if it is less than random. Such a low
mean competence can occur if the topic of the community is inherently difficult, or if
the community is aﬄicted by a large fraction of spammers, malicious or biased raters.
(2) It is vulnerable to collusion attacks. In a collusion attack, raters coordinate to rate
the same data objects with the same value. A collusion is beneficial for raters if they
are remunerated based on the estimated quality of their ratings. It allows colluders to
artificially increase their remuneration while saving the cognitive effort for determining
the truthful values of the contributions they rate. Further, since DSA assigns an inflated
weight to the ratings of colluders, a collusion can severely damage the accuracy of DSA.
To overcome these two shortcomings, we propose gold strategies. Gold strategies utilize
the notion of gold objects, i.e., contributions that DSA knows the true class of. Knowing
the true class of a contribution with certainty allows DSA to estimate more accurately the
competence of the raters who gave ratings to this contribution. This in turn, increases the
accuracy of the estimates for non-gold objects. The existing approach simply selects gold
objects randomly. However, this does not suffice to increase the accuracy of DSA much.
In contrast to the existing approach, the gold strategies we propose select contributions
based on the ratings the contributions have received. Specifically, they select contributions
based on the level of agreement between raters, i.e., to what extent members of the
community agree on the class of a given contribution. Trusted experts rate the selected
contributions which turns these contributions into gold objects. However, trusted experts
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and thus gold objects are costly. Consequently, our goal is to use the number of gold
objects that maximizes the net benefit, i.e., the benefit of gold objects minus their costs.
Determining that number a priori is infeasible. We propose an algorithm that adaptively
determines the number of gold objects based on runtime information.
1.2.1. Contributions
We make the following contributions for classification schemes in peer-production settings:
• We analyze properties of majority vote, weighted majority vote, and DSA under
varying assumptions, for example w.r.t. the competence distribution of the raters,
or the distribution of the ratings in different settings.
• A common approach in the literature to differentiate between high- and low-quality
raters is to evaluate their ratings by means of a set of randomly selected gold
objects. In contrast, we propose gold strategies (i.e., selecting contributions based
on specific criteria for evaluation by expert raters) that use the level of agreement
between the ratings of the community as a selection criterion. We evaluate the
effectiveness of the gold strategies in various settings by means of simulation. We
show that, in low-competence settings, selecting contributions based on the level of
agreement is vastly superior to the existing approaches that use randomly selected
gold objects.
• We propose an adaptive algorithm that determines the number of gold objects in
order to maximize the net benefit. Instead of fixing a predetermined number of
gold objects, the adaptive algorithm adds gold objects iteratively and automatically
decides when to stop adding further gold objects based on runtime information. We
show that the adaptive algorithm determines the optimal number of gold objects
for each gold strategy and each setting with high accuracy.
• We study the effects of collusion attacks against DSA. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to do so. We show that gold strategies based on the level of
agreement are highly effective for countering collusion attacks.
Our results are somewhat orthogonal to DSA. In principle, they are applicable to
methods related to DSA [IPW10, WRW+09, RY12] as well.
1.3. Reviewing the Reviewers – Author Perception of Scientific
Peer Reviews
Science is one of the most long-standing models of peer production [Hay09]. Most
scientific communities use peer review as their de facto standard for quality assurance.
Reviewing a scientific paper includes grasping its content, deciding on appropriate scores,
and formulating valuable comments. This requires considerable intellectual effort and
time. However, the incentive to write high-quality reviews tends to be somewhat low. A
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possible reason for this is that reviewers remain anonymous to the authors and to the
scientific community. Most reviewers do provide high-quality reviews. At the same time,
the ratio of reviews of lower quality is non-negligible, at least according to the perception
of authors. Various discussions regarding the pros and cons of peer reviewing in various
scientific communities show this [CKG02, Nat06a, BBC+07].
We believe that feedback given by authors has potential to improve the review process.
In particular, we deem review ratings a promising means for identifying high-quality
reviews and for remunerating reviewers.1 However, the specifics of a remuneration based
on review ratings are not obvious. For instance, we must assume that accept/reject
decisions influence the perception of authors. Therefore, rewarding reviews directly based
on the ratings they receive from authors is unlikely to be objective. To illustrate: A
review of a rejected paper is likely to obtain low ratings. Had the same paper been
accepted, on the other hand, the review would presumably receive higher ratings, should
that assumption hold.
To gain empirical insights into authors’ perception of reviews, we have conducted a
study with authors of a peer reviewed computer science conference. The main objective
of the study was to determine which criteria are potentially useful to identify high-quality
reviews and thus to determine an adequate basis for reviewer remuneration. To this end,
we incorporated review ratings into the review process. Authors could assess each review
they had received according to a broad selection of criteria, such as helpfulness of review
comments, or the perceived effort of the reviewer to understand the paper.
1.3.1. Contributions
We make the following contributions regarding the peer production of peer reviews:
• We carry out a detailed analysis of author perception of peer reviews. Among
others, we address the following questions: How strongly do the characteristics of
the review, in particular the review scores, as well as the accept/reject decision,
affect author ratings? Which of the different aspects of the review influence the
authors’ perception of the overall review quality most?
• We investigate how to remunerate peer reviewers based on author ratings. To our
knowledge, we are the first to do so. We discuss a suitable metric to remunerate
reviewers that neutralizes possible effects of the review process, e.g., the effects of
the accept/reject decision, on author ratings.
1.4. Outline
This dissertation is structured as follows: We start by discussing the preliminaries that
are required to understand the following investigations in Chapter 2. The preliminaries
include a discussion of motivations for peer production in general and for motivation in
1 The remuneration could, for example, be in the form of ‘best reviewer’ awards.
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online communities in particular. Further, we discuss honest rating mechanisms as well
as structured knowledge, ontologies in particular.
Next, we study the peer production of structured knowledge in Chapter 3. This
includes the presentation of our tool Consensus Builder, as well as the discussion of our
experiments, their results, and the lessons learned.
In Chapter 4, we investigate classification schemes for contributions in peer-rating
online communities. Starting with a discussion of the properties of different classification
schemes, we propose gold strategies. We evaluate the effectiveness of gold strategies for
increasing the classification accuracy in low-competence communities, and for countering
collusion attacks.
Chapter 5 introduces our study on author perception of peer reviews in computer
science. It discusses the setup and the results of the study. Utilizing the study results,
we discuss a remuneration function for reviewers based on author ratings.
Chapter 6 concludes.
1.5. Bibliographic Note
Portions of this dissertation have been published in [HKB08, KB14] (collaborative creation
of structured knowledge), in [KB06, KB15] (classification schemes for contributions in
peer-rating online communities), and in [KBY10] (author perception on peer review).
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2. Preliminaries
This chapter introduces topics that are necessary to understand the rest of this work. This
includes (i) a discussion of under-contribution and motivation in peer-production settings,
(ii) an introduction to honest rating mechanisms, and (iii) a discussion of structured
knowledge, in particular of ontologies.
2.1. Under-Contribution and Motivation in Peer Production
We discuss the literature on under-contribution and motivation in peer production. This
includes an introduction to the various psychological models for explaining motivation.
In particular, we analyze the literature to answer the following questions:
• How pervasive is under-contribution in peer-production communities?
• What are the different types of motivation and how do they affect peer production?
• What motivates people to contribute to peer-production artifacts, in particular in
open-source software development, and in online communities?
2.1.1. Under-Contribution
Many peer-production communities suffer from under-contribution (also called under-
provision), that is, only a minority contributes. The vast majority of users, on the other
hands, free rides [BLW+04, Wil08, PHT09, MMM+11, PCL+07, Gil13]. For example,
in February 2012, Wikipedia had 476 million unique visitors but only 85,163 active
editors with more than five edits [Zac12]. In other words, about 0.02% of the users where
active contributors. Moreover, the number of contributions per active participant in
most peer-production communities follows a Power-law distribution: a tiny fraction of
very active ‘power users’ creates the vast majority of contributions. For instance, among
Wikipedia editors, the top 0.1% contribute nearly half of the value (44%) as measured in
number of words viewed by users [PCL+07]. Similarly, 10% of the top contributors to
open-source software account for 72% of the total codebase [GP00].
According to Kraut and Resnick, under-contribution can be a problem even in highly
successful communities, like Wikipedia. For example, a quality assessment conducted by
Wikipedia in 2010 found that out of roughly 900,000 articles evaluated on the English
Wikipedia, two-thirds were stubs, i.e., articles “containing only a few sentences of text
which is too short to provide encyclopedic coverage of a subject” [KR12]. Wilkinson and
Huberman [WH07] find that article edits on Wikipedia follow a log-normal distribution.
That means that a small number of articles that cover highly relevant or visible topics
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attract a disproportionately high number of edit operations whereas a large number of
articles receive very little edits. Similarly, Gilbert finds “widespread under-provision”
[Gil13] of votes on the social-news site Reddit. Roughly half of all valuable content is
overlooked on its first submission to the site.
Under-contribution is even more damaging to smaller communities. To reach a critical
mass [BPSW10, RMJ10, SW14], i.e., to be sustainable in the long run, small communities
need a higher proportion of active contributors and/or a higher number of contributions
per member than large communities.
Models to Explain Under-Contribution
Several theoretical models try to explain why under-contribution is so wide-spread in peer
production. For example, economic theory predicts that voluntary contributions in peer
production will be under-provided because they are public goods [Ols65]. That is, once
they are available, everyone can benefit from them without incurring costs. Since peers
contribute voluntarily, they gain no monetary benefit from contributing. This makes
free riding, i.e., consuming without contributing, the rational choice. So, there arises a
social dilemma, where everyone would be better of if everyone contributed something,
but there is a strong temptation to free ride on others contributions [KKRK12]. However,
not everyone free rides all the time. In fact, as experience and many experiments show,
many people contribute to public goods on a regular basis [Cap13].
Another theoretical model to explain under-contribution is social loafing. Social loafing
refers to the tendency of individuals to expend less effort when working in a group
than when working individually. For example, social loafers (also called lurkers in the
context of online communities) follow the content of online communities, but choose not
to contribute. Karau and Williams [KW93] integrate various theories about social loafing
into their collective effort model to explain what motivates people to contribute to groups.
Like most economic models, the collective effort model assumes that individuals try to
maximize the expected utility of their actions. The model assumes that individuals will
contribute to a collective task only to some extent. The exact extend depends on how
much they expect their effort to translate into a valuable outcome. The motivation of an
individual to contribute to a collective task depends on how strongly he/she perceives
the relationship (a) between individual performance and group performance, (b) between
group performance and group outcomes, and (c) between group outcomes and individual
outcomes.
Because under-contribution is such a widespread phenomenon, there has been a great
interest in investigating motivation for peer production in general, and user motivation
in online communities in particular, as we will see in the following.
2.1.2. Types of Motivation
In general, the psychological literature, as well as the literature on motivation in peer
production, distinguishes between two broad categories of motivation – intrinsic and
extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is “based in the innate, organismic needs for competence
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and self-determination” [DR85, p. 32]. Intrinsic motivation makes an activity interesting
and enjoyable. Further, it makes an activity likely to be performed for its own sake as
opposed to as a means to an end [DR85]. In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to
the performance of an activity in order to achieve an outcome. Extrinsic motivation
stems from an external source. This could be rewards like money, status, or grades, or
other external regulations, like threats of punishment [DR85, KR12]. For example, some
people might slay monsters in the multi-player online game World of Warcraft because
they enjoy the task itself (intrinsic motivation). Others might do so because they are
motivated by the status gained (extrinsic motivation) from achieving a high level in the
game [KR12].
Some authors further distinguish between strictly intrinsic motivation, strictly extrinsic
motivation, and internalized extrinsic motivation [DR00]. The latter is realized when
people assimilate formerly extrinsic motives such that they become personally endorsed
values that are integrated into the sense of self [DR00]. For example, people might start
exercising to attain some outcome like fitness or weight loss, but might later internalize
the importance of exercising as their own value and thus exercise more volitionally.
We note that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is not undisputed.
For example, Reiss [Rei04] questions the distinction. Instead, he identifies 16 basic desires
or motives such as power (desire to influence), curiosity (desire for knowledge), status
(desire for social standing and attention), the desire for social contact, or the desire to
eat. His theory states that the satiation of each of the basic desires produces an intrinsic
feeling of joy. Further, he emphasizes individual differences in the expression of these
desires. For example, some people have more desire for social contact than others.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation for Peer Production
Kraut and Resnick [KR12] discuss how to use both types of motivation to encourage
participation in online communities: Intrinsic motivation in online communities and other
peer-production settings can be increased for example by combining contribution with
social interaction. For open-source software projects, this can be achieved, for example,
by holding conferences. In online communities, (virtual) social contact is often provided
in form of discussion forums, comment features, or other social features of the respective
community platform. Further, community designers can enhance intrinsic motivation by
providing clear goals and feedback, and challenges that are adjusted to people’s skills.
Online communities enhance extrinsic motivation by means of reputation mechanisms,
system privileges, as well as tangible rewards like gift certificates or money. We discuss
particular examples of extrinsic motivation further below.
Does Extrinsic Motivation Undermine Intrinsic Motivation?
Psychologist disagree on the relationship between the two types of motivation. Some argue
that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation both enhance each other. For example, optimal
work performance occurs when jobs are interesting and challenging and employees are
rewarded for their work [PL68, CBP01]. Others state that extrinsic rewards undermine
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(or crowd out) intrinsic motivation [Dec71]. For example, Lepper et al. [LGN73] assigned
children that liked drawing to three experimental groups and let them draw pictures.
In a first session, the first group received an expected (previously announced) reward
for the drawings, the second group received an unexpected reward, and the third group
received no reward at all. In a second drawing session, now unrewarded for all, children
of the first group chose to draw less than children of the other two groups.
Further, different meta-analyses come to different conclusions whether tangible external
rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation or not (see for example [PM13] for an overview).
[CP02, CBP01] try to resolve the controversy. They argue that extrinsic rewards increase
intrinsic motivation and performance on tasks that are of low initial interest. For high
interest tasks, rewards have positive effects on motivation when they are intangible (e.g.,
in the form of verbal praise) or unexpected. Expected, tangible rewards do not affect
high initial intrinsic motivation negatively when they are given for achieving predefined
performance levels (e.g., scores) or when they are given for exceeding peers. On the
other hand, tangible rewards given independently of performance, e.g., for a number of
completed units, can decrease intrinsic motivation. Kraut and Resnick [KR12] discuss
these findings w.r.t. online communities. They formulate the design claim that “adding
a task-contingent reward (for doing or finishing a task, regardless of performance) to
an already interesting task will cause people to be less interested in the task and to
perform it less often. The effect will be larger for monetary rewards than for prizes,
status rewards, and charitable donations”.
Does the crowding-out effect matter in peer-production settings? The crowding-out
effect of extrinsic on intrinsic motivation seems limited in existing peer-production settings.
Moreover, external rewards seem to have rather positive effects in most peer-production
settings. For instance, Lakhani et al. as well as Roberts et al. investigate motivations
to contribute to open-source software projects. Contrary to their expectation, they find
no evidence of extrinsic motivations crowding out intrinsic motivations [RHS06, LW05].
In many online communities, external rewards in form of reputation, status, or karma
points seem to be an essential ingredient to stimulate contributions [MMM+11, LR04].
For example, Farzan et al. [FDM+08] could substantially increase contributions in an
online community employed within a corporation by introducing an incentive mechanism
based on reputation points. Harper et al. study question-and-answer sites and find that
paying more money for an answer leads to longer, better answers [HRRK08]. Thus, even
though under certain conditions, extrinsic rewards might undermine intrinsic motivation,
in general, extrinsic rewards seem to have no negative effects in peer-production settings.
Finally, even if extrinsic motivation does crowd out intrinsic motivation, designers of
online communities are usually much more concerned with the overall combined effect of
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation [KR12]. In that sense, the crowding-out effect does not
seem to matter much.
12
2.1. Under-Contribution and Motivation in Peer Production
2.1.3. Motivation to Contribute to Open-Source Software
Lakhani and Wolf [LW05] find that open-source software contributors are motivated by a
combination of various intrinsic and extrinsic factors. As mentioned above, they find that
neither of the investigated factors dominates or crowds out the others. The most important
intrinsic factors are a sense of creativity and the feeling of an obligation/connection
towards the group. About 40 percent of the open-source contributors are paid by the
respective employers to participate.
Similarly, Roberts et al. [RHS06] find that contributors to open-source software projects
have multiple motivations. They differentiate between strictly extrinsic motivation in form
of payment, internalized extrinsic motivation (contributing to solve a problem of personal
use or benefit, or to enhance status and career opportunities), and strictly intrinsic
motivation (activities that satisfy the need for competence, control, autonomy, and
enjoyment). They find no evidence of extrinsic motivations crowding out strictly intrinsic
motivations. Further, they find that monetary compensation and status motivation
lead to above-average participation levels, while strictly intrinsic motivation does not.
They speculate that intrinsic motivation may not be associated with better performance
because aspects that make an activity interesting might come at the expense of attention
towards the overall outcome. For example, contributors might work at perfecting a minor
feature while loosing sight of the overall goal.
2.1.4. Motivation in Online Communities
Wikipedia
Nov studies the question “What motivates Wikipedians?” per questionnaire [Nov07]. His
main findings are that contributors to Wikipedia report to be primarily motivated by
fun (example questionnaire item: “Writing/editing in Wikipedia is fun.”) and ideology
(example questionnaire item: “I think information should be free.”). Interestingly, while
fun is moderately correlated with contribution level, ideology is not. The author offers
the explanation that opinions about ideology might be strong but do not translate into
actual behavior, exhibiting a case of “talk is cheap”. Similarly, Yang and Lai [YL10]
find that intrinsic motivation and internal concept-based motivation (“I consider myself
a self-motivated person who likes to share knowledge”) have the greatest impact on
contributions to Wikipedia, while extrinsic motivation (status within the community and
respect from others) plays only a minor role.
Kittur et al. [KPK09] investigate the conflict between two different kinds of motivation
for peer production. On the one hand, the authors argue that users self-select tasks that
“scratch their personal itch”. On the other hand, peer-production communities often
require a significant amount of maintenance work that individual members do not find
rewarding. Their hypothesis, why this kind of group work still gets done, is that the
strong identification of individual peers with their subgroups influences these peers to do
more group-related work. They test the hypothesis based on log files of WikiProjects. A
WikiProject is a group of editors who team up to improve Wikipedia usually focusing
on a particular domain. Upon joining a WikiProject, editors are more likely to work on
13
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project-related content. Further, editors shift their contributions towards coordination
and maintenance work rather than production work. This suggests, that group influence
can play an important role even in presumably self-directed peer-production systems.
Panciera et al. argue that Wikipedians, more specifically, ‘power editors’ who made
at least 250 edits, “are born not made” [PHT09]. That is, they differ systematically
from the less active majority of editors in the following categories: their initial activity
level is higher and stays higher than that of other editors, they invoke community norms
more often, and they produce edits of higher quality, and thus can be considered the
“essential core” of the community. In contrast, Solomon and Walsh [SW14] investigate
WikiProjects and find that the participation of power users in early stages of the projects
is less valuable to sustainability than the collective contributions of less active majority
of editors.
Finally, Halfaker et al. investigate reasons for the steady decline of the number of
Wikipedia editors since 2007 [HGMR13]. They show that the usage of algorithmic tools
for quality control that automatically reject contributions is responsible for the decline,
since it acts as a demotivator that is driving away newcomers. Further, they find that
Wikipedia’s formal mechanisms for defining group norms and rules have calcified against
changes, in particular those changes proposed by newcomers.
Online Communities Using Extrinsic Motivation
Other communities rely more strongly on extrinsic forms of reward than Wikipedia. For
example, the technology related news-aggregator Slashdot (“News for nerds, stuff that
matters.”) rewards users with karma points [LR04]. Users can post news stories and
related comments. To avoid information overload and to filter bad comments, Slashdot
employs a distributed moderation system. Moderators, i.e., users above a certain karma
threshold, can rate the quality of comments with scores from -1 to +5. Users receive
karma points for different activities such as moderating comments or posting comments
that receive high scores. To remove bad moderators, Slashdot employs a meta-moderation
system where meta-moderators can rate ratings as either fair or unfair. Thus, karma
points stimulate extrinsic motivation both by the privileges they grant and because they
are a status signal to the community. A similar system is employed by other social-news
sites such as Reddit [Gil13] or Hacker News [Hac14].
The question & answer site Stack Overflow [MMM+11] relies heavily on a moderation
system as well: participants can vote questions and answers of others up and down
and suggest to close inappropriate questions. To motivate users, Stack Overflow utilizes
several “highly effective” [MMM+11] extrinsic factors: The points gathered for upvoted
comments and questions serve as reputation and are also converted to system privileges.
Further, the site awards badges for participation such as ‘Enthusiast’ (‘Visited the site
each day for 30 consecutive days.’) or ‘Autobiographer’ (‘Completed all user profile
fields’) [Sta14]. Moreover, public profiles demonstrate a user’s expert knowledge to the
community of peers or potential employers.
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Social Science Theories for Motivation in Online Communities
The GroupLens research group [Gro14] built their own community for movie recom-
mendations called MovieLens [CLA+03]. Within this community, they have conducted
various studies. To investigate how to motivate users, they have primarily deployed
theories from social science.
For example, Beenen et al. [BLW+04] utilize the collective effort model (see above) as
well as goal-setting theory [LL02] to stimulate contributions to the MovieLens community.
They test a number of hypotheses that are based on predictions from the theoretical
models. They find that users contribute more when they are reminded of the uniqueness
of their contributions and when they are given specific and challenging goals. However,
other predictions from the social science theories did not materialize. For example,
individual goals (“rate 8 movies”) were not more motivating than group goals (“rate 80
movies in a group of ten”). Further, contrary to what the collective effort model predicts,
MovieLens users will not rate more movies when (i) the personal benefit they receive
from doing so or (ii) the benefit they provide to the community is made salient.
Similarly, Rashid et al. [RLT+06] utilize the collective effort model to fix the problem
of under-contribution in MovieLens. They find that displaying messages in the user
interface reminding users of the unique value of their contributions increases contribution
quantity.
Cosley et al. [CFK+05] also deploy the collective effort model to study user motivation.
Specifically, they investigate how a peer’s contributions are affected by being overseen by
other peers. To test this, they let users of the MovieLens community check data entered
by other users via online forms. They find that being overseen has no affect on initial
quality, i.e., on the quality of data when first entered by the users. However, the final
quality, i.e., the quality of the movie data after peers have checked it, was improved by
the checking. They find no difference between peer and expert oversight.
Lampe et al. [LWVO10] find that users continue to participate in an online community
for different reasons than those that led them to the site originally. Additionally, they
find that a sense of belonging was important to registered as well as to anonymous users.
Under-Contribution of Ratings
Ratings are a form of contribution. Therefore, they tend to suffer from under-contribution
as well. For example, [Gil13] finds widespread under-provision of ratings on Reddit.
Despite sharing the characteristic of under-contribution with contributions in general,
there also seem to exist unique intrinsic motivations for contributing ratings. For example,
ratings in online forums usually follow a bimodal, u-shaped distribution, with most of the
ratings being either very good or very bad [HPZ06, AP00]. Hu et al. [HPZ06] propose a
‘brag-and-moan’ model to explain the distributions. The model assumes that consumers
only choose to rate when they are either very satisfied with the purchased products
(brag), or very dissatisfied (moan).
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2.1.5. Discussion
The works discussed above can provide design recommendations to increase motivation
within online communities. However, even though there exists a large body of literature
on motivation in peer production, the problem of under-contribution remains [Gil13].
Further, we are not aware of publications that experimentally test extrinsic incentives to
rate the quality of contributions. Moreover, motivation to contribute might differ between
successful communities such as Wikipedia or fun-based communities like MovieLens on
the one hand, and communities for the creation of structured knowledge on the other
hand. In Section 3.1.2 we discuss related work directly concerned with motivation for
the collaborative creation of structured knowledge.
2.2. Honest Rating Mechanisms
The idea behind honest rating mechanisms (HRMs) is to elicit honest ratings in the
absence of an objective truth criterion. Possible application scenarios of HRMs include
online product ratings (“How do you assess the quality of the digital camera x?”),
polls of expert judgments (“What is the probability of global warming to occur?”),
psychological surveys (“Do you prefer red or white wine?”), or ratings that assess the
quality of contributions in online communities (“Is the user comment of high quality?”).
In these scenarios, explicit rewards can improve the quality of responses by encouraging
a respondent to take the time to evaluate the question/contribution carefully, and to
answer accurately and truthfully. Further, such rewards can potentially mitigate the
under-contribution of ratings. However, appropriate rewards are difficult to determine
because the objective truth is not available. This may be because the questions are
inherently subjective (e.g., wine preference), or because the truthfulness of a response
can only be established at a much later point in time (e.g., the occurrence of global
warming). And simple rewards, for example a fixed remuneration per rating, are unlikely
to yield the desired result. HRMs counter this problem by rewarding answers depending
on the answers made by peers. They compute rewards in such a way that honesty, not
conformity to the majority opinion, is the optimal strategy for respondents. (This does
not exclude the majority opinion from being correct.) They achieve this by exploiting
correlations between opinions of different persons regarding the same question.
2.2.1. The Peer Prediction Mechanism
In the following, we discuss the Peer Prediction mechanism (PP) [MRZ05]. First, we
introduce the basic setting. Then we discuss different approaches for incentive compatible
payments in this setting.
Setting
The peer-prediction method applies to settings where agents receive a noisy signal of
some states of the world. The states of the world could be subjective preferences for
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wine (‘red/white’) or the quality values of a digital camera (‘low/medium/high’ quality),
etc. In the scenario discussed in this dissertation, the agents are the raters and the
relevant states are the quality values of contributions made to a knowledge base, i.e.,
their correctness. In line with the literature, we refer to these states of the world as types.
The PP mechanism assumes that the type t of a given contribution is fixed, i.e., each
contribution has a true quality that does not change over time. The number of types
is finite and from the set of types T , i.e., t ∈ T . For example, a contribution could
have types ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The mechanism assumes that all raters share a common
prior belief regarding the distribution of types p(t). This common prior assumption is a
standard assumption in game theory [SLB09]. The true type is hidden from the rater,
who can only perceive a noisy signal. Let i denote a generic rater from the set of raters
I, with |I| ≥ 3. Each rater i privately receives signal Si from the set S = {s1, . . . , sm} of
possible signals. Think of the signal as the relevant information the rater uses to form
her1 subjective opinion about the quality of the contribution. (In case of the red wine
question above, having a certain preference, e.g. ‘I prefer red wine’, constitutes the signal.
For a setting regarding product ratings, experiencing the product quality constitutes the
signal.) Let P (sj | t) = P (Si = sj | t) be the probability that a rater receives signal sj
when the true type of the product is t. In other words, each type induces a distribution of
signals. The mechanism assumes that different types induce different signal distributions.
E.g., a type ‘low quality’ might induce signals ‘low quality’ with higher probability
than a type ‘high quality’. Conditional on the true type of the contribution, signals are
independent and identically distributed. The mechanisms assume P (· | ·) to be common
knowledge, i.e., everyone knows that everyone knows, etc. [FT91].
The mechanism assumes that raters are rational, i.e., that they update their beliefs
regarding priors in line with Bayesian reasoning. Upon receiving signal sj , a rater updates
her posterior belief that another randomly chosen rater receives signal sk as follows
P (sk | sj) =
∑
t∈T
P (sk | t) · P (t | sj). (2.1)
She obtains the posterior probability of type t given sj (the second factor in the sum of
Equation (2.1)) by applying Bayes’ theorem
P (t | sj) = P (sj | t)p(t)
P (sj)
. (2.2)
The prior signal belief (the denominator in Equation (2.2)) can be calculated from the
conditional signal distribution and the type prior
P (sj) =
∑
t∈T
P (sj | t)p(t). (2.3)
Note that the inventors of the HRM claim, but do not test, that it is not necessary
for users to do the rather complicated computations [MRZ05]. As long as they trust the
mechanism to perform the updating correctly, users will prefer to report honestly.
1We refer to the rater who is scored by the HRM as female.
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Example. For illustration, consider the following example. Assume, there are two
possible types ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ for a contribution that we encode -1 and 1,
respectively, i.e., T = {−1, 1}. Since it is assumed common knowledge, all raters (as
well as the mechanism) know that the prior probability of a contribution to be of type
1 is p(1) = 0.7. Further, assume that there are two possible signals ‘low’ (l) and ‘high’
(h), with conditional signal distributions P (h | −1) = 0.4 and P (h | 1) = 0.8. Therefore,
P (h) = P (h | −1) · P (−1) + P (h | 1) · P (1) = 0.68. Suppose that rater i has received
signal h. In this case, according to Equation (2.1), her belief that another rater i′ receives
a ‘high’ signal is P (Si′ = h | Si = h) = 0.73. Had rater i received a ‘low’ signal instead,
her belief that i′ receives a ‘high’ signal would be P (Si′ = h | Si = l) = 0.58.
This subjective correlation between the signal of a rater and the signals of other raters
is the essential piece of information that Peer Prediction (and other HRMs) exploits to
incentivize truthful responses.
Empirical evidence for Bayesian updating. The assumption that respondents use their
own opinion as evidence for the popularity of this opinion among others has been
replicated in numerous studies, see [MM87] for an overview. For example, a red wine
lover tends to estimate the ratio of people who prefer red over white wine higher than
average. In general, respondents who endorse a certain opinion deem it more popular
than those who do not. In one study, Ross et al. [RGH77] asked students to walk around
the Stanford campus wearing a sandwich board2 reading ‘Repent!’. Students who agreed
to engage in this activity estimated on average that 58.3 percent of all students would
also agree. Students who were not willing to wear the board estimated on average only
29.7 percent would agree to wear it. We could also replicate the Bayesian-updating effect
in our own study on how authors rate peer reviews they have received. Here, the more
unfavorable ratings an author issues, the more he expects others to do the same. Initially,
the literature has regarded this phenomenon as a ‘false consensus effect’, an egoistic bias
to think that other people behave similar to us. Dawes, in particular, was the first to
propose a Bayesian explanation for this phenomenon [Daw89, Daw90].
Incentive Compatible Scoring
After all raters have received the signals (i.e., formed their opinion), the mechanism asks
them to submit ratings according to their signals. Let ri ∈ S denote the rating submitted
by rater i. Which rating i actually submits upon receiving signal sj is determined by
her rating strategy. The rating strategy of rater i is a function σi = (σi(1), . . . , σi(m)) :
Sm → Sm that maps the signals received by i to the signals reported (i.e., her ratings).
That is, i reports rating σi(j) ∈ S whenever she receives signal sj . The honest rating
strategy is σ∗ with σ∗(j) = sj for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i.e., the rater always reports the
truth, that is, her rating equals the signal she received.
The mechanism scores each rater for submitting her rating. The mechanism computes
the score by comparing i’s rating to the rating of another rater, ref (i), called the reference
2A sandwich board consists of two boards that hold a message and are connected by straps by which
they are hung over a person’s shoulders.
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rater of i, with ref (i) 6= i. Let pi(σi(j), σref (i)(k)) be the score/payment received by i
when she announces σi(j) and ref (i) announces σref (i)(k). The expected score ES of
rater i depends on her posterior beliefs given the signal sj she has received, her own
rating strategy σi, and the rating strategy of her reference rater σref (i)
ES(σi, σref (i) | sj) = Esk∈S(pi(σi(j), rref (i)(k)) | sj)
=
∑
sk∈S
P (Sref (i) = sk | Si = sj)(pi(σi(j), rref (i)(k))), (2.4)
where the posterior signal belief P (Sref (i) = sk | Si = sj) that ref (i) receives the signal
sk is computed according to Equation (2.1).
The honest reporting strategy σ∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) [Har67] if and
only if for all signals sj ∈ S and all reporting strategies σ′ 6= σ∗
ES(σ∗, σ∗ | sj) ≥ ES(σ′, σ∗ | sj). (2.5)
That is, if ref (i) reports truthfully, i’s optimal strategy is to report truthfully as well. It
is a strict BNE, if the above inequality is strict. Miller et al. prove that payment schemes
pi(·, ·) which satisfy Equation (2.5) for all raters exist [MRZ05]. The literature refers to
such payment schemes, which make honest reporting a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as
Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. I.e., it is in every rater’s best interest to truthfully
report her signal if all the other raters report truthfully as well.
Payment Schemes of Classical Peer Prediction
The classical Peer Prediction (PP) mechanism [MRZ05] uses proper scoring rules to
induce truthfulness. In the following, we briefly discuss scoring rules in general. Then,
we show how the PP mechanism applies proper scoring rules to construct incentive
compatible payments for ratings.
Proper scoring rules. Scoring rules [Win69, MW70, Sav71, Coo91, GR07] have been
developed to elicit truthful probability predictions about events with publicly verifiable
outcomes. In a nutshell, respondents are asked for the prediction of a future event,
for example the probability of rain next Tuesday. After the event has materialized (on
Wednesday) a scoring rule assigns a reward based on the predicted probability distribution
and the materialized event.
More formally, a respondent announces a probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pm) over
m mutually exclusive events ω = {ω1, . . . , ωm}. Once the event ωj has materialized, a
scoring rule R(p, ωj) scores the respondent based on his prediction p and ωj . A scoring
rule is proper if the respondent maximizes his expected score by announcing the prediction
that corresponds to his true belief. It is strictly proper if the maximum is unique. The
three best-known strictly proper scoring rules are
1. the quadratic scoring rule R(p, ωj) = 2pj −∑mk=1 p2k,
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Figure 2.1.: Three strictly proper scoring rules and one improper scoring rule: expected
scores for the true belief that Germany has a 70 percent chance of winning
the FIFA world cup 2014.
2. the spherical scoring rule R(p, ωj) =
pj√∑m
k=1 p
2
k
, and
3. the logarithmic scoring rule R(p, ωj) = ln pj .
Further, a strictly proper scoring rule remains strictly proper after any positive affine
transformation. I.e., if R(p | ω) is a strictly proper scoring rule then aR(p | ωj) + b, a > 0,
is also a strictly proper scoring rule.
As another example, suppose a respondent is asked to give a prediction for the following
question: “What is the probability that Germany wins the FIFA World Cup 2014?”.
Suppose the respondent’s true belief is that Germany has a 70 percent chance of winning.
As Figure 2.1 visualizes, he can maximize his expected score by reporting his true belief.
Contrast this with a scoring rule that is not proper: the linear scoring rule. The linear
scoring rule rewards a respondent for the event that materialized with a score that is
proportional to the probability assessment of that event: R(p, ωj) = c · pj , where c is
some positive constant. Here, the respondent can maximize his expected score by setting
his assessment to pj = 1 if pj > pk for k 6= j. That is, the linear scoring rule rewards
overconfident statements.
Applying scoring rules to the Peer Prediction setting. In an HRM setting, the out-
comes of events cannot be verified, either because they lie in the distant future or they
are inherently subjective. Instead, the classical PP mechanism applies proper scoring
rules to the posterior belief about the signal distribution of other raters. However, since
signals are private information, the mechanism applies scoring rules to the ratings instead.
Recall that ri ∈ S denotes the rating submitted by rater i. The PP mechanism scores
every rater i dependent on the distribution over the reference ratings that her rating ri
predicts, i.e., P (rref (i) | ri), and on the actual rating submitted by her reference rater
rref (i)
pi(ri, rref (i)) = R(P (rref (i) | ri), rref (i)). (2.6)
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In other words, PP scores a rater on how accurately her rating predicts her reference
raters’ rating.
Miller et al. proof that honest rating is a strict BNE of the PP mechanism: if the
rating of her reference rater is honest, a rater can uniquely maximize her expected score
(Equation (2.4)) by truthfully announcing her subjective beliefs as well.3
Further, since strictly proper scoring rules remain strictly proper after positive affine
transformation (see Section 2.2.1), the mechanism can scale payments without violating
the Nash equilibrium conditions. Miller et al. show that it is possible to scale the
payments in such a way that they cover the rating costs. Moreover, appropriate scaling
can offset external benefits gained from lying, i.e., bribes.
Example continued. Recall, that after receiving a ‘high’ signal (h), rater i’s posterior
belief that the reference rater ref (i) receives a ‘high’ signal is P (Sref (i) = h | Si = h) =
0.73. Conversely, had i instead received a ‘low’ signal (l), the posterior probability that
ref (i) receives h is P (Sref (i) = h | Si = l) = 0.58. We consider both cases in the following:
(1) Assume, she has received h. Using the logarithmic scoring rule, the resulting expected
score for i if she reports h is
ES(h, h | h) = 0.73 log 0.73 + 0.27 log 0.27 = −0.58.
If she lies and reports l instead, the mechanism scores her according to the posterior
distribution implied by l. In that case, her expected score is
ES(l, h | h) = 0.73 log 0.58 + 0.27 log 0.42 = −0.64.
Now, (2) if she had received l instead, her expected payoffs were −0.68 and −0.74 for
announcing l and h, respectively. So telling the truth, i.e., announcing the signal she has
received, maximizes her expected payoff in both cases.
As noted above, the inventors of the HRM claim that it is not necessary for users to
do the rather complicated computations [MRZ05]. As long as they trust the mechanism,
users will prefer to report honestly.
2.2.2. Peer Prediction with Linear Programming
Jurca et al. [JF06] use automated mechanism design [CS02] to construct incentive
compatible payments. That is, instead of applying proper scoring rules, they define
payments as an optimization problem. In order to achieve this, they redefine the BNE
(Equation (2.5)) conditions, adding two aspects. First, they explicitly consider the rating
costs, i.e., the costs for evaluating a contribution and for submitting the rating. Second,
they consider the potential benefits a rater might gain from lying. Then they use these
conditions as constraints of a linear program that minimizes the expected amount of
money the mechanism has to pay.
3 To guarantee the strictness of the BNE, the proof assumes stochastic relevance [MPZJ07] for signals,
i.e., raters with different signals have different posterior beliefs. Stochastic relevance is almost always
satisfied when different types generate different signal distributions [MRZ05].
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Let c ≥ 0 denote the fixed rating costs. Further, let λ(sj , σ′(j)) be the external
benefit a rater can gain from reporting signal σ′(j) when she observed signal sj , where
λ(sj , sj) = 0 and λ(sj , sl) ≥ 0 for all sj , sl ∈ S and sj 6= sl. Incorporating the rating
costs and the lying benefits into the BNE of Equation (2.5) yields
ES(σ∗, σ∗ | sj) ≥ ES(σ′, σ∗ | sj) + λ(sj , σ′(j)),
ES(σ∗, σ∗ | sj) ≥ c.
(2.7)
This means that the honest rating strategy must yield a higher expected payoff than
lying and that this expected payoff must exceed the rating costs c. Given c and λ(· | ·),
the honest reporting strategy is a BNE if and only if the inequalities in Equation (2.7)
hold for all signals sj ∈ S and all reporting strategies σ′ 6= σ∗.
Using the definition of the expected score (Equation (2.4)) the BNE conditions above
can be expressed as follows∑
sk∈S
P (sk | sj)(pi(sj , sk)− pi(sl, sk)) > λ(sj , sl),∑
sk∈S
P (sk | sj)pi(sj , sk) > c,
(2.8)
for all sj , sl ∈ S, sl 6= sj .
The expected amount the mechanism has to pay an honest rater is the sum of the
expected payments for that rater weighted by the prior probabilities of the signals he
can receive
Esj∈S (ES(σ∗, σ∗ | sj)) =
∑
sj∈S
P (sj)
∑
sk∈S
P (sk | sj)pi(sj , sk)
 . (2.9)
The optimal payment scheme pi(· | ·) minimizes the expected cost of the mechanism
(Equation (2.9)) while satisfying the conditions of the BNE (Equation (2.8)). Thus, the
optimal payment scheme solves the following linear program
minimize
∑
sj∈S
P (sj)
∑
sk∈S
P (sk | sj)pi(sj , sk)

subject to
∑
sk∈S
P (sk | sj)(pi(sj , sk)− pi(sh, sk)) > λ(sj , sl) , ∀sj , sl ∈ S, sj 6= sl∑
sk∈S
P (sk | sj)pi(sj , sk) > c , ∀sj ∈ S
pi(sj , sk) ≥ 0 , ∀sj , sk ∈ S.
(2.10)
Example with LP. We continue the the two signals, two types example from above and
set the lying benefits to λ(l, h) = λ(h, l) = 0.05 and the rating costs to c = 0.1. The
optimal incentive compatible payments pi(ri, rref (i)) in that case are pi(h, h) = 0.2252,
pi(l, l) = 0.4224, and pi(h, l) = pi(l, h) = 0.
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2.2.3. Lying and Collusion Equilibria
Even though honest reporting is the desired equilibrium strategy of the Peer Prediction
mechanism, it is not unique. Other equilibria like rating always high or rating always
low exist as well. [JF07] proposes countermeasures against such lying coalitions. The
countermeasures are based on increasing the number of reference ratings per rating and
increasing the budget of the mechanism to offset incentives for such lying coalitions.
Systematic taste differences among raters also pose a potential threat to the proper
functioning of the mechanism. For example, some raters might have contrarian views or
might generally be harsher in their assessment of quality. Whether the problems of lying
equilibria or taste differences occur without countermeasures in reality is an interesting
question that our experiments will address as well.
2.2.4. Further Honest Rating Mechanisms
In this section we briefly discuss HRMs similar to the Peer Prediction mechanism that
relax some of its assumptions.
The Bayesian Truth Serum
The Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) [Pre04] also makes truth-telling a BNE. BTS makes
basically the same assumptions as Peer Prediction (Section 2.2.1). In particular, it
assumes rational (i.e., Bayesian) updating from a common prior shared between all raters.
However, in contrast to PP the common prior needs not be known by the mechanism. In
addition to her rating, the BTS mechanism asks each rater for her posterior signal beliefs.
That is, for each rated contribution each rater also predicts the empirical distribution
of all ratings for the contribution. The mechanism scores the predictions for accuracy.
Additionally, it assigns an ‘information score’ to each rating ri = sj that reports signal
sj as follows
information score for ri = log
actual relative frequency of sj
(geometric) mean predicted frequency of sj
.
Intuitively, ratings that are more common than collectively predicted receive high scores
while ratings that are less common receive low scores. The resulting BNE only holds for
sufficiently large numbers of raters.
For our scenario of ratings in an online community we deem BTS not suitable because
of its prohibitively high rating costs. As we have seen above, ratings are already sparse
in most online communities. Our experiments show that they remain sparse (though
considerably less so) even after applying an HRM. Expecting every rater to issue
one rating plus one prediction of the empirical distribution of ratings for every rated
contribution is rather unrealistic.
Recent Extensions of Peer Prediction and the Bayesian Truth Serum
Since we have conducted the experiments in this dissertation, a number of extensions of
PP and BTS have been proposed. [WP12b] introduces a ‘robust Bayesian Truth Serum’
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(RBTS), an extension of the BTS mechanism that does not require large numbers of
raters. Instead, it is incentive compatible for populations consisting of more than two
raters and works for binary signals only. Like the original BTS, the RBTS asks the
rater for two reports, a prediction and a rating, which it scores by means of strictly
proper scoring rules. [RF13] also introduces an extension of the BTS that works for small
populations with more than 1 rater and for categorical signals. It elicits two reports for
each rated contribution as well. Finally, [WP12a] extends Peer Prediction such that it
works without a common prior. To achieve this, it elicits two ratings: one rating before
the rater has seen the contribution and one afterwards.
Like BTS, these new mechanisms also have high rating costs compared to the original
PP mechanism. This makes them likely unsuitable for the scenario envisioned as well.
However, they could be evaluated in future work in settings where high rating costs are
more tolerable, e.g., in settings with only few ratings overall. An example of such a
setting could be an expert team that creates a ‘seed’ ontology with very few items whose
correctness has an over-proportional influence.
2.3. Structured Knowledge and Ontologies
In Section 1.1, based on [NCA08], we introduced the term structured knowledge as
referring to any kind of interrelated, conceptualized information. This can range from a
set of terms with informal relationships, like a hierarchy of tags, to a fully axiomatized
ontology. In this section, we discuss the basic notion of ontology and related terms, and
clarify their usage.
Karlsruhe Germanyis located in
Figure 2.2.: Structured knowledge: two-node network.
To gain intuition about structured knowledge and its usefulness, let us start with a
simple example. Consider the sentence ‘Karlsruhe is located in Germany’. We can break
this apart into the two terms Karslruhe and Germany and the relationship is located
in, as depicted in Figure 2.2. This form makes the two entities (Karlsruhe and Germany)
and their relationship explicit and thus easier to interpret for a computer than the natural
language version. It is also an abstraction that captures the essence of many similar
formulations of the same fact (‘Karlsruhe is a city in Germany’, etc.).
Adding more semantics to this structure will make it more useful for (human or
machine) interpretation and automatic processing. For example, we can tell the computer
that Karlsruhe is a city and that Germany is a country. Further, we can enhance the
information structure by generalizing the concepts City to Settlement (which also
includes Village), and adding attributes such as founding date. Figure 2.3 depicts
the resulting ontology. Based on this ontology, an automatic agent that is looking for a
vacation destination in Germany on our behalf could identify Karlsruhe as a potential
destination.
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City Country
Settlement Village
Karlsruhe Germany
integer
1715 is located in
is located in
instance of instance of
is a is no
t a
is afounding
year
founding
year
Figure 2.3.: Simple city-country ontology.
Note that the semantics in Figure 2.3 are represented in the structure. In the words of
Tim Berners-Lee [BLF99, p. 12]:
[ . . . ] a piece of information is really defined only by what it’s related to,
and how it’s related. There really is little else to meaning. The structure is
everything.
In the following, we give a brief overview of ontologies and related forms of structured
knowledge. For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Staab and Studer [SS09] or
Domingue et al. [DFH11].
2.3.1. Definition of Ontology
The word ‘ontology’ comes from philosophy where it refers to the science of being.
Ontology, as a discipline of philosophy, studies the kinds and structures of objects,
properties, and events in every area of reality. One of ontology’s earliest practitioners
was Aristotle4 as documented in his book Metaphysics. The term ‘ontology’ itself was
coined much later, namely in the seventeenth century, independently by two German
philosophers. See [Flo04] or [BS91] for more detailed discussion of ontology in philosophy.
Computer science takes a more pragmatic stance. Here, an ontology refers to an artifact
that encodes knowledge about a domain of interest. In computer science, ontologies are
in particular used as knowledge representation formats in artificial intelligence [RN13]
and play a key role in enabling the Semantic Web [BLHL01].
A common definition of ontology in computer science is the following [GAVS11] (cf.
[SBF98, Gru93] for similar definitions):
An ontology is a formal explicit specification of a shared conceptualization of
a domain of interest.
The definition entails the following:
4 Aristotle himself called it ‘first philosophy’ [Flo04, p. 155].
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• A Conceptualization is an abstract, simplified view of the world. The view is
represented by objects or concepts and the relationships between them [GN87,
GG95].
• Formal means that the ontology must be serializable in some machine readable
knowledge representation language that exhibits well-defined semantics.
• Explicit refers to the fact that concepts, relationships, and constraints are explicitly
defined and thus accessible for machines.
• Shared means that the members of the community using the ontology all agree
to a sufficient degree upon the conceptual model contained within the ontology.
Without such a consensus, the ontology might be practically useless [GOS09].
• Finally, the conceptualization is typically limited to a specific domain of interest.
This simplifies its creation and maintenance, as well as its reusability.
2.3.2. Components of an Ontology
The following components are characteristic for ontologies [GAVS11, UG04]:
• Concepts. Ontologies contain a collection of terms that are of interest in a given
domain. General concepts of the domain are captured in form of classes (also called
types or categories) such as City or Country. Further, ontologies might contain
individuals, i.e., instances of classes, for example Karlsruhe as an instance of City.
• Relationships. By connecting concepts, relationships provide meaning and structure
to the ontology. Without them, the ontology would simply be a collection of terms.
In Figure 2.3, is located in is a relationship.
• Class-instance relationships. They are the essential means to distinguish between
classes and instances. At the same time, they associate individual instances with
classes. For example, Karlsruhe is an instance of the class City.
• Superclass-subclass relationships, also called subsumptions or is-a relationships.
Classes can subsume other classes. The subsuming class is called superclass (or
supertype) while the subsumed class is called subclass (or subtype). For example,
City is a subclass of Settlement. In general, the subclass implicitly inherits
the properties of the superclass. For example, City inherits founding year from
Settlement.
• Attributes. These are properties of classes or instances with simple data types, such
as string, or integer. For example, a Settlement has a founding year of type
integer.
• Axioms. Axioms are logical statements that say what is true in a given domain.
In principle, axioms can specify arbitrarily complex rules. The most commonly
used axioms are the relationships listed above. Further typical axioms include
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constraints for the domain and range of properties, the transitivity, reflexivity and
symmetry of relations, and the disjointness of classes. In Figure 2.3, we could define
the is located in relation as transitive, and asymmetric, or specify that Village
and City are disjoint classes.
Formal axioms allow for deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning can for example
infer new facts that are only implicitly stated in the ontology. Further, it can verify
an ontology, i.e., ensure that it does not contain contradictory information.
An ontology including a set of instances constitutes a knowledge base [UG04].
Components such as classes, relationships, constraints, or subsumption are also part of
other conceptual modeling techniques used in computer science such as entity-relationship
models (ERMs) [Che76] or the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [RJB04]. In fact, as
we will see below, models based on ERMs and UML class diagrams can be regarded as
a form of ontology. The difference between the models commonly created with these
techniques and ontologies in the narrow sense is subtle and lies in the usage and the
purpose, as well as in the expressivity [GAVS11, UG04]. The main purpose of UML class
diagrams and ERMs is designing software systems or database schemas, respectively. As
such, the models are focused on representing only the concepts relevant to the respective
software system, and thus they often incorporate technical design decisions. Ontologie’s
(in the narrow sense) main purpose, on the other hand, is to serve as a source of domain
knowledge. Hence, the resulting models are more general. Further, ontology languages
allow for more expressive constructs that are typically not found in ERMs and UML,
and are especially designed to allow for deductive reasoning.
2.3.3. Usage of Ontologies.
Grüninger and Lee [GL02] identify three different usage areas of ontologies: communica-
tion between agents (human or automatic), computational inference, and reusing and
organizing knowledge (e.g., structuring digital libraries).
In the following, we discuss four different areas of usage of ontologies based on Grimm
et al. [GAVS11]:
• Knowledge organization. Many information systems contain representations of
knowledge that are difficult to process automatically, such as unstructured or
only partially structured data like books, newspaper articles, images, or other
multimedia documents. Here, ontologies allow for structuring and organizing the
stored knowledge [GL02]. Further, ontologies provide semantics to metadata for
web resources.
• Semantic search. This includes queries to a single knowledge base (“Find the
five longest rivers running through German cities founded before 1700.”), as well
as semantically enhanced search over the World Wide Web. In the latter case,
for example, ontologies provide background knowledge for concept-based query
expansion [BMS07], or for ranking query results according to the “rational surfer
model” [FDP+05].
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Figure 2.4.: Example of an ontology spectrum by degree of formality by [GOS09].
• Integration. According to Uschold and Grüninger, ontologies can act as a neutral
template for data models used in multiple applications. Moreover, ontologies can
serve as an interchange format mapping between the data models of different
applications [UG04].
• Formal processing and inference. Automated reasoning over ontology-based back-
ground knowledge is a functionality that may be applied in the usage areas above.
In the future, ontologies may support agent-based scenarios such as sending a software
agent to buy a laptop computer, including searching multiple sites and comparing offers
over these sites [RN13], or letting the agent arrange schedules for physical therapy
sessions [BLHL01].
2.3.4. Ontology Spectra
We can divide ontologies by their degree of formality into a spectrum starting with
lightweight ontologies at one end and heavyweight ontologies at the other [UG04, GAVS11].
Here, degree of formality refers to the extent to which the ontology is axiomatized.
Lightweight ontologies possess no or only a few axioms, and may consist of terms
only, with little specification of the meaning. Heavyweight ontologies are characterized
by extensive axiomatization. Along the spectrum, parallel to the degree of formality,
the amount of meaning specified, and the support for automated reasoning increases
[UG04]. Figure 2.4 depicts one such spectrum. Similar spectra exist that classify the
various ontology subtypes according to their degree of formality [UG04, McG05], as well
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as according to similar dimensions. These dimensions include support for automatic
reasoning [SW01], semantic interoperability [Obr03], and expressiveness [Wel07]. Besides
their dimension, the spectra differ regarding their level of granularity. Moreover, they
differ regarding the relative order of the different ontology subtypes. For example, some
authors place thesauri along the formality continuum to the left of taxonomies while
others place them to the right. Further, some authors place folksonomies on the far
left side of the formality spectrum [Wel07] while others place them right of thesauri
[GAVS11, GOS09]. See [Bra11] for a comprehensive discussion of ontology spectra.
In the following, we describe important types of ontologies along the formality spectrum
loosely based on [GAVS11]:
• Glossaries and folksonomies are unstructured, uncontrolled lists of keywords or tags.
Glossaries list terms and their meanings in an unstructured way. Folksonomies
are a collection of tags (keywords) assigned to resources such as websites (e.g.,
at Delicious), images (Flickr), or videos (Youtube). As opposed to conventional
keyword indexes used for example to annotate books in library catalogs, folksonomies
arise from collaborative tagging activities of many users and thus add a social
dimension.
• Thesauri are a simple form of structured knowledge that organize the words of a
domain according to lexical criteria such as synonymy, antonymy, homonymy, etc.
Thus, their formality and expressivity are rather low. Examples are the Historical
Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary [hto] or the WordNet thesaurus [Fel98].
• Concept schemes are semantic structures that are characterized by rather informal
semantic relationships, such as ad-hoc hierarchies like the Yahoo catalog.5 Typically,
concept schemes arise from collaborative efforts of larger communities. They also
include tag hierarchies generated from folksonomies by exploiting the co-occurence
of tags, or the similarity of tag usage by different users [Mik05, HGM06].
• Formal taxonomies are class hierarchies based on a formal notion of subsumption
(i.e., the is-a relationship is transitive).
• Conceptual Data Models such as UML class diagrams or ERMs are aimed towards
designing information systems (see discussion above). In these models, logical
formalization is typically used to check constraints rather than for deductive
reasoning.
• Rule and fact bases are knowledge bases consisting of a large number of instances.
They typically exhibit basic querying and simple reasoning capabilities over class
and property hierarchies.
5 [LM01] give an example of an informal is-a relationship taken from the yahoo catalog: Here, the general
category ‘apparel’ includes a subcategory ‘women’s apparel’ that includes subcategories ‘dresses’ and
‘accessories’. While every instance of ‘dress’ is an instance of ‘apparel’, ‘fragrance’ (which is an instance
of ‘accessories’) is not an instance of ‘apparel’.
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• General logical theories are the most formal type of ontology. They exhibit a highly
axiomatized and expressive knowledge representation. They formulate axioms in
first order, higher order, or modal logic.
For ontologies based on logical languages, there exists a trade-off between expressiveness
and reasoning efficiency [GOS09]. The very expressive formal languages do not allow for
sound and complete reasoning, are in general undecidable. Less expressive subsets of
first-order logic, like description logic, on the other hand, allow for decidable and efficient
reasoning.
Moreover, and more important from the users’ perspective, there exists a trade-off
between the degree of formality/expressiveness of an ontology and the size of its community.
The more formal and expressive an ontology the higher the cost for understanding it
and thus the smaller its community [Hep07]. Further, lightweight ontologies are easier
for users to understand and thus better suited for to be created and maintained by
communities than heavyweight ones.
2.3.5. Ontology Languages
There exists a variety of ontology representation languages, in particular in the context of
the Semantic Web. We only give a brief overview of some prominent examples and refer
to [AVH04, PRH+06] for a detailed discussion. Note that in this thesis, we are primarily
concerned with the design and deployment of incentive mechanisms for the collaborative
construction of structured knowledge. In this specific context, the ontology language to
encode the knowledge is of secondary concern.
RDF(S). The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a standard developed by
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to encode metadata and ontologies for the
Semantic Web. To make statements about (web) resources, RDF uses subject-predicate-
object triples. To allow for a worldwide unique identification, subjects, predicates, and
objects are usually identified by uniform resource identifiers (URIs). Thus, the statement
‘Karlsruhe is located in Germany’ can for example be expressed as (subject, predicate,
object) triple:
(http://dbpedia.org/resource/Karlsruhe,
http://www.geonames.org/ontology#locatedIn,
http://dbpedia.org/resource/Germany)
RDF Schema (RDFS) is defined on top of RDF. As basic ontology language, RDFS
includes features such as relationships, instantiation, subsumption.
OWL. The Web Ontology Language (OWL) is a W3C standard defined on top of
RDF(S). It serves as the main ontology language for the Semantic Web. OWL offers a
high expressiveness. Besides the capabilities inherited from RDF(S), OWL is able to
express for example disjointness between classes, boolean combination of classes (for
example, a union of classes Male and Female to Person), and special restrictions for
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relationships such as the relationship’s cardinality, transitivity, or reflexivity. To account
for the trade-off between expressiveness and efficient reasoning (see page 30), OWL comes
in several variants with varying degrees of expressiveness: For example, OWL Full is
fully compatible with RDF(S), both syntactically and semantically. OWL DL, is a more
restricted version of OWL, designed for efficient reasoning.
Topic Maps. Topic Maps [Pep00] are an ISO standard, and define a data model and
an associated data format for knowledge representation. Topic Maps can be categorized
as lightweight ontologies residing roughly on the level of concept schemes. In contrast
to RDF(S) or OWL, which are built for automatic processing, Topic Maps provide
few and easy to understand semantic features. This makes them well-suited for direct
manipulation by humans. The basic elements of Topic Maps are topics, associations, and
occurrences. Topics represent real or abstract entities (like Karlsruhe or Germany) and
can be grouped together by means of topic types. Topics and topic types roughly represent
instances and classes, respectively. Associations represent relationships between topics
and can be grouped together by association types. Topics that partake in associations
have assigned association roles (for example, Karlsruhe could play the contained role
while Germany could play the role container in a located in association). Occurrences
link topics to external resources. Like RDF, Topic Maps use URIs to uniquely identify
elements.
SKOS. The Simple Knowledge Organization System (SKOS) is another language for
representing lightweight ontologies. It was announced 2009 by the W3C and is build on
top of RDF(S).6 SKOS’s fundamental modeling element is Concept. Further, among
other modeling primitives, SKOS allows for defining labels for concepts, and provides
two kinds of relationships: broader/narrower relationships and associative relationships.
2.3.6. Traditional Ontology Engineering
Ontology engineering refers to the “activities that concern the ontology development
process, the ontology life cycle, and the methodologies, tools and languages for building
ontologies” [GPCFL04]. A number of methodologies for engineering ontologies from
scratch have been proposed. They can broadly be categorized into traditional and
collaborative ones. The traditional methodologies mainly follow a centralized approach
where a small number of ontology engineering experts develop the ontology, using the
input elicited from domain experts. See [GPCFL04] for an overview. The traditional
methodologies are somewhat influenced by traditional software engineering methods.
Pinto and Martins [PM04] identify five different stages of the (traditional) ontology
engineering process (see also [GPCFL04, ST06]): (i) specification, i.e., identifying the
purpose and scope of the ontology, (ii) conceptualization, i.e., creating the conceptual
model, (iii) formalization, i.e., transforming the conceptual model into a formalized form,
6http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-skos-reference-20090818
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(iv) implementation of the model into a knowledge representation language, and (v)
maintenance, i.e., updating and correcting the ontology.
The problem with these traditional methodologies is that they insufficiently consider
the question that is essential for the usefulness of an ontology, namely, how to reach a
shared consensus among all stakeholders of the ontology. Instead, they put the knowledge
engineers in a central position, while only sparely, or not at all, involving the actual users
of the ontology in the creation process [VPTS05]. This centralized approach also makes
ontology creation and maintenance costly and time consuming activities, because they
are executed by rare and expensive ontology engineers. Thus, nowadays “it is generally
acknowledged that, in order to be useful, but also economically feasible, ontologies should
be developed and maintained in a community-driven manner” [SLR14].
We discuss collaborative ontology engineering methodologies in Section 3.1.2.
2.3.7. Ontology Learning
The manual engineering of ontologies is a laborious endeavor. Therefore, various tech-
niques for the automatic or semi-automatic generation of ontologies from various kinds
of data sources have been developed. These techniques are summarized under the
label ‘ontology learning’. See [CMSV09, WLB12] for a detailed discussion. [WLB12]
(based on [BM05]) groups the aspects of ontology learning into sub-tasks of increasing
complexity. These sub-tasks are the learning of: terms, concepts, taxonomic relations,
non-taxonomic relations, and axioms. This group of sub-tasks is also called the ontology
learning layer cake. To accomplish these sub-tasks, ontology learning leverages techniques
from machine learning or computational linguistics. For example, for extracting terms
from natural language text, linguistic techniques such as part-of-speech tagging [JM09]
can be employed. Statistic techniques such as tf-idf [MRS08] can filter the relevant
terms in a subsequent step. To assign terms into groups, discover concepts, or construct
hierarchies clustering techniques (among others) can be employed [WLB12]. Besides
using text sources, there are also approaches to automatically extract ontologies from
semi-structured sources such as UML class diagrams [XNH+11], tables [TEL+05], or folk-
sonomies [DHS07]. Information extraction approaches such as [SSW09, ECD+04] extend
existing (usually handcrafted) ontologies by parsing natural language documents, and
extracting ontological facts from them. Some of these focus in particular on extracting
structured knowledge from Wikipedia [LIJ+14, SKW07].
Despite these advances, the formal quality of ontologies generated with ontology
learning is still insufficient for many practical applications [GAVS11]. Even though
automated or semi-automated approaches to ontology learning can support the ontology
engineering process to a large degree, ontology development remains a human-driven
process [SS10].
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Knowledge – Empirical Studies of
Rating-Based Incentive Mechanisms
The question of how to create structured knowledge continues to be a fundamental
research issue. Experts for its creation are rare and costly, and automatic solutions
remain insufficient for many practical applications (cf. ‘Traditional Ontology Engineering’
on page 31 and ‘Ontology Learning’ on page 32).
In this chapter, we study how to utilize web-based peer production for the creation of
structured knowledge. This is a promising approach. It shifts the burden for creating
the structured knowledge away from the rare experts and puts it into the many hands
of peers within online communities. Compared to traditional centralized methods, this
has several advantages: it inherently fosters consensual agreement about the semantics
captured in the knowledge structures, is less costly, and reduces the time lag between
changes in knowledge and adapting the knowledge representation.
However, peer production of structured knowledge poses the same challenges as peer
production in general (see Chapter 1) namely: (1) How to motivate peers? As discussed
in Section 2.1.1, many online communities suffer from under-contribution, i.e., only a
minority contributes. (2) How to ensure and assess data quality? Quality assurance is
in particular important for structured knowledge, which is used for query processing or
automated reasoning.
To answer these questions, we study how rating-based incentive mechanisms can
motivate users and assure the quality of the structured knowledge created collaboratively.
We assume the following real-world scenario: An online community creates structured
knowledge. Its members review the contributions of each other and rate them according
to the quality perceived. To motivate users to contribute, they receive points according
to the number and quality of their contributions. The quality of contributions, in turn,
is computed based on the ratings they receive. Finally, the points gathered are converted
into external rewards, e.g., gift coupons as with Epinions or system privileges as with
Slashdot.
Since ratings play such a crucial role – they measure contribution quality and determine
rewards for good contributions – they have to be of high quality as well. To motivate
users to provide high-quality ratings, we apply an HRM to our scenario, namely the
Peer Prediction mechanism, described in Section 2.2.1. We have chosen Peer Prediction
because it has the lowest rating costs among all HRMs. For Peer Prediction, a user
needs to submit only one rating for a contribution she wants to assess. Other HRMs
require two ratings instead, or even estimates of the distribution of other ratings. (For a
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discussion of the rating costs of HRMs see Section 2.2.4). This makes Peer Prediction
best-suited for our scenario. However, despite the various articles on HRMs, not much
effort has been expended to test these mechanisms empirically. In fact, we are only aware
of one empirical study of an HRM, namely of the Bayesian truth serum [WP13]. In the
study, the authors test the mechanism by means of questionnaires. In particular, we are
not aware of any studies that apply HRMs in the context of collaborative knowledge
creation tasks within an online community.
We study the following research questions regarding the creation of structured knowl-
edge:
1. How do reward mechanisms for contributions as well as for ratings influence user
behavior?
2. How do rewards for contributions that are either fully or partially dependent on
ratings influence the quality and the number of contributions, compared to rewards
that are fixed?
3. Does an HRM lead to ratings of higher quality, compared to a fixed reward per
rating?
To this end, we have developed a platform for the collaborative creation of structured
knowledge called Consensus Builder (CB). It provides the functionality to browse the
knowledge base and to create and change data items. To address the problems of low
quality and under-contribution of ratings, CB allows for a fine-grained rating of the
semantic structures. Further, it features rating-based incentive mechanisms, in particular
an HRM. The underlying incentive mechanisms can easily be exchanged. This enables us
to investigate to which extent these mechanisms stimulate the quality and the quantity
of the data. CB is operational in a real-world environment.
Based on the research questions, we formulate a number of hypotheses. We extensively
test the hypotheses in a series of controlled field experiments using CB as a platform. The
experiments took place in different settings and with participants of different backgrounds,
using setups close to the real-world scenario envisioned.
A main finding of ours is that an HRM leads to ratings of equal or higher quality,
compared to static rewards. Further, we find that fully rating-dependent – but not
partially rating-dependent – rewards for contributions improve contribution quality, but
result in fewer contributions compared to a fixed reward per contribution.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 reviews related work. Section 3.2
presents our collaboration platform Consensus Builder. Section 3.3 discusses our design
decision regarding the application of the HRM. Section 3.4 states our hypotheses.
Section 3.5 introduces the experimental setups, and Section 3.6 present the results of the
experiments. Section 3.7 discusses the results and the lessons learned in the experiments,
and gives some design recommendations for structured-knowledge-creating communities.
Section 3.8 concludes.
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3.1. Related Work
3.1.1. Extrinsic Incentives for Contribution Quality
In Section 2.1 we have reviewed the literature on motivation in peer production in general
and in online communities in particular. As we have stated in Section 2.1.5, we are not
aware of any work that experimentally tests extrinsic incentives to rate the quality of
contributions.
3.1.2. Collaborative Methods for the Creation of Structured Knowledge
Section 2.3.6 introduced traditional, centralized, ontology engineering and concluded
that generally ontologies should be developed in a community-driven manner. Further,
Section 2.3.7 discussed various techniques for creating ontologies automatically. It
concluded, that the formal quality of ontologies generated with ontology learning is still
insufficient for many practical applications and that ontology development remains a
human-driven process.
In the following, we discuss methodologies that enhance the traditional ontology
engineering approach with collaborative aspects. Beyond that, we discuss how to construct
structured knowledge with alternative approaches such as using paid crowdsourcing like
Amazon Mechanical Turk, or using gamification1 to motivate users.
Collaborative Ontology Engineering Methodologies
Several methodologies for ontology engineering that incorporate collaboration mech-
anisms have been proposed [HJ02, MLMS06, VPTS05, KV06, AH07]. Most of these
methodologies aim to develop heavyweight, fully axiomatized ontologies. They differ,
for example, w.r.t. the exact strategy and the techniques used for creating the ontology,
or w.r.t. the kind of users involved in the creation process (knowledge workers, domain
experts, ontology engineers, ontology users). [SLR14] provides a comprehensive overview.
Holsapple and Joshi were the first to propose a collaborative methodology for ontology
engineering [HJ02]. Their method consists of four phases: In the preparation phase,
knowledge workers specify design criteria and related standards to guide the development
of the ontology. In the so called anchoring phase, the knowledge workers develop an initial
ontology to seed the collaborative effort. In a third phase, a panel of knowledge workers
iteratively improves the ontology using a process model adapted from the Delphi method
[LT75]. Views on the ontology are elicited from each participant individually, and in a
later step reconciled by means of feedback, thus fostering a consensual understanding. In
the fourth phase, the ontology is deployed for actual usage.
The DILIGENT methodology [VPTS05] involves domain experts, ontology engineers,
knowledge engineers (roughly: mediators between ontology engineers and domain ex-
perts), as well as ontology users. A small group consisting of domain experts and
knowledge/ontology engineers creates the core ontology. This ontology is subsequently
1Gamification is the use of game design elements in non-game contexts [DKND11].
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used and updated locally by ontology users. A central board (presumably) consisting of
knowledge and ontology engineers is responsible for controlling and updating the ontology.
The engineering board collects the local changes made by users, analyses them, and
revises the ontology accordingly.
The HCOME methodology proposes a more human-centered, decentralized engineering
model [KV06]. Here, knowledge workers discuss requirements for a shared ontology
during a specification phase. Afterwards, they develop ontologies individually, and, in a
later step, share them with the community for revision and merging.
Most of the collaborative methodologies for ontology engineering develop heavyweight
ontologies not suitable for direct manipulation by end users alone. Further, these
methodologies, with the exception of HCOME, rely on centralized techniques using
ontology engineers to some degree. Most importantly, neither of the methodologies above
is explicitly concerned with mechanisms for user motivation.
Braun and colleagues introduce a more light-weight, Web 2.0 based methodology
for ontology engineering [BSW+07]. Their community-driven approach relies on the
maturing of ideas and concepts from tags into formal ontologies. Further, they discuss
intrinsic motivations users might have to engage in the maturing activities, such as future
retrieval or contribution and sharing. The maturing starts with the reuse of tags within
the community, which leads to the emergence of shared vocabularies and the convergence
of tags to concepts. In a later step, for example, users create class hierarchies because
they want to better support their search needs or because they like to describe concepts
or images in more detail, etc. Their approach might benefit from explicitly incentivizing
users, e.g., using the mechanisms presented and evaluated here.
Various tools for the collaborative creation of structured knowledge have been proposed,
ranging from full-fledged ontology editors with collaborative features [SKKM03, TN07]
over Wiki-based approaches for semantic data [AD06, CCT04, Sou05, Sch06, VKV+06]
to tools that support tagging folksonomies [J+07, ZB07]. Some of these tools feature
rating mechanisms. All this work does not include systematic attempts to evaluate the
effect of ratings on knowledge quality for these tools. There also exist commercial tools
for the collaborative creation of structured knowledge, notably Freebase [BEP+08]. Noy
et al. [NCA08] give a detailed overview of tools for the collaborative construction of
structured knowledge. Further, they discuss general requirements for such tools and the
different collaboration approaches implemented in these tools.
Siorpaes and Simperl analyze tools and methodologies for semantic content creation,
including the ones described above, and identify tasks that are inherently human driven
[SS10], i.e., tasks that require human input and are not automatable. For example, they
identify describing the domain and scope of ontologies, defining axioms, building class
hierarchies, and creating class-instance relationships as human driven tasks. Collecting
relevant terms and discovering suitable ontologies for reuse are examples of tasks that
they identify as partially automatable.
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Paid Crowdsourcing and Gamification
Eckert et al. use input from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers to construct is-a
relations between pre-selected terms in a philosophy knowledge domain [E+10]. They
propose a redundancy-based method to achieve high-quality results from the input of
AMT workers. As opposed to our approach, they included concept pairs for which
they could objectively determine a correct answer, i.e., a gold standard, to identify
well-performing AMT workers. Further, their method, as any AMT-based scheme, is
only applicable to domains known to the general public. Only such domains can attract
a sufficient number of AMT workers with the necessary understanding. For example,
AMT workers do not possess the knowledge necessary to create ontologies for specific
domains, like medical ontologies, or ontologies for supply chain management.
Kochhar et al. collect human input for decisions in the Freebase knowledge base that
an automated process cannot decide [KMP10]. They make use of paid contractors and
to a lesser degree of volunteers to act as judges for these non-automatable decisions. To
increase the quality of the judgments, they cultivate long-standing relationships with
their judges. In addition, they identify judges with id and profile. The authors describe
these relationships as the main reason for the good quality of the judgments. Thus, their
results are unlikely to be transferable to typical online communities with an anonymous
character. Further, the judge decisions could potentially benefit from the use of an HRM.
Von Ahn uses games to motivate users to perform useful tasks [vA06]. For example,
users in the ESP Game are randomly paired to create tags for an image and receive
points whenever their tags match. Siorpaes and Hepp [SH08] use this principle to build
ontologies from Wikipedia entries by categorizing entries as either classes or instances.
Users receive points when they agree on the categorization. Again, these approaches are
better suited for knowledge domains that are known to the general public and where
data is already available, e.g., in form of Wikipedia entries. Next, the game of assigning
Wikipedia entries to predefined categories and rewarding users based on answers by other
users is essentially an HRM setting. Thus, scaling the rewards for agreement by means
of an HRM could give way to better results with these games.
3.2. Creating Structured Knowledge with Consensus Builder
This section describes Consensus Builder, our web-based tool that allows for the col-
laborative creation of structured knowledge. For our experiments, we use two different
versions of Consensus Builder: Consensus Builder 1.0 (CB1), released in 2007, and
Consensus Builder 2.0 (CB2), released in 2009. Both versions overlap to a large degree.
In the following, we first describe CB2 since it represents our latest development. The
description considers the different aspects of the functionality of CB2. Afterwards, we
describe how CB1’s functionality differs regarding each of these aspects.
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Figure 3.1.: Details for topic Harrison Ford in Consensus Builder 2.0
3.2.1. Consensus Builder 2.0
Data Format
CB2 uses a lightweight ontology data model similar to Topic Maps [Pep00] and Entity-
Relationship Models [Che76] with some deviations for better usability. Data can be
created on the type and on the instance level. That is, users can specify the schema and
create instance data. Topics represent entities of the real world, e.g., Harrison Ford
or Indiana Jones. Topics can have one or more types, e.g., Harrison Ford is of type
Person and of type Actor. Types contain attributes and association types. Attributes
describe simple data, like ‘date of birth’, and are constrained by data types, e.g., integer,
string, or date. Association types describe associations between topic types, e.g., Actor
<acts in> Movie.
Having said this, the objective of this chapter is the design and deployment of incentive
mechanisms for the collaborative construction of structured knowledge. In this specific
context, the data format to encode the knowledge is of secondary concern. We have
mainly chosen the data format described above because of its ease of use for non-expert
users. The functionality of Consensus Builder is applicable to other formats for structured
knowledge as well, such as those specific to the Semantic Web. Furthermore, the data
format currently used can be mapped to OWL in a straightforward way: Topic types are
mapped to OWL classes, attributes to data-type properties, association types to object
properties (as well as to their inverse properties) with domains and ranges restricted to
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the respective classes or data types. Topics are mapped to instances, attribute values to
literals, etc.
Collaborative Editing and Rating
Users can create and change all parts of the data model collaboratively. They can create
single data elements like attributes or topics and change elements created by others.
When a user adds a type to a topic, the topic inherits the attributes and association types
of that type. For example, when a user adds the type Actor to the topic Harrison Ford,
Harrison Ford inherits the association type <acts in> from Actor. Subsequently, users
can set attribute values and add associations to the topic as specified by the added type.
E.g., they can add topics of type Movie that Harrison Ford acted in, such as Blade
Runner. CB2 takes care that users can create only attribute values and associations
that are valid regarding the type level. In addition, CB2 provides various functions for
browsing and searching, and contains functionality to discuss topics and topic types, and
statistics such as user scores. Further, CB2 contains an announcement feature that allows
to make announcements to the community of users or to subsets of the community.
Rating scheme. CB2 features a fine-grained association between contributions and
ratings, called rating scheme, that lets users assess the quality of contributions on a
very detailed level. Users can rate every element on the type as well as on the instance
level that can be manipulated, e.g., topic names, attributes and association types, and
attribute values.
A rating of a contribution x refers to the perceived correctness of x. The specific
semantics differ depending on the contribution rated. For example, rating a type-
instance relationship between type Person and topic Harrison Ford means evaluating
the correctness of the statement “Harrison Ford is a Person”. Rating the attribute Date
of birth of type Person evaluates the correctness of the statement “Date of birth is an
attribute of Person”. The functions for rating, editing, and displaying the data are tightly
integrated in the user interface; see Figure 3.1. (See also Figure A.1 in Appendix A.)
Rating scale. CB2 supports rating scales of arbitrary granularity. Since our rating
scheme is very fine-grained, we prefer rating scales of lower granularity in order not to
overburden the user. In general, we either use the well-known five-star rating scale or a
binary rating scale (‘low’ vs. ‘high’). Cosley et al. test scales of different granularity and
find that ratings correlate strongly between scales, even though users give slightly higher
mean ratings on the binary scale than on the more fine-grained scales. They conclude
that “a designer might choose to allow users to rate on any scale they wish” [CLA+03].
Dealing with side effects of change operations. Users can change and delete individual
contributions. However, change/delete operations are not trivial in any setting where
data items depend on each other. For instance, what happens with other contributions
and ratings associated with a contribution just deleted? Think of the deletion of a type
that has associated topics and has received high ratings. To address these issues, we
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operation points(operation) in CB2 points(operation) in CB1
Creating a topic type 3 -
Creating a topic 3 3
Creating an association type 4 4
Creating an association 2 2
Creating an attribute 3 -
Creating an attribute value 2 2
Creating an occurrence - 2
Adding a type to a topic 2 2
Table 3.1.: Number of points per operation in CB2 and CB1.
have made the following design decision. Users can only change/delete a contribution if
it satisfies two conditions. First, it must not have dependent contributions. For example,
an attribute can only be changed/deleted if there are no attribute values associated with
it. Second, it either must not have received any ratings, or its average rating value must
be below a certain threshold. Consequently, only contributions deemed low quality by
the community can be changed/deleted. The user who has changed the contribution
becomes its new owner.
Commission: Rating-Dependent Remuneration
To motivate users to create and maintain the data, we reward data operations with
points based on ratings given by other users. We refer to the rating-based remunerations
as commission. A user obtains a commission every time another user issues a favorable
rating for a contribution that the first user is the owner of. (The owner of a given
contribution x is the user who made the most recent change to x. If x has not been
changed then x’s creator is its owner.)
Let r ∈ {1, . . . ,m} denote the value of a given rating for a given contribution. That is,
in case of a five-star rating, r is the number of stars of that rating and m = 5. In case of
binary ratings, m = 2, r = 1 denotes a ‘low’ rating, and r = 2 denotes a ‘high’ rating.
We compute the commission in CB2 as
commissionCB2 = τ(r) · points(operation), (3.1)
where τ is a function depending on the scenario, and points(operation) depends on
the operation. See Table 3.1 for an overview of points(operation). For instance,
points(Create topic) = 3.0. (We specify the function τ used in the experiments in
Section 3.5.5.)
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3.2.2. Differences of Consensus Builder 1.0 compared to Consensus Builder
2.0
Data Format
The data format of CB1 is closer to the Topic Maps format (cf. ‘Topic Maps’ on page 31).
Here, as opposed to the model in CB2, a topic can have one or more types, e.g., the
topic type Professor is of type Instructor. However, topic types do not constrain the
attributes and associations that their instances can have. Instead, in CB1, association
types partially fill the role of schema elements. Similar as in CB2, they constrain the
types of the topics that can partake in the instantiated association. As opposed to CB2,
association types are reified concepts that can exist on their own, i.e., independent of
topic types. Further, CB1 supports occurrences, i.e., information sources that are relevant
to a particular topic. A topic can have one or more occurrences that represent links to
external web pages or documents, e.g., to the personal website of the professor.
Collaborative Editing and Rating
CB1’s user interface for editing and rating is similar to that of CB2; see Figure 3.2 for
a screenshot. (Further, see Figure A.2 in Appendix A.) However, since the type level
does only partially constrain the instance level, users have more freedom when creating
attributes, and occurrences for a topic in CB1. Here, only the creation of associations
is constrained. One can interpret this as ratings of other users playing the role of the
schema level: they indicate non-allowed attributes.
Similar to CB2, CB1 allows for deleting concepts that have no dependent concepts only.
However, in CB1, a concept that has dependent concepts can be changed, for example an
association type that has associated instances. In that case, CB1 invalidates all ratings
associated with the changed concept.
Commission
CB1 pays commission on top of the points for the respective operation. That is, for each
data operation the user receives a guaranteed reward of points(operation) as described in
Table 3.1. In addition to this guaranteed reward, a user receives a commission if another
user rates his contributions favorably
commissionCB1 = τ ′(r), (3.2)
where τ ′ is a function depending on the scenario. (We specify the function τ ′ used in the
experiments in Section 3.5.5.)
3.3. Design Decisions Concerning the Honest Rating
Mechanism
We want to elicit high-quality ratings, as opposed to ratings that are uninformed or
simply copy the majority opinion. (This does not exclude the majority opinion from
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after signal p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4) P (h)
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5
l 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.4
h 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.5
Table 3.2.: Updating the type prior p(t).
being correct.) However, a simple reward, e.g., one point per rating, does not suffice.
It does not provide an incentive for the rater to gather information before issuing her
rating and to respond truthfully. To address these challenges, we use an HRM, namely
the Peer Prediction mechanism described in Section 2.2.1. In the following, we describe
the design decisions behind our implementation of the HRM. For a detailed discussion of
HRMs, see Section 2.2.
Estimating types and signal distributions. Let Bin(n | q,N) denote a binomial dis-
tribution of getting n successes in N Bernoulli trials with success probability q. We
encode types as T = {1, . . . , θ}. We assume that each type t ∈ T generates a binomial
distribution of signals with success probability q = t/(θ + 1). That is, type t generates
the signal distribution P (sj | t) = Bin(j − 1 | t/(θ + 1),m− 1).
For each contribution k, we maintain one local type distribution pk(t). We also
maintain one global type distribution p(t) that we use to initialize the local distribution of
a newly created contribution. When a user submits a rating r for k, we update k’s local
distribution pk(t) as well as the global distribution p(t) with r. Further, we assume that
changing an item in the knowledge base also changes its quality and therefore renders
previous ratings invalid. Consequently, if a user changes a contribution k, we reset k’s
rating history and initialize pk(t) with the global distribution at the time of change.
For an illustration of the process of updating p(t), consider the following example
adapted from [MRZ05], with two signals, ‘low’ (s1 = l) and ‘high’ (s2 = h), and four types,
i.e., T = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Since there are only two signals, the binomial signal distribution
degenerates to a Bernoulli distribution. That is, type t generates signal h with probability
P (h | t) = t/5. In other words, types 1, 2, 3, and 4, generate h signals, 20, 40, 60, and
80 percent of the time, respectively. Table 3.2 shows the updating of p(t) according
to Bayes’ theorem. Initially, p(t) is uniform and the marginal probability for signal h,
P (h), is 0.5. After receiving rating l, the lower types become more likely (second table
row). Subsequently, after receiving h (third row), p(t) becomes symmetric again, but the
extreme types (1 and 4) become less likely.
In general, spreading out the type space makes the changes of p(t) smoother. In the
experiments, we use types in the set {1, . . . , 9} because this resolution is sufficient for
our purposes.
Sequential scoring. The original Peer Prediction mechanism scores all ratings for a
given contribution simultaneously. That means, the HRM has to wait with scoring
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until every user in the community has submitted her rating. Since this is impractical in
many scenarios, the authors of the HRM suggest a group-scoring extension for sequential
interaction [MRZ05]. That is, they suggest to put subsequent ratings into small groups
of three or more ratings, and score ratings in the group simultaneously.2 We adapt
this extension for our purposes as follows. To score ratings as soon as possible, like the
original group-scoring extension, we put subsequent ratings of a contribution into groups
of small size (typically 3 or 4). However, instead of scoring ratings in a group only after
the group is complete, we score each rating against the k-th next rating within that
group. More formally, let g denote the group size. Suppose, there is a sequence of ratings
i = 1, 2, . . . , I for a given contribution. We score each rating i against the reference rating
r(i) = ((i+ k − 1) mod g) + 1 + b(i− 1)/gc · g.
For example, for g = 3 and k = 1, the first tuples (i, r(i)) are (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (4, 5),
etc. This means, raters only have to wait for the next rater at most – or not wait at
all, in case of rating i = 3, 6, 9, . . . – until their rating is scored. Thus, our adaptation
scores raters more than 1.5 times earlier (given g = 3 and k = 1) than the original
group-scoring extension, where raters have to wait for their score until their group is
complete. Moreover, our adaptation also reduces the number of ratings that potentially
remain unscored – because their rating group never got complete – compared to the
original extension.
To guarantee the conditions for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we update the distri-
butions pk(t) and p(t) with r(i) as soon as we have scored rating i. Further, users can
view the mechanism’s current estimate of P (s) for a given contribution by clicking a
‘details’ link next to the contribution. To motivate the users that have unscored ratings,
we display the sum of the expected scores for her unscored ratings.
Finally, we vary k and g randomly from time to time, so that raters cannot guess their
reference rater easily. Thus, we hope to keep users from cheating, i.e., coordinating their
ratings with their reference raters.
3.4. Hypotheses
Based on our research questions, we have formulated five hypotheses. They refer to
• the effects of ratings,
• the effects of commissions, and
• the effects of the HRM.
We use the template Hsuperscriptsubscript for denoting a hypothesis. The superscript denotes
the variable whose effects we want to study: ‘rate’ denotes ratings, ‘comm’ denotes
2 Simply scoring each rating against the subsequent one is not feasible. In that case, the last rater has
no incentive to tell the truth, and, consequently, the second last rater – who is scored against the last
rater – has no incentive to tell the truth either, etc.
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commissions, and ‘hrm’ denotes the HRM. The subscript denotes the effected variables:
contribution quality (‘cqual’), contribution quantity (‘cquan’), rating quality (‘rqual’).
An exception to this template is the introductory hypothesis.
Having said this, our hypotheses are as follows.
Hr-meas: Ratings are a reliable measure of the quality of contributions. Rating mech-
anisms are always based on the assumption that individual ratings can be aggregated to
a meaningful measure of quality. We suggest that ratings are indeed suitable to measure
the quality of contributions.
Hratecqual: The presence of ratings increases the quality of contributions. Cosley et
al. [CFK+05] (see also Section 2.1.4) have conducted a study in an online community
where the contributions of a participant are assigned to another participant who can
check the contribution for accuracy and correct it if necessary. Their results show that
this checking improves the quality of contributions. We hypothesize that the same effect
occurs when the checking/correcting of contributions is replaced by the broader concept
of rating mechanisms. That is, we hypothesize that users create contributions of higher
quality in Consensus Builder if they can rate each other’s contributions.
Hcommcqual : Commissions (both commissionCB1 and commissionCB2) increase the quality
of contributions compared to static rewards. Commissions reward users for their
contributions contingent on the ratings of their peers: the more favorable ratings a
contributions receives the higher the reward. Static rewards, on the other hand, reward
users for every contribution with a fixed number of points. The assumption behind
commissions is that users put in more effort to create high-quality contributions if they are
rewarded for quality. We expect his assumption to hold for both variants of commission,
i.e., for commissionCB1 and for commissionCB2. This seems likely but is not self-evident.
Hcommcquan : The fully rating-dependent commissionCB2 reduces the quantity of contribu-
tions compared to static rewards. In CB1, users receive a rating-dependent commission
(commissionCB1) in addition to a fixed, i.e., rating-independent, reward per contribu-
tion (see Section ‘Commission’ on page 42). Based on our experience with CB1, we
emphasized the rating-dependent part of commissions in CB2. That is, we removed the
rating-independent reward and made commissionCB2 fully dependent on ratings (see
Equation (3.1)). However, we expected a trade-off between quantity and quality: if
users are exclusively rewarded contingent on quality they create contributions of higher
quality (as the previous hypothesis states) but of lower quantity. Thus, prior to designing
experiments for CB2, we formulated this hypothesis.
Hhrmrqual: An HRM improves rating quality compared to static rewards. Hypothesis
Hratecqual above states that the presence of ratings has a positive impact on the quality of the
created knowledge. Hhrmrqual, on the other hand, is explicitly concerned with the quality of
the ratings themselves. We expect that scoring ratings by means of the HRM motivates
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raters to submit ratings of higher quality than a fixed score per rating. We deem such
high-quality ratings essential for the creation of high-quality knowledge. This is because
only high-quality ratings allow filtering out bad contributions and thereby increase the
quality of the knowledge. Ratings of low or unknown quality cannot achieve this.
3.5. Experiments
To test our hypotheses, we conducted two series of experiments with Consensus Builder.
The first series of experiments used CB1. In this first series, we wanted to gain empirical
insights into how suitable Consensus Builder is as a tool for the collaborative creation
of structured knowledge. The experiments of this series focus mainly on testing the
hypotheses that regard the presence of ratings for the collaborative creation of structured
knowledge. The second series of experiments used CB2. The respective experiments were
primarily concerned with testing the hypothesis regarding the HRM. Both series tested
the hypotheses concerned with the effects of commissions.
In the following, we first elaborate the design of the experiments. We then present
the individual experiments of each series. Afterwards, we describe characteristics of the
experimental setup common to all experiments, such as the configuration of the HRM
and the commission functions, and external rewards participants received. Further, we
discuss the different gold standards we used for quality assessment. Finally, we list the
statistical methods we used for our analysis.
3.5.1. Experimental Design
To test our hypotheses, we conducted controlled single-blind experiments. That is, in
each experiment, we randomly assigned participants to the experimental group (EG) or
the control group (CG) without the participants’ knowledge. We use the EG to evaluate
the effects of the mechanisms in question. The CG serves as the baseline. For example,
to test whether ratings affect contribution quality, we enabled ratings for the EG and
disabled them for the CG. Such a controlled design allows us to establish cause and effect
since the only variable that differs systematically between EG and CG is the respective
experimental feature.
As independent variables (causes) we choose the following
• usage of ratings vs. no ratings,
• usage of commissions vs. static rewards, and
• HRM scoring of ratings vs. a static reward per rating.
As dependent variables (effects) we measure among others
• contribution quality,
• contribution quantity, and
• rating quality.
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To measure rating and contribution quality, we employed different gold standards that
we discuss below in Section 3.5.6.
Shared Data between Experimental Groups vs. Separate Data
Should EG and CG operate on the same data or should they use separate knowledge
bases? This question refers to the internal validity of the experiment: Does the dependent
variable measure the effect caused by the variation of the independent variable? Or
does it measure some other undesired influence by a third variable? The answer to
these questions depends on the interaction between the respective independent and the
dependent variables, as we discuss in the following.
Separate data to measure contribution quality. To make sure that the differences in
‘contribution quality’ are indeed caused by variations of the independent variables ‘usage
of ratings’ and ‘usage of commission’, both experimental groups have to operate on
separate sets of data. To see why this is so, consider the alternative, i.e., using a shared
knowledge base. In such a setting, it is impossible to differentiate between the effects
of the independent variable and other undesired effects, such as the following three. (1)
Data entries depend on each other, e.g., the contributions on the instance level depend
on the schema level. That means, the quality of a contribution a can be influenced by
the quality of another contribution b associated to a. And the former could have been
created by a member of one group while the latter could have been created by a member
of the other group. In that case, it is unclear what influenced the quality of a: The
independent variable? The quality of b. A bit of both? (2) A contribution x could be
created from a member of one group and afterwards be changed by a member of the
other group. In that case, it is unclear which group to attribute the quality of x to. (3)
When testing the effects of commissionCB2, we expect a higher number of low quality
contributions in the CG according to Hcommcquan and Hcommcqual . This might affect the results
even more if both groups operated on shared data. Only separate knowledge bases for
each group let us eliminate such undesired effects on contribution quality and thus allow
for an unambiguous assessment of the contribution quality of each group.
Shared data to measure rating quality. To measure the effects of the HRM on rating
quality, on the other hand, both groups have to operate on the same data. If the groups
used separate knowledge bases, it would be hard to tell whether differences in rating
quality result from the usage of the HRM or from differences between the knowledge
bases. For example, separate knowledge bases could differ regarding the average level of
difficulty for assessing the data. In that case, the rating quality would not only reflect
the effects of the HRM but also the effects caused by the variation in difficulty. Only
when participants from both experimental groups rate items from the same set can such
undesired effects on the dependent variable ‘rating quality’ be minimized.
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3.5.2. Experiments Using Consensus Builder 1.0
We conducted the experiments with CB1 in the context of an existing online lecture
community in January and February 2008. The community consisted of students attending
the lectures of our department. The community portal of the lecture community contained
tools for course management and collaboration (see Figure A.3 in Appendix A). For
example, students could access the syllabus of the courses, check recent announcements,
download lecture material, and use a discussion forum. In order to make CB1 available
to the participants of the online community, we integrated CB1 into the community
portal. To achieve a seamless integration, we facilitated navigation between the Topic
Map created with CB1 and the other tools of the community. For example, users could
link lecture slides as occurrences of topics. They could also rate the validity of these
occurrences. In this lecture community setting, we conducted two experiments with CB1
that we describe in the following.
Experiment Ratecompare
For this experiment, we invited students of the lecture “Database Deployment” and
instructed them to model the lecture as a Topic Map. At the beginning of the experiment,
we gave a short introduction to Topic Maps and demonstrated our tool. We wanted to
test Hratecqual, i.e., that the usage of rating mechanisms increases the quality of contributions.
Thus, we enabled ratings for the EG and disabled ratings for the CG. In order to eliminate
potential influences between the groups, we let each experimental group create its own
Topic Map. The experiment lasted two weeks.
Experiment Commission-cb1
For this experiment that we conducted subsequently to Ratecompare, we invited stu-
dents of the lecture “Data Warehousing and Mining”. The students of this lecture overlap
almost completely with those of the lecture “Database Deployment” of Ratecompare.
Consequently, we let already registered participants remain in their respective experi-
mental group assigned to them in Ratecompare. Again, we instructed participants
to model the lecture as a Topic Map and we gave general introductions to Topic Maps
and Consensus Builder. To test Hcommcqual , i.e., that commissions improve the quality of
contributions, we chose usage of commission as the independent variable: users in the
EG received the commissionCB1 while users in the CG did not receive a commission.
Both EG and CG received a guaranteed reward for creating contributions as described in
Table 3.1. We enabled ratings in the EG since they are the basis for commissions. To
exclude the effect of ‘ratings vs. no ratings’ on contribution quality, we enabled ratings
in the CG as well. Again, we let EG and CG work on separate Topic Maps to eliminate
potential influences between the groups. The experiment lasted two weeks.
48
3.5. Experiments
Testing Hr-meas
In each experiment conducted with CB1, at least one of the experimental groups used
ratings. This allows us to test Hr-meas.
3.5.3. Experiments with Consensus Builder 2.0
We conducted a number of experiments with CB2 in March, July, and December 2010.
Participants in the experiments with CB2 used Consensus Builder as a standalone tool.
That is, as opposed to the CB1 experiments, we did not embed Consensus Builder into
another community platform for these experiments.
Experiment Commission-cb2
We designed this experiment to test Hcommcqual for commissionCB2 as well as Hcommcquan. EG
and CG operated on separate data in order to eliminate potential influences between the
groups. For Commission-cb2, we invited students of the lecture “Database Systems”.
We asked participants to model the content of the lecture and also related information,
and to rate each others’ contributions. We rewarded ratings of both the EG and the CG
by means of the HRM. The experiment lasted three weeks.
To test Hcommcqual and Hcommcquan, we chose usage of commissions as the independent variable.
Users in the EG received the commissionCB2 while users in the CG received a rating-
independent reward points(operation) as defined in Table 3.1. To prevent potential
exploitation, this amount was deducted when the contribution was deleted.
Experiment Rateonly
In this experiment, we focused exclusively on the HRM. To reduce effects that are not
related to the HRM, we disabled all functionality for creating and editing contributions.
This resulted in a modified CB2 which only supported rating, searching, and viewing.
We recruited participants among students of our chair and instructed them to rate 127
contributions. We had preselected these 127 contributions from a knowledge base that
students had created for the domain “Karlsruhe Institute of Technology” in a creation
phase prior to the experiment itself. The selected contributions remained embedded
within the knowledge base. That is, the participants of the experiment could see all the
contributions from the creation phase, but could rate the 127 selected ones only. The
experiment lasted three days. To test Hhrmrqual, we scored participants in the EG with the
HRM, while the CG was scored statically with one point per rating.
Experiment Honstudents
We tested Hhrmrqual in a setting with the full functionality of CB2. We invited students
of the lecture “Machine Design” of the Department of Mechanical Engineering of our
university. We told them to create topics and types which represent the content of the
lecture and to rate the contributions of others. Again, we rewarded the EG by means
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of the HRM and the CG with one point per rating. To allow for comparing the rating
quality of EG and CG later on, both groups worked together on the same knowledge
base. The experiment lasted three weeks.
Experiment Honstaff
We repeated the experiment Honstudents to test Hhrmrqual in a setting close to that of a
community within a company. For this run, we invited researchers from the Institute of
Product Engineering of our university. As knowledge domain we used a model for the
engineering design process developed by this institute [ASM11]. We advised participants
to use the elements of that engineering model as topic types and concrete instances as
topics. The experiment lasted two weeks.
3.5.4. Real-World Significance of the Experimental Setups
Our experiments go well beyond vanilla laboratory experiments in several respects: They
take place in real-world settings, within online communities where participants are not
restricted by laboratory conditions. Unlike toy domains, the knowledge domains used were
complex and had real-world significance. For example, the majority of the participants
of the CB1 experiments stated that they planned to use the Topic Maps they had built
for the preparation of their exams. The participants used Consensus Builder in an
asynchronous fashion from home or from their workplace. We put attention to not letting
participants know that an experiment was taking place nor that there existed different
experimental groups. We achieved this by announcing the experiments as “beta test and
user study”. (In Ratecompare, some participants who knew each other in real life were
assigned to different groups. When these participants asked why their acquaintances
could rate contributions and they could not, we claimed that only few participants used
rating mechanisms in order to calibrate system parameters.) During the CB1 experiments,
we introduced experimental features to the members of the EG by means of email. During
the CB2 experiments, we introduced them by means of the announcement feature within
the Consensus Builder tool. Further, the assignment to groups was invisible to the
participants, i.e., there were no indicators (e.g., specific URLs, etc.) that made the group
explicit. The experiments lasted up to several weeks. This blurred the distinction between
real world and experiment further. In general, participants remained anonymous to each
other throughout the experiment and had no information about how many members their
respective communities had. The university courses from which we recruited participants
for the CB2 experiments had an anonymous character as well. All had a high number
of students (up to 600).3 Further, one of the lectures (experiment Honstudents) has
been recorded and broadcast on the Internet, and most students chose to watch it from
home. Thus, even though participants in these experiments were from the same course,
we have not been aware of any personal interaction regarding the creation of structured
knowledge (the exception being Ratecompare). This impression was confirmed in
3 The lectures that supplied the participants for the CB1 experiments were smaller (about 60 students
each) and therefore less anonymous.
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personal discussions with participants who have come to our offices to collect their
remunerations for participating. Thus, regarding the aspects that are relevant to the
character of our study, the settings do not differ much from large online communities.
3.5.5. Further Characteristics of the Experiments.
Settings for Rating Scale and HRM Parameters
CB1. For the experiments with CB1, we used the well-known five-star rating scale, i.e.,
signals are members of the set {1, . . . , 5}, where 1 represents the ‘worst’ and 5 the ‘best
possible’ value. As HRM, we used the classical Peer Prediction mechanism with the
quadratic scoring rule and scaled the remunerations for ratings to the interval [0, 1].
CB2. For the experiments with CB2, we used a binary rating scale, i.e., ratings are
either ‘low’ or ‘high’. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, users are not significantly influenced
by the granularity of the rating scale [CLA+03]. Remember that in the CB2 experiments,
we were primarily concerned with testing the hypothesis regarding the HRM. Therefore,
we chose the binary rating scale since it makes conveying the intuition behind the HRM to
users easier than more fine-granular scales. Accordingly, we have modeled signals to be in
the set {l, h}. For CB2, we used the Peer Prediction HRM with the linear program defined
in Equation (2.10). Therefore, we had to specify an upper bound for the external benefit a
rater can gain from lying, i.e., reporting a different signal than she has received. Because
in our experimental setups side payments for lying from third parties are unrealistic,
we simply set the external lying benefits to a low value of λ(sj , sl) = 0.5 for all signals
sl 6= sj . We set the external benefits gained from truth-telling to λ(sj , sj) = 0. (We
avoid setting the external lying benefits to 0 because this would lead to the undesirable
effect that raters receive the same payments for lying as for truth telling.) Further, we
set the rating costs c to 1.5 points. Given the λ(·, ·) settings described above and c = 1.5,
the linear program scales the expected payments for truth-telling to about 1.5 points, if
the type prior is not very heavily skewed. This allows for a comparison with the CG,
who was rewarded with 1 point per rating. We use 1.5 points instead of 1 for the EG
because we assume risk-averse participants, as well as some unscored ratings.
Settings for Commission
We set τ ′ = 0.25(r−1). That is, the commission for CB1 experiments is commissionCB1 =
0.25(r − 1). In other words, a user received 0.25 points for a two-star rating given to
his/her contribution, 0.5 points for a three-star rating, and so on.
We set τ = 0.2(r − 1). I.e., commissionCB2 = 0.2(r − 1) · points(operation). That is,
the current owner of a contribution received 0.2 · points(operation) for every positive
rating the contribution had received and 0 points for negative ratings.
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External Rewards
To recruit students for Ratecompare and Commission-cb1, we announced to conduct a
lottery of six exam bonuses. The intention behind the lottery was to motivate participants,
including those with low scores. The high scores of other participants would likely deter
those low-scoring participants if only the top-k members received a reward. The points
gathered served as number of lots for the lottery. So the chance of winning an exam
bonus was proportional to the final score in the experiment.
To motivate students to participate in Commission-cb2 and Honstudents, each
active participant received a guaranteed compensation of 5 Euro. A participant was
considered active if he/she had reached at least 30 points. Additionally to the guaranteed
compensation, we conducted a point-dependent lottery over Ne · 10 Euro in total for
each experiment e, where Ne denotes the number of active participants of e. The lottery
consisted of 2 ·Ne draws of 5 Euro each. Every full point counted as an individual lottery
ticket.
To motivate the researchers to participate in Honstaff we raﬄed off two digital
cameras (Canon IXUS 105) and eight USB flash drives. Here, the chance of winning was
proportional to the points gathered in the experiment as well.
For Rateonly, we paid each participant of the CG a fixed compensation of 6 Euro.
Each participant i of the N participants of the EG received (3 + points(i)∑
i
points(i) ·N) · 7 Euro,
where points(i) is the total number of points gathered by i during the experiment.
Note that, in an ideal scenario, external rewards scale in proportion to the points
gathered. That means that the budget used for rewards would scale with the number of
points as well. However, for our experiments, we only had a fixed amount of rewards
at our disposal. The fixed amount might introduce some competition, as we discuss in
Section 3.7.
Training Phase for CB2
We noticed that contribution quality increased between Ratecompare and Commission-
cb1 in both experimental groups. We attribute this partially to learning effects, since,
as mentioned, the participants of Ratecompare and Commission-cb1 overlapped to
a large degree. To mitigate such potential learning effects in the CB2 experiments, we
added a training phase prior to each of these experiment. During this training phase,
participants got accustomed with the Consensus Builder tool. To aid learning, we
provided screencasts that explained the usage of CB and the details of data modeling in
particular.
(Late) Registration
Anonymous accounts raise the problem of Sybil attacks [Dou02] where users forge multiple
identities to gain larger influence. To counter those attacks in the CB1 experiments, we
applied validation techniques to make sure that each person created only one account. For
this purpose, we distributed activation keys among the students and manually ensured
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that each person obtained at most one key. This activation key was prompted during
the creation of an account and synchronized with the database. In the experiments with
CB2, the domain of the email address constrained the registration to guard against Sybil
attacks.
Participants could enter a CB2 experiment while it was already running. An algorithm
based on biased coin randomization [Efr71] assigned participants to either the EG or the
CG, while keeping the numbers of members of the groups balanced.
Questionnaire
After each experiment, we invited the participants to complete a questionnaire. It elicited
feedback on rewards, ratings, rating mechanisms, the behavior of other participants, and
the usability of the Consensus Builder tool. The number of questions per questionnaire
ranged up to 30, dependent on the configuration for the respective participant. We used
a five point Likert scale response format (‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’) for most
questions. To motivate participants to fill out the questionnaire, they received extra
points upon successful completion.
3.5.6. Gold Standards for Quality Assessment
In the following, we discuss the different gold standards we used to assess the quality of
contributions and ratings.
Expert Ratings
For the CB1 experiments, as well as forCommission-cb2, Honstudents, andHonstaff,
we let domain experts rate a subset of contributions and used their ratings as gold standard.
The subset of contributions, as well as the rating scale experts used, depended on the
hypothesis to test. Testing Hhrmrqual required comparing the rating quality between the
EG and the CG. We randomly picked 150 contributions that had received at least
one rating from both experimental groups. Here, experts used the same rating scale
as users. To test Hcommcqual and Hratecqual, we simply picked 50 contributions randomly from
each group. Here, experts used a five-star ratings scale to allow for a fine-granular
assessment of the contribution quality. For Commission-cb2, in addition to the 50
randomly selected contributions such as attributes, associations etc., we let the experts
assess the ‘overall quality’ and ‘overall adequateness’ of the topic or topic type associated
with the respective contribution as a whole. This allows for a comprehensive quality
assessment of the contributions. In summary, apart from Commission-cb2, the experts
used the same user interface as the participants to issue ratings. To understand the
context, experts could see all contributions created in the respective experiment. To
remove potential bias, experts had no knowledge about which experimental group the
contributions they rated belonged to.
We chose the following domain experts for the various experiments: up to three
teaching assistants (numbers in brackets) of the respective course for Ratecompare
(three), Commission-cb1 (three), Commission-cb2 (two), and Honstudents (one).
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For Honstaff, we chose a scientist whose research topic is the engineering model that
served as the domain for the experiment. Since each of the domain experts had limited
experience in data modeling for the latter two experiments, a database expert supported
them with the assessment of the data model.
Inter-rater agreement between experts. For each of the experiments Ratecompare,
Commission-cb1, and Commission-cb2 we let multiple experts rate the contributions.
To make sure that our experts were in agreement, we computed a pairwise Cohen’s kappa
measure for experts that rated the same sets of data. Cohen’s kappa is a statistical
measure of inter-rater agreement [FLP13]. A kappa value of less than 0 stands for less
than chance agreement, while a value of 1 means perfect agreement. Since the expert
ratings are ordinal data, we computed the weighted kappa [Coh68] with square weights
(disagreements are weighted according to their squared distance from perfect agreement).
The computed kappa values were all statistically significant (p < 0.01) and ranged
from 0.21 to 0.61 (mean = 0.42, se = 0.035), indicating fair to substantial agreement
[LK+77]. After we had computed the kappa values, we let each expert group discuss the
controversial ratings to find a final consensus. We use these consensus ratings for the
statistical analysis below.
As mentioned, for the domains modeled for Honstudents and Honstaff we had
to recruit experts from another department. Here, we could only mobilize one domain
expert for each experiment. However, we deemed the situation of using only one domain
expert as acceptable since our previous experiments had shown that the opinions of
multiple experts overlap to a sufficiently large degree.
Manipulation
For Rateonly, we selected 127 contributions manually (all on the instance level) out
of the more than 5000 contributions created during the data-creation phase. The
contributions selected were unambiguously correct, as confirmed by information publicly
available on websites. We manipulated 34 out of the 127 contributions so that they were
false. The manipulated contributions together with the remaining manually selected ones
served as the gold standard.
We classified the manipulations in three categories according to the effort needed to
verify the respective errors:
1. Easy to verify. These are blatant errors, like a building having 666 elevators or a
paper on sensor networks published in 1920.
2. Medium effort to verify. This category contained plausible-looking errors, like
changes in room numbers or changes in co-authors of a paper. They could be
detected by internet search.
3. Hard to verify. These manipulations were subtle and could only be verified with
high effort, for example, the number of floors in a remote building.
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We hypothesized that the HRM has an effect on errors of Category 2 only. Both groups
should recognize errors in Category 1. Category 1 allows checking whether participants
made any effort at all. For Category 3, the effort for error detection exceeded the benefit
from honest ratings by much. It served as an extra check to exclude the possibility that
the EG was more motivated than the CG a priori.
3.5.7. Overview Experimental Setups
Table 3.3 shows an overview of the different setups for CB1 and CB2 experiments:
Columns contain the experiments. Rows list the respective characteristics.
3.5.8. Statistical Methods
We test the correlation between aggregated user and expert ratings with Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient ρ. Further, we use Spearman’s ρ to test the correlation between
Likert responses from the questionnaire and other experimental results. We use Pearson’s
χ2 test to evaluate associations between binary variables, e.g., between classification
errors and usage of the HRM. (For directional associations we use the one-tailed χ2
test [FLP13].) We use Welch’s t-test to evaluate the difference of the mean number of
contributions. We compare the five-star expert ratings by means of the Mann-Whitney U
test [dWD10]. We carry out the analysis by means of the statistical software R [R C13].
3.6. Results
We present the results of our experiments, including the evaluation of the hypotheses
and of the questionnaire. Table 3.4 gives an overview of the number of participants,
contributions, and ratings for each of the six experiments.
3.6.1. Hr-meas: Ratings are a Reliable Measure of Contribution Quality
Many online communities aggregate ratings and display the average value as a measure
of contribution quality. In order to analyze whether aggregated ratings are suitable to
measure the quality of contributions, we compared user ratings gathered in experiments
Ratecompare and Commission-cb1 with expert ratings for the same contributions.
Since the ratings of each contribution are averaged, as many ratings as possible are
required to generalize from the subjective opinions of individual members. To have at
least as many user ratings as expert ratings, we considered only contributions with at
least three ratings from different users. An analysis of the data shows that there is a
medium correlation (ρ = 0.46, p < 0.01) between the average ratings of users and experts.
Because of the significant correlation between user and expert ratings, we deem the first
hypothesis supported.
It is worth mentioning that the average of the expert ratings (mean = 0.56, se = 0.03;
ratings normalized to zero-to-one range) is lower than the average of the user ratings
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Figure 3.3.: Distribution of expert ratings for contributions in Ratecompare. (5 is the
best-possible rating, and 1 the worst-possible rating a contribution could
receive.)
(mean = 0.66, se = 0.03). In other words, the experts were more critical than the users
in their assessment of contribution quality.
3.6.2. Hratecqual: The Presence of Ratings Improves the Quality of
Contributions
To test if the presence of ratings improves contribution quality, we use the data gathered
in Ratecompare. Remember that we enabled ratings for the EG and disabled ratings
for the CG in this experiment. As Figure 3.3 shows, the experts rated the contributions
by the EG more favorably – even though only to a moderate extent – than those by the
CG. The difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whithney U = 626, p < 0.05). Thus
we deem hypothesis Hratecqual supported.
3.6.3. Hcommcqual : Commissions (both commissionCB1 and commissionCB2)
Increase Contribution Quality
For Hcommcqual we distinguish between the commission paid additionally to guaranteed rewards
(commissionCB1) and commission paid for favorable ratings only (commissionCB2).
In experiment Commission-cb1, the CG received a fixed reward per contribution while
the EG received points according to commissionCB1 additionally to the fixed reward. We
find no statistically significant difference between the distributions of the expert ratings
for the EG and the CG (Mann-Whithney U = 1723.5, p = 0.8). Even though the EG
earned more five-star ratings from the experts, it received less four-star ratings than the
CG (Figure 3.4). The remaining ratings (three-, two-, one-star) have about the same
relative frequency in both groups.
In experiment Commission-cb2, the EG received points according to commissionCB2
while the CG received a fixed reward per contribution. Figure 3.5 shows the distributions
of expert ratings for individual contributions, as well as for ‘overall quality’, and ‘overall
adequateness’ of the respective topics and topic types. We find statistically significant
differences between the ratings for CG and EG in all three expert rating categories. That
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Figure 3.4.: Distribution of expert ratings in Commission-cb1. (5: best-possible, 1:
worst-possible rating.)
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Figure 3.5.: Commission-cb2: distributions of expert ratings for individual contributions,
as well as for ‘overall quality’, and ‘overall adequateness’. (5: best-possible,
1: worst-possible rating.)
is, in each category, experts assigned significantly lower ratings to the CG (rewarded
statically) than to the EG (rewarded with commissionCB2): (1) individual contributions
(Mann-Whithney U = 1023.5, p < 0.05), (2) ‘overall quality’ (Mann-Whithney U = 684,
p < 0.05), (3) ‘overall adequateness’ (Mann-Whithney U = 549, p < 0.01).
According to these results, we deem hypothesis Hcommcqual as partially supported. It is
supported for commissionCB2, but not for commissionCB1.
Interestingly, we find for Commission-cb1 that members of the EG were significantly
more critical with their ratings (mean = 0.59, se = 0.39; ratings normalized to zero-
to-one range) than members of the CG (mean = 0.72, se = 0.32)(Welch’s t(2655.8) =
9.63, p < 0.01). This fact conflicts with the assessment by the experts who evaluated
contributions by both groups as of about equal quality. Apparently, the EG was biased
towards more critical ratings and displayed a more competitive behavior compared to
the CG. The same result holds true for Commission-cb2 as well. Here, participants
remunerated with commissionCB2 seem to rate their peers’ contributions more critically,
too. The ratio of negative ratings was significantly higher in the EG (0.258) than in the
CG (0.039) (χ2(1)=31.2, p < 0.01), even though the experts rated the contributions of
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the EG more favorably. We discuss the implications of this finding in Section 3.7.
3.6.4. Hcommcquan : commissionCB2 Reduces Contribution Quantity
We tested Hcommcquan in Commission-cb2. There were much fewer contributions per partici-
pant in the group using commissionCB2 (mean = 27.0, median = 22 se = 7.96) than in
the one without (mean = 126.5, median = 46.5, se = 67.27). However, there was a lot of
variation between the number of contributions of individual participants as is reflected
by the high standard errors of the means. Further, the difference of the means is not
statistically significant (one-tailed Welch’s t(5.14) = 1.47, p = 0.10). Consequently, even
though the numbers are suggestive, we deem Hcommcquan as not supported.
3.6.5. Hhrmrqual: An HRM Improves Rating Quality
To test Hhrmrqual, we compare the error rates of ratings rewarded with the HRM (EG) to
those rewarded statically (CG). Let r ∈ {0, 1} denote a given rating, and let g(r) ∈ {0, 1}
denote the gold standard of that rating.4 We define the rating error re(r) as an indicator
variable
re(r) =
{
1 if r 6= g(r)
0 otherwise.
The error rate of ratings (err) is the proportion of rating errors out of all ratings, i.e.,
err = 1|G|
∑
r∈G re(r), where G is the set of ratings which we have a gold standard for.
For Honstudents (see Figure 3.6a), there was a highly significant association between
rating errors and the usage of the HRM (χ2(1) = 71.52, p < 0.01). The err was much
higher for the CG (0.57) than for the EG (0.11). The odds ratio of making a rating error
when using the HRM was 0.09. We conclude for this experiment that the mechanism
improved rating quality.
For Honstaff (see Figure 3.6a) we found no statistically significant association between
rating errors and the usage of the HRM (χ2(1) = 1.9071, p = 0.17). The CG showed
slightly better results regarding rating quality (err=0.16) than the EG (err=0.22). For
Honstaff, we conclude that there is no significant effect of the HRM on rating quality.
A possible reason for this is that the researchers already had a high intrinsic motivation
to create high-quality data since they wanted to use it in their research later on. Further,
even though they did not interact outside of CB for the knowledge-creation task, they
might have felt stronger obligations towards their relatively close-knit group. This high
intrinsic motivation might have diminished the effects of the HRM.
Figure 3.6b shows the err for the three error categories of Rateonly for CG and EG,
respectively. The participants of the EG made significantly fewer errors in the ‘medium
effort to verify’ category (odds ratio = 0.5, χ2(1) = 3.3, one-tailed p < 0.05). For the
other two error categories, we found no significant association between errors and the
usage of the HRM(‘easy to verify’: χ2(1) = 1.52, p = 0.22; ‘hard to verify’: χ2(1) = 0.002,
p = 0.96). The err for ratings of non-manipulated contributions was very low in both
4The gold standard of a rating simply is the gold standard of the contribution the rating belongs to.
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Figure 3.6.: Error rate of ratings for CG and EG.
Hypothesis Result
Hr-meas supported
Hratecqual supported
Hcommcqual for commissionCB1 not supported
Hcommcqual for commissionCB2 supported
Hcommcquan not supported (but suggestive)
Hhrmrqual supported in two out of three experiments
Table 3.5.: Overview results regarding hypotheses.
groups (CG: 0.054, EG: 0.043) and the association not statistically significant (two-tailed
χ2(1) = 0.27, p = 0.6). We conclude that, for Rateonly, the HRM increases rating
quality.
Summing up, we find that two out of three experiments support Hhrmrqual.
Note that the low error rate for HRM ratings also supports Hr-meas, i.e., ratings are a
reliable measure of contribution quality. This is because the less rating errors occur, the
more correct and thus reliable the ratings are as a measure of contribution quality. In
other words, the results obtained for Hr-meas show that aggregated ratings are a reliable
measure of contribution quality. The results obtained for Hhrmrqual show that this is more
likely to be true for HRM-scored ratings than for statically rewarded ones.
3.6.6. Summary of the Hypotheses Tests
The empirical results we obtained support two of our hypotheses fully and two partially.
Table 3.5 shows an overview.
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3.6.7. Evaluation of the Questionnaire
19 participants of the CB1 experiments, and 27 participants of the CB2 experiments
answered the respective questionnaire. The questions differed somewhat between the
questionnaires used for CB1 and CB2. Further, the number of questions differed between
experimental groups because the different experimental conditions rendered some ques-
tions meaningless for the respective groups. (E.g., we did not ask participants whose
ratings we had scored statically whether they had understood the HRM.) Figure 3.7
shows an overview of the results for selected questions.
In the following we analyze the answers to the respective questionnaires in more detail.
Analysis of the CB1 questionnaire responses. Remember that at the end of the
CB1 experiments, we raﬄed off exam bonuses as the sole external reward to motivate
participation. In the questionnaire, we asked participants if they would have preferred
deterministic rewards for the top k users, and further, if they considered the lottery of
rewards as fair. Somewhat expected, user score and the desire for a deterministic rewards
were correlated (ρ = 0.55, p < .05), while user score and viewing the lottery as fair were
anti-correlated (ρ = −0.47, p < 0.05). In other words, participants with higher scores
deem the lottery less fair and show a stronger desire for deterministic rewards. We found
a moderate negative correlation between rating truthfully and joining the consensus
rating (ρ = −0.48, p < .05). That is, the participants apparently consider truthful and
consensus-oriented ratings as mutually exclusive. Further, the EG in Commission-cb1
reported more often that they tried to keep the scores of their fellow members low than the
CG, although the difference was not statistically significant (Mann-Whithney U = 28.5,
p = 0.14). This confirms our observation that there is a conflict between truthful ratings
and commissions for good contributions. We discuss possible implications in the next
section.
Analysis of CB2 questionnaire responses. We asked participants which rating strategy
they used to maximize their rating score. Some stated an altruistic attitude “I did not
intend to get as many points as possible, but tried to increase the quality of contributions
by rating pointless or bad contributions as bad.”, “I tried to rate as much as possible as
honestly as possible.” (both rewarded by the HRM). Others said they tried to maximize
their scores, although with different rating strategies, dependent on their respective
scoring mechanism, namely “Rating many items, but only those whose quality was easy
to decide.” (HRM), and “Simply rated everything, no matter how.” (static reward for
ratings).
Further, we analyzed the correlations of experimental results of the participants and
their questionnaire answers. Not surprisingly, we find a positive correlation between the
understanding of the HRM and the number of ratings (ρ = 0.52, p < .05). There is a
strong correlation between the number of ratings and the stated strategy of rating the
contributions of others badly in order to keep their scores low. However, this holds true
only for raters whose ratings were scored statically (ρ = 0.764, p < 0.5). For participants
using the HRM, on the other hand, this correlation was negligible (ρ = 0.16, p = 0.59).
62
3.6. Results
C
B
1*
: I
 p
la
n 
to
 u
se
 t
he
 T
op
ic
 M
ap
 c
re
at
ed
 w
it
h 
C
B
1 
fo
r 
m
y 
ex
am
 p
re
pa
ra
ti
on
.
C
B
2:
 A
m
ou
nt
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l r
ew
ar
ds
 (
lo
tt
er
y 
an
d 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n)
 w
as
 a
de
qu
at
e 
C
B
1:
 A
m
ou
nt
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l r
ew
ar
ds
 (
lo
tt
er
y 
ex
am
 b
on
us
es
) 
w
as
 a
de
qu
at
e
O
th
er
s 
w
er
e 
(C
oo
pe
ra
ti
ve
(1
)−
C
om
pe
te
ti
ve
(5
))
C
B
2*
 H
R
M
 u
se
rs
: C
on
vi
nc
ed
, h
on
es
t 
ra
ti
ng
s 
m
ax
im
iz
e 
sc
or
e
C
B
2*
 H
R
M
 u
se
rs
: H
on
es
t 
ra
ti
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 in
du
ce
d 
ef
fo
rt
C
B
2*
 H
R
M
 u
se
rs
: H
on
es
t 
ra
ti
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 e
as
y 
to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d
I 
tr
ie
d 
to
 k
ee
p 
co
m
m
is
si
on
s 
of
 o
th
er
s 
lo
w
 b
y 
gi
vi
ng
 lo
w
 r
at
in
gs
O
th
er
s 
ra
te
d 
m
y 
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s 
ho
ne
st
ly
I 
ra
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 g
ro
up
 o
pi
ni
on
I 
ra
te
d 
ho
ne
st
ly
C
B
2*
: B
et
te
r 
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s 
du
e 
to
 c
om
m
is
si
on
B
et
te
r 
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s 
du
e 
to
 r
at
in
gs
R
at
in
gs
 im
pr
ov
e 
da
ta
 q
ua
lit
y
C
B
2*
: G
ra
nu
la
ri
ty
 o
f t
he
 r
at
in
g 
sc
al
e(
E
xa
ct
ly
 r
ig
ht
(1
),
 T
oo
 c
oa
rs
e(
2)
))
G
ra
nu
la
ri
ty
 r
at
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
(T
oo
 fi
ne
(1
),
 R
ig
ht
(2
),
 T
oo
 c
oa
rs
e(
3)
)
C
B
2:
 C
re
at
in
g 
da
ta
 w
it
h 
C
on
se
ns
us
 B
ui
ld
er
 w
as
 e
as
y
C
B
1:
 C
re
at
in
g 
da
ta
 w
it
h 
C
on
se
ns
us
 B
ui
ld
er
 w
as
 e
as
y
0
10
20
30
40
50
N
um
be
r 
of
 r
es
po
ns
es
A
n
sw
er
5 4 3 2 1
Fi
gu
re
3.
7.
:N
um
be
r
of
re
sp
on
se
s
fo
r
se
le
ct
ed
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
qu
es
tio
ns
fo
r
C
B
1
an
d
C
B
2
ex
pe
rim
en
ts
.
A
ns
we
rs
ra
ng
e
fro
m
1:
‘st
ro
ng
ly
di
sa
gr
ee
’t
o
5:
‘st
ro
ng
ly
ag
re
e’
,u
nl
es
s
ot
he
rw
ise
no
te
d.
(C
B
1*
/C
B
2*
:
qu
es
tio
n
wa
s
pa
rt
of
C
B
1/
C
B
2
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
on
ly
.)
63
3. Peer Production of Structured Knowledge
We find a weak correlation between the understanding of the HRM and the score received
per rating (ρ = 0.31, p = .18). In other words, it is not necessary to understand the
mechanism in order to profit from it.
3.7. Discussion and Lessons Learned
We discuss the experimental results and present the lessons learned while conducting the
experiment.
More critical ratings due to commissions. Both forms of commission we tested –
commissionCB1 and commissionCB2 – lead to somewhat more competitive user behavior:
Users rewarded with commission give more critical ratings than users not rewarded
with commission. Further, the responses to the questionnaire for CB1 confirm the more
competitive behavior. We speculate that this is due to the zero-sum character of the
external lottery rewards we offered. I.e., participants competed for a fixed number of
lottery prices. And since positive ratings for other participants’ contributions increase the
others’ chances of winning said price, users might rate more negatively. If our speculation
is correct, a simple solution to this problem is to remove the zero-sum character by
remunerating users not with a fixed number of rewards but with rewards proportional
to the number of points. Of course, this might drastically increase the budget that is
required to pay for commissions and the HRM scores, and thus is not an option for most
online communities. Further, many online communities motivate users by prestige or
status within the community, which is by definition zero-sum, at least concerning the
overall status. Subdividing the overall status hierarchy into many might alleviate the
zero-sum character. In that case, users can compete to be the best in many different
categories. However, even though our data indicate somewhat more critical ratings due
to commissions, the majority of ratings was of high quality. This is also supported by the
results gained in Honstudents and Honstaff, which both show a high rating quality,
at least for the participants rewarded by the HRM.
Besides the truth-telling Nash-Equilibrium, lying equilibria are also possible for the
HRM mechanism (Section 2.2.3). In a lying equilibrium, raters agree on rating all
contributions or a subset of contributions as either good or bad. Such undesired equilbria
might be facilitated by commissions in zero-sum conditions: In order to avoid giving
points to possible competitors, it might be conceivable that users – tacitly or explicitly –
agree on rating all contributions as bad, while still being rewarded by the HRM. We did
not find any evidence of a lying equilibrium.
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation. Participants have been intrinsically motivated to
some degree. They made good contributions and gave high-quality ratings even when they
did not receive an extra reward for it. However, one of our results is that contributions
and ratings are at least as good or better in the presence of commissions and the HRM,
respectively. We speculate that, at least to some degree, the intrinsic motivation resulted
from the fixed monetary compensation for participation, insofar as participants felt
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they had to offer at least some effort. In fact, when planning the experiments, given
a fixed total budget, we were confronted with a tradeoff between two quantities: On
the one hand, the guaranteed compensation for participating. On the other hand, the
score-dependent external rewards for commissions and rating scores. A low guaranteed
compensation results in fewer participants. A high guaranteed compensation provides
less incentive from rating dependent rewards. This is a known problem in the literature.
For example, a study about the effects of monetary incentives on survey responses finds
that larger monetary incentives produce (1) a higher response rate, (2) a greater degree
of effort expended, and (3) more favorable comments towards the survey sponsor [JB90].
Therefore, the results gained in favor of the HRM and of commission might have been
even stronger, had the respective CGs not been rewarded by means of a fixed reward.
Ratings sparsity. Despite the rewards offered, ratings are sparse in both CG and EG
in the experiments with a variable number of ratings. That is, there are not nearly as
many ratings per contribution as there are participants per group (see Table 3.4). Several
reasons are possible: (1) Some participants do not like to rate data items they do not
understand well enough even if they receive a guaranteed (static) score. For example, one
participant of Rateonly dropped out after the creation phase because she did not feel
sufficiently familiar with the knowledge domain. (2) The number of points for ratings was
too low compared to the points(operation) for contributions (cf. Table 3.1 and ‘Settings
for Rating Scale and HRM Parameters’ on page 51). In that case, increasing the number
of points per rating would solve the problem. (3) Many ratings remained unscored which
might deter users from rating. For example, 65 percent of ratings by the EG in the
experiment Comission-cb2 remained unscored by the HRM. This is because the HRM
only scores a rating if there is a reference rating available, as described under ‘Sequential
scoring’ on page 43 in Section 3.3. This might be a chicken-and-egg problem: If only a
few ratings are scored, users rate less because they might get the impression that ratings
are not rewarded as expected. But if users rate less, there are fewer reference ratings
and thus only few ratings get scored. Higher expected points per rating and longer
running experiments might solve this problem. (4) The guaranteed compensation for
participation, as discussed above, might be another reason for the low number of ratings.
In future work, instead of fixing the points per contribution and the expected score per
rating a priori, a mechanism could dynamically adjust them according to their relative
shortage. For example, if ratings are scarce in a community, the expected score for
ratings could be scaled to attract more ratings. The mechanism could be further refined
to assign higher rewards for areas in the knowledge base, where contributions or ratings
are particularly sparse.
Fake HRM vs. the real one. The results show a weak correlation between rating scores
and understanding of the mechanism. An interesting question is whether a fake HRM
would have the same effects as the real one. We speculate that telling participants that an
HRM is used while scoring with some fake mechanism (for example, randomly) would still
yield comparable results, at least in the short run. This could be tested experimentally
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by comparing the alternatives ‘no mechanism’, ‘real HRM’, and ‘fake HRM’. Note that,
even if a fake mechanism yielded results similar to those of the real mechanism, the real
mechanism would still be at least as good (or better in case participants realized the
fake).
Evidence that a fake mechanism could work in the short run comes from Shaw et
al. [SHC11]. They find that telling crowd workers the idea behind the Bayesian Truth
Serum HRM (”You will receive a bonus payment if your answer is more common than
collectively predicted.”), without performing the actual computation of the score, is
sufficient to incentivize the workers to answer survey questions more accurately. Their
task was rather short lived, so the same reasoning as above applies: In the long run, the
fake would likely be discovered.
Appropriate domains for experiments are hard to find. It turned out to be difficult to
find domains with all of the following characteristics: (a) They are sufficiently controversial
to generate variance in the ratings. (b) The experimenters, but not the participants, have
access to the gold standard. For example, in the creation phase before the Rateonly
experiment, participants kept the schema extremely simple and almost exclusively copied
data publicly available on the web. Since the contributions were almost completely correct,
there were no negative ratings and hence no variance in the rating values. This means
that we could not have measured the effects of our mechanisms on either contribution or
rating quality of the creation phase meaningfully.
Surprisingly good data modeling. The quality of the schema created by participants
not familiar with data modeling was surprisingly good. Despite some beginner mistakes
(confusion of normal associations and type associations, creation of topic type ‘Properties’)
the quality of the schema level was good and detailed.
3.7.1. Design Recommendations
Putting the labor intensive task of creating and maintaining structured knowledge into
the hands of online communities is a feasible approach. The results of our study can
give recommendations for the design of such communities. In general, if the intrinsic
motivation is not sufficient for motivating users to contribute to an online community,
extrinsic incentives can be provided. Such incentives are important to tie committed and
thus valuable members to the community. Our experimental study confirms that rewards
are a potential means to motivate users to contribute to an online community and create
high-quality data.
In particular, the following design recommendations might be of help:
• Ratings are better than no ratings. They measure the quality of contributions
reliably and increase the quality of the knowledge.
• Allow for a fine-grained association of ratings to contributions. We have not tested
this per hypothesis. However, our experience gained in the experiments described
above, as well as in some beta-tests with Consensus Builder, suggest that the
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fine-grained ratings scheme is helpful for a detailed assessment of contribution
quality. Further, the overwhelming majority of the questionnaire responses assess
the granularity of the rating scheme as ‘exactly right’ Figure 3.7.
• Use an HRM. Users react to the presence of an HRM with ratings that are at least
as good or better than statically rewarded ratings.
• Use fully rating-dependent commissions. Rewarding users for good contributions
based on the positive ratings of their peers is beneficial. However, the rewards must
be fully rather than only partially rating dependent, as our results show.
• Expect somewhat increased competitiveness due to rating-dependent rewards, in
particular in zero-sum games for fixed prices or prestige within the community.
3.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated peer production as a means to create structured
knowledge collaboratively. We have proposed the usage of ratings and rating-based
incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions and to increase the quality of the
knowledge created. In particular, we have discussed how a mechanism for honest
ratings can be applied to this scenario. To evaluate our approach, we have developed
a platform for the collaborative creation of structured knowledge called Consensus
Builder. We have formulated hypotheses and designed experiments to test the effects
of reward mechanisms on the quality of contributions to the structured knowledge base
as well as on the quality of ratings. Using Consensus Builder, we have carried out six
experiments that took place within different online communities. The online communities
constructed complex knowledge domains in settings close to real-world scenarios. The
results of the experimental study show that our platform is suitable for the collaborative
creation of structured knowledge. Ratings prove to be a reliable measure for the quality
of contributions in an online community. Further, we find that the usage of rating
mechanisms, as well as fully rating-dependent rewards for good contributions, increase
the quality of contributions. Finally, we find that an honest rating mechanism improves
the quality of ratings in two out of three experiments.
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4. On the Accuracy of Classification
Schemes for Contributions in
Peer-Rating Online Communities
In the previous chapter we have focused on measuring and improving the quality of online-
community contributions. Now, we turn to the problem of how to classify contributions,
i.e., how to decide to which class of a set of predefined classes a contribution belongs.
Specifically, we investigate how to classify contributions based on the ratings they
have received. This is relevant for the increasing number of online communities whose
contributions serve as input for automatic processing. As an example, consider an online
community that creates an ontology. Here, the community needs to decide, e.g., if a
contribution is a class or an instance or if a name of an item in the ontology is correct or
not. Later, the community uses the classified contributions for query processing.
The general scenario is the same as in the previous chapter. I.e., members of the
community create contributions collaboratively and subsequently rate each others’ contri-
butions. Ratings correspond to the possible classes of an entry, e.g., “class/instance” or
“correct/incorrect” in the ontology example above. After the ratings have been submitted,
the community classifies the contributions by aggregating the ratings of the contributions.
For the work at hand, we mainly focus on a binary classification setting, i.e., a given
contribution can belong to two possible classes.
Note that the open-community setting that we study differs from the typical paid
crowdsourcing settings such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT offers mechanisms
to qualify workers by asking them to rate specific contributions. Based on this qualification,
workers can be excluded from participating in certain tasks. In contrast to this, we
assume a high degree of autonomy of the individual community members. We can neither
manipulate individual raters to rate selected contributions nor exclude them from rating.
A simple scheme for aggregating ratings is the well-known majority vote (MV). Despite
its simplicity, MV can achieve a surprisingly high accuracy provided that the quality of
ratings is sufficiently high [Con85]. One aim of this chapter is to give an intuition for the
high performance of MV and to show under which conditions it is achieved. Aggregating
ratings by means of the weighted majority vote (WMV) can increase the classification
accuracy compared to MV, provided WMV knows the individual competence of each
rater, i.e., his1 probability of rating correctly. Intuitively, weighted majority vote assigns
a higher weight to high-competence raters than to low-competence raters. Yet, in general,
rater competencies are unknown.
For this case, Dawid and Skene proposed an algorithm (Dawid-Skene algorithm,
1To balance things out, we refer to raters in this chapter as male.
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DSA) to estimate the competencies of the raters and to classify the contributions
accordingly [DS79]. DSA was originally developed to combine opinions of multiple
physicians for medical diagnosis. In recent years, there have been a lot of proposals to use
DSA – and algorithms closely related to DSA – in particular for crowdsourcing settings
[WRW+09, WIP11, RY12, WIP]. However, despite its popularity, DSA has two major
shortcomings: (1) it is vulnerable to low-competence settings, and (2) it is defenseless
against collusion attacks. In this chapter, we address these two shortcomings.
Firstly, if the mean competence of the community of raters is close to or less than
random, e.g., close to or less than 0.5 in binary classification tasks, DSA performs
rather poorly. Such a low mean competence can occur if the topic of the community is
inherently difficult. It can also occur if the community has a large fraction of spammers,
biased raters, malicious raters, or simply raters with consistent misunderstanding. A
spammer assigns ratings randomly, independent of the true value of the object rated.
Biased raters give consistently too high or too low ratings. [IPW10] gives the following
example of a biased rater: Think of a task of classifying web content into the categories
appropriate and non-appropriate for children. For this task, parents of young children
tend to rate more conservatively than the general population. That is, they tend to
consistently rate sites as inappropriate for children that the general population rates as
appropriate. Another example might be a community that builds a knowledge base on
the advantages and disadvantages of various kinds of power plants. Here, environmental
activists would likely be biased in their assessments. For example, they might assess
nuclear power plants as more dangerous than they are objectively. Further, raters might
give anti-correlated ratings. That is, on average, they invert ratings, either maliciously
or because of a consistent misunderstanding. Settings with mean competence close to or
less than random seem rare but do occur. For example, Kazai et al. report an average
mean competence close to random (0.56) over eight binary open crowdsourcing tasks
[KKMF13]. In one of their tasks, the workers reached only a mean competence of 0.35.
Such low-competence settings can have a devastating effect on the classification accuracy
of DSA and related approaches which assume that the majority is correct on average.
Secondly, DSA is defenseless against collusion attacks. In a collusion attack, raters
coordinate to rate the same data objects with the same value to artificially increase their
estimated competence. This is beneficial for the colluders if they receive a remuneration
for their ratings that is based on their estimated competence. For example, many
online communities remunerate users with reputation or karma points for high-quality
contributions. We propose to compute remunerations in such communities contingent
on the competence estimates by DSA. Similarly, Wang et al. propose an algorithm that
pays crowdsourcing workers based on, among other metrics, the competence estimates
calculated by DSA [WIP]. However, they do not address collusion attacks. When the
remuneration is based on the estimated competence, a collusion attack allows colluders
to artificially increase their remuneration while saving cognitive effort for determining
the truthful value of the data objects. Since DSA assigns an inflated weight to their
low-competence ratings, colluders can also severely damage the accuracy of DSA.
We propose gold strategies based on the level of agreement to increase the accuracy
of DSA in low-competence settings and to counter collusion attacks. Gold strategies
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adopt the notion of gold objects, i.e., contributions that DSA knows the true value of.
Gold objects are a common approach in the literature to differentiate between high- and
low-quality raters. The approaches known in the literature use predetermined, randomly
selected gold objects. However, as we will show, simply selecting contributions as gold
objects at random does not increase the accuracy to a satisfying degree in our setting.
Instead, our gold strategies select contributions based on the ratings they have received.
Specifically, our gold strategies select contributions based on the level of agreement
between community members, i.e., to what extent their ratings agree on the class of a
given contribution. Subsequently, trusted experts rate the selected contributions, thereby
turning them into gold objects. Of course, the accuracy benefit of gold objects is offset by
their costs. Consequently, we are interested in maximizing the net benefit of gold objects,
i.e., the benefit of a given number of gold objects minus their costs. Determining the
number of gold objects that maximizes the net benefit a priori is infeasible. We propose
an algorithm that adaptively determines the number of gold objects based on runtime
information.
To summarize, in this chapter we investigate the following:
• Properties of MV and WMV. We discuss the relationship between the number of
raters, the competence distribution, and the accuracy for MV and WMV under
different assumptions w.r.t. the competence of raters.
• Estimation quality of DSA. We study the effect of the competence distribution and
the number of ratings on the estimation quality of DSA in different settings.
• Gold strategies based on the level of agreement. We propose gold strategies, i.e.,
selecting contributions for evaluation by expert raters, that use the level of agree-
ment between the ratings of the community as a selection criterion. We test the
effectiveness of the gold strategies in various settings by means of simulation.
• Adaptive Gold Algorithm. We propose an algorithm that determines the number of
gold objects in order to maximize the net benefit. Instead of fixing a predetermined
number of gold objects, the adaptive algorithm automatically decides when to
stop adding further gold objects based on runtime information. We evaluate the
algorithm by means of simulation.
• Collusion attacks. We study the effects of collusion attacks against DSA. Further,
we test the effectiveness of gold strategies to reduce the benefit gained by colluding.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study collusion attacks against
DSA.
A main finding of ours is that gold strategies based on a high level of agreement
between raters improve the accuracy of DSA in low-competence settings considerably.
Moreover, the adaptive gold algorithm reaches over 90 percent of the net benefit that the
respective gold strategy can maximally achieve. Finally, we find that gold strategies are
highly effective in countering collusion attacks against DSA.
71
4. Accuracy of Classification Schemes in Peer-Rating Online Communities
Our analysis concentrates on DSA. However, we argue that the related methods that
are based on DSA potentially suffer in low-competence settings and under collusion
attacks as well. This is because these methods either (1) use the output of DSA as
input for their algorithm [IPW10], or (2) they make assumptions similar to those of DSA
(even though with some modifications); like DSA, they use an expectation-maximization
framework to estimate competencies and to classify the rated items [WRW+09, RY12].
Thus, our findings are somewhat orthogonal to DSA and applicable in principle to these
related methods as well.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the formal model and the
notation. Section 4.2 discusses the accuracy of majority voting and related decision rules.
Section 4.3 presents the DSA algorithm. Section 4.4 introduces two basic simulation
settings we use as templates for the evaluation of DSA. Section 4.5 analyzes the effects
of the number of data objects and the mean competence of the raters on the accuracy of
DSA. Section 4.6 discusses the gold strategies and evaluates them. Section 4.7 introduces
and evaluates the adaptive gold algorithm. Section 4.8 discusses the effects of collusion
attacks against DSA and evaluates the gold strategies to counter them. Section 4.9
reviews related work. Section 4.10 discusses the main findings and Section 4.11 concludes.
4.1. Model and Notation
We consider an online community where participants can rate the contributions of their
peers. Let K = {1, . . . ,m} denote the set of contributions and let k ∈ K denote a single
contribution. We also call a contribution a data object in the following. We assume that
each data object has a fixed type t from the set of types T .2 We focus on a binary setting.
I.e., there are two different types (for example ‘correct/incorrect’, ‘class/instance’ etc.).
We encode the types with −1 and 1, i.e., T = {−1, 1}.
We use ok to denote the true type of data object k and ok = t to denote the event that
the true type of k is t. Let p(t) denote the prior probability of a randomly chosen data
object to be of type t. Raters are those participants of the online community who issue
ratings. We use I = {1, . . . , n} to denote the set of all n raters of the community.
Let ri,k ∈ T denote the rating given by rater i to data object k. We use R = {ri,k} to
denote the set of all ratings and s = |R| to denote the number of all ratings. Each rater
rates each data object at most once. We use Rk = {ri,k′ | k′ = k} to denote the set of
ratings for data object k and sk = |Rk| to denote the number of ratings for k.
A classification method estimates the type oˆk ∈ T of each data object k. We use
oˆk = ok and oˆk 6= ok to denote the events that the classification method estimates the
type of ok correctly and incorrectly, respectively. Throughout this chapter, we use θˆ to
indicate an estimator of a parameter θ. Finally, let 1(·) be the indicator function, i.e.,
1(·) is equal to one if its argument holds true, and equal to zero otherwise. See Table C.1
in Appendix C for a summary of the notation.
2In line with the HRMs described in Section 2.2, we use the term ‘type’ instead of ‘class’ here.
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4.1.1. Competence Models
A rater perceives the type of a data object with some error and rates it according to
his perception. Note that in contrast to HRMs, we assume here that raters do not act
strategically. I.e., we do not consider the case where raters might change their behavior
depending on the behavior of other raters. (We do consider this case below in Section 4.8
when discussing collusion attacks.) Let P (ri,k = q | ok = t) denote the response probability
that rater i gives a rating of value q ∈ T given that the true type of the rated data
object is t ∈ T . We assume that P (ri,k = q | ok = t) is the same for all data objects k
of type t. In other words, for a given rater all data objects of a given type are equally
difficult. Further, we assume that, conditional on the type of a data object, ratings are
independent and identically distributed.
We use the following three models to capture assumptions of increasing strictness on
the response probability.
Type-Dependent Competence. We call the probability that rater i rates correctly
given that the true type of the data object is t, i.e., c(t)i = P (ri,k = t | ok = t), i’s
competence for type t. Since we consider binary types, i.e., t ∈ {−1, 1}, it follows that
P (ri,k = t | ok = t) = 1− P (ri,k = q | ok = t) for t 6= q. Thus, the set of competencies
{c(−1)i , c(1)i } specifies all response probabilities of rater i.
Heterogeneous Type-Independent Competence. We assume that rater i rates
correctly with competence ci = c(t)i that is the same for both types t ∈ {−1, 1}.
Homogeneous Competence. We assume that every rater i has the same type-
independent competence c = ci.
Having defined the competence, we can clarify the notion of spammers, biased, and
anti-correlated raters introduced above. A biased rater’s competence is low for one
type only. An anti-correlated rater inverts ratings, either because he is malicious or he
consistently mixes up both categories. This means that his competence for both types is
less than 0.5. A spammer has competence 0.5.
4.2. The Accuracy of Majority Decision Rules
To gain insights into the relationship between rater competence and classification accuracy
we start by investigating the accuracy of the following majority decision rules: majority
vote, and maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) rule, as well as the weighted majority
vote as a special case of the MAP rule.
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4.2.1. Majority Vote
MV decides for type t if more than one half of the ratings are in favor for t 3
oˆk = t if
∑
ri,k∈Rk
1(ri,k = t) ≥
⌊
sk
2
⌋
+ 1 (4.1)
where bsk/2c denotes the ‘floor’ under sk/2, i.e., the largest integer smaller than sk/2.
4.2.2. Accuracy of Majority Vote for Homogeneous Competencies
First, we discuss the case where all raters have the same competence c, i.e., c = ci for all
i. Later, we will drop this assumption.
MV classifies a contribution correctly if more than half of the ratings are correct (cf.
Equation 4.1). For example, suppose that we want to classify a contribution based on
three ratings. In this case, MV decides correctly if exactly two ratings are correct, for
which there are three possible ways, or if exactly three ratings are correct. Thus, the
probability of correct classification is the sum of two terms: 3c2(1− c) + c3. The general
formula for the accuracy of MV under homogeneous competence can be derived by
summing up the probabilities that lk out of sk ratings are correct for all lk ≥ bsk/2c+ 1,
i.e.,
PMV(oˆk = ok) =
sk∑
lk=bsk/2c+1
(
sk
lk
)
(c)lk(1− c)sk−lk . (4.2)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between the accuracy of MV and the competence
for different odd numbers of raters.
The relationship between the competence, the number of raters, and the accuracy of
MV has first been formulated by Marquis de Condorcet in 1785 [Con85] and is known as
Condorcet’s jury theorem (CJT): For odd sk and homogeneous rater competence c
• if c > 0.5, then PMV(oˆk = ok) increases monotonically in sk,
and limsk→∞ PMV(oˆk = ok) = 1,
• if c < 0.5, then PMV(oˆk = ok) decreases monotonically in sk,
and limsk→∞ PMV(oˆk = ok) = 0,
• if c = 0.5, then PMV(oˆk = ok) = 0.5 for all sk.
Grofman et al. [GOF83] show that the CJT is also valid for heterogeneous type-
independent competencies ci if the distribution of ci is symmetric around the mean c¯. In
that case, c¯ substitutes c in the CJT.
3 The rule that decides in favor for the type t that receives most of the ratings, i.e., oˆk =
t, if argmaxt∈T =
∑
ri,k
1(ri,k = t), is called plurality vote. In the literature simple majority
vote and plurality vote are often both called majority vote according to [Kun04]. Plurality vote and
majority vote are equivalent for settings where the number of types is two and the number of ratings
is odd.
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Figure 4.1.: Accuracy of majority vote for homogeneous competence and odd numbers of
ratings sk.
Optimality of Majority Vote for Homogeneous Competencies greater than 0.5
Even though it is a simple method, MV achieves a high accuracy, provided that the
competence is greater than 0.5. In fact, if we add the assumption that the prior is not too
heavily skewed in favor of one type, we can show that MV is the optimal classification
scheme for two-type settings.
Proposition 1 (Optimality of Majority Vote under Homogeneous Competence). Under
the assumption of the homogeneous competence model in Section 4.1.1 and given that
sk is odd, c > 0.5, and 1− c < p(t) < c for both types t ∈ {−1, 1}, majority vote is an
optimal decision rule, i.e., there exists no decision rule that has a higher accuracy.
The proof is in Appendix B.1.
4.2.3. MAP Rule and Weighted Majority Vote for Known Competencies
and Type Priors
The MAP rule and WMV are restatements of Bayes’ theorem. Thus, both methods
yield optimal estimates of the data object types oˆk, assuming that they know the true
competencies and the true type prior. This is rarely satisfied in the real world. However,
discussing these methods reveals insights into the behavior of DSA.
Maximum a Posteriori Probability Rule
The MAP rule considers the type dependent competence model with known competencies.
It decides in favor of the type t with the maximum posterior probability given the ratings,
i.e.,
oˆk = arg max
t∈T
P (ok = t | Rk). (4.3)
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Ties are handled arbitrarily. Since T = {−1, 1}, this is equivalent to deciding in favor of
the type with the higher posterior log-odds
oˆk = sign
(
log P (ok = 1 | Rk)
P (ok = −1 | Rk)
)
.
By Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability that data object k is of type t given the
ratings Rk is
P (ok = t | Rk) = P (Rk | ok = t) · p(t)
P (Rk)
.
Since we assume conditional independence of the ratings given the type of the data object,
the likelihood of the ratings can be expressed as the product of the individual likelihoods
P (Rk | ok = t) =
∏
ri,k∈Rk P (ri,k | ok = t). Thus, the posterior log-odds for data object k
are
log P (ok = 1 | Rk)
P (ok = −1 | Rk) = log
p(1)
p(−1) +
∑
ri,k∈Rk
log P (ri,k | ok = 1)
P (ri,k | ok = −1) . (4.4)
In other words, in our two-type model, the MAP rule is equivalent to a majority vote
that weighs each rating by the log ratio of the rating likelihoods of its rater:
oˆk = sign
log p(1)
p(−1) +
∑
ri,k∈Rk
log P (ri,k | ok = 1)
P (ri,k | ok = −1)
 . (4.5)
That is, a rating ri,k = q has weight log(P (ri,k = q | ok = 1)/P (ri,k = q | ok = −1)).
Later, we will use this insight to derive a weighted measure of the level of agreement
between raters.
Weighted Majority Vote with Optimal Weights
WMV with optimal weights is a special case of the MAP rule. It assumes known type-
independent heterogeneous competence ci = c(t)i = P (ri,k = t | ok = t) for all types t and
all data objects k. Thus, we can reformulate the individual likelihoods
P (ri,k | ok = 1)
P (ri,k | ok = −1) =
{
ci/(1− ci) if ri,k = 1
(1− ci)/ci if ri,k = −1.
Since log ci/(1− ci) = − log(1− ci)/ci we can restate Equation (4.5) as the WMV rule
oˆk = sign
log p(1)
p(−1) +
∑
ri,k∈Rk
ri,kvi(ci)

with
vi(ci) = log
ci
(1− ci) . (4.6)
being the optimal weight of rater i.
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Equation (4.6) reveals a relationship between the (type-independent) competence of
a given rater i and i’s usefulness for the estimation of the data object type. Raters
with competence ci > 0.5 have positive weight. Raters with competence ci < 0.5 give
on average the opposite of the true rating, either maliciously or because of consistent
misunderstanding. The function vi reverses the “direction” of their ratings by assigning
them a negative weight. Moreover, vi(ci) = −vi(1−ci). In other words, a low competence
rater i′ with ci′ < 0.5 is equally beneficial for the accuracy of WMV as a high competence
rater i′′ with ci′′ = 1− ci′ . Spammers, i.e., raters with competence near 0.5, on the other
hand, are worst for the accuracy of WMV. This is because they generate ratings that are
completely random. They have zero weight, i.e., vi(0.5) = 0.
4.2.4. Accuracy of Majority Vote vs. Accuracy of Weighted Majority Vote
with Known Rater Competencies
We explore the influence of the number of raters and of the competence distribution on
the accuracy of WMV. To this end, we run a simulation under the type-independent
heterogeneous competence model. We draw the competence ci of each rater i uniformly
at random from the interval [c¯ − w/2, c¯ + w/2], with mean competence c¯ and interval
width w. For example, for w = 0.4, and c¯ = 0.5 we draw competencies uniformly from
the interval [0.3, 0.7]. We vary the mean competence c¯ from 0 + w/2 to 1− w/2 in 0.05
steps. We use a uniform prior, i.e., p(−1) = p(1) = 0.5 and average the results over 100
simulation runs. The simulation breaks ties by fair coin toss. In the simulation we use
the competence ci to compute i’s optimal weight. Since the prior p(t) is uniform, it has
no influence on the type estimates. Figure 4.2 shows the accuracy of MV and WMV as a
function of the mean competence c¯ for different numbers of raters n and different interval
widths w. For c¯ > 0.5 the accuracy of WMV is higher than or as high as the accuracy of
MV. Like MV, WMV benefits from higher n.
The accuracy curves are minimal at c¯ = 0.5 and symmetric w.r.t. the line c¯ = 0.5. In
other words, the further c¯ is away from 0.5, the higher the accuracy. This is because
high-competence and low-competence raters are equally beneficial for the accuracy of
WMV, as described above. Competencies near 0.5, on the other hand, are worst for the
accuracy of WMV because they generate random ratings. This also explains why WMV
benefits from larger competency ranges w. Namely, the probability of having raters with
very high or with very low competence increases with w.
As already mentioned, WMV with known competencies is optimal (under the model in
Section 4.1) because WMV is a restatement of Bayes’ theorem. Therefore, it represents
an upper bound for the mean accuracy of rating aggregation methods discussed in this
chapter, in particular for DSA.
However, WMV assumes that the competencies ci of raters and the p(t) are known
quantities. In open settings, this assumption does not hold. The remainder of this
chapter deals with the problem of what to do if competencies are unknown.
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Figure 4.2.: Accuracy of MV and WMV for known competencies ci for different compe-
tence interval widths w and numbers of raters n.
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4.3. Estimation of Rater Competencies and Data Object Types
with the Dawid-Skene Algorithm
DSA relies on the type dependent competence model.
Using only the ratings as inputs, DSA estimates (1) the competencies cˆ(t)i , (2) the type
priors pˆ(t), and (3) the type probabilities Pˆ (ok = t). DSA iterates between computing
the competencies (1) and the type priors (2) using the type probabilities (3) as input,
and computing the type probabilities (3) using the competencies (1) and the type priors
(2) as input.
Algorithm 1: Our implementation of DSA.
Input: set of ratings {ri,k} given by rater i to data object k, additive smoothing
parameters a and d
Output: set of estimated types {oˆk}k∈K , set of estimated response probabilities
{Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)}i∈I,q∈T,t∈T (equivalent to set of estimated
competencies {cˆ(t)i }i∈I,t∈T )
1 foreach contribution k ∈ K do
2 initialize Pˆ (ok = t) with majority vote.
3 repeat
4 foreach type t ∈ T do
5 pˆ(t)← a+
∑m
k=1 Pˆ (ok = t)
ad+m
6 foreach i ∈ I, q ∈ T , t ∈ T do
7 Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)←
a+∑k∈K r(q)i,k · Pˆ (ok = t)
ad+∑q∈T ∑k∈K r(q)i,k · Pˆ (ok = t)
8 foreach contribution k ∈ K and each type t ∈ T do
9 Pˆ (ok = t)←
pˆ(t)∏i∈I ∏q∈T Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)1(ri,k=q)∑
t∈T pˆ(t)
∏
i∈I
∏
q∈T Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)1(ri,k=q)
10 until {Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)}i∈I,q∈T,t∈T converges;
11 foreach k ∈ K do
12 oˆk ← arg maxt∈T Pˆ (ok = t)
For brevity and clarity we use the estimates of the response probabilities Pˆ (ri,k =
q | ok = t) instead of the competence estimates in the following description. Since
we use binary types this is equivalent to using the type dependent competencies (cf.
Section 4.1.1). Having said this, DSA proceeds as follows (cf. Algorithm 1). It initializes
the type estimates for each data object. Then it repeats the following three steps until
convergence.
1. It estimates the prior of type t by summing up the estimated probabilities of each
data object being of type t and dividing the sum by the number of data objects m
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(line 5 in Algorithm 1).
2. To infer the response probability Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t), DSA sums up the ratings i
has given in favor for type q and weighs each rating by the estimated probability
that the rated data object is of type t. It normalizes the obtained sum by the
weighted sum of all ratings of i (line 7).
3. DSA computes the posterior probability that data object k has type t given the
ratings it received (line 9). Since it does not know the true response probabilities
and the true type prior neccessary for the computation, DSA uses the estimates of
these quantities obtained in the two previous steps.
Finally, DSA classifies each data object by assigning the type t that has the maximum
estimated posterior probability.
We have added two implementation details that the authors of DSA did not specify.
First, the authors leave the initialization of Pˆ (ok = q) unspecified. We use MV to this
end. Further, we use additive smoothing (line 5 and line 7 of Algorithm 1) to avoid 0
probabilities that would cancel out all other factors of the product in line 9 of Algorithm 1.
For the two-type setting in this chapter, we set the smoothing parameters a = 0.1 and
d = 2.
Obtaining the competence estimates cˆi of the type-independent competence model is
straightforward. We simply sum up DSA’s estimates of the type dependent competencies
and weigh them with the estimates of the type priors
cˆi = cˆ(−1)i pˆ(−1) + cˆ(1)i pˆ(1). (4.7)
In the following we investigate the behavior of DSA.
4.4. Settings of a Simulation to Analyze the Dawid-Skene
Algorithm
To gain insights into the behavior of DSA we analyze its performance by means of
simulation. This simulation is rather unrelated to the previous one in Section 4.2.4. We
use the type-independent heterogeneous competence model. For each rater i we generate
random ratings according to his competence ci. We draw the competence ci of each rater
i uniformly at random from the interval [c¯−w/2, c¯+w/2], with mean competence c¯ and
interval width w. To describe the number of ratings per rater we introduce a simulation
parameter rating rate. The rating rate of rater i, rr i ∈ [0, 1], is the probability that i
assigns a rating to a given data object.
We use two basic simulation settings – UNIFORM and SKEWED – to cover two
common scenarios. They differ with respect to the distribution of user ratings, the
number of raters, the number of data objects, and the type prior. We have determined
the default number of data objects m for each setting by simulating each setting with
successively increasing m while keeping the other parameters fixed (see Section 4.5.1).
The resulting default m for UNIFORM and SKEWED are the points where the accuracy
of DSA starts to converge to a steady state.
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Figure 4.3.: The probability density function of the truncated Pareto distribution of
setting SKEWED.
4.4.1. Simulation Setting UNIFORM
This setting represents a small, homogeneous community for example in a company or
a lecture community. The default number of raters for this setting is n = 50. We also
use smaller n in experiments where we want to analyze the effect of n on the accuracy
of DSA. The rating rate in this setting is the same for all raters, i.e., rr = rr i for all
raters i ∈ I. We set rr = 0.4, that is, on average 2 out of every 5 raters issue a rating for
a given data object. The prior for a data object to be of a given type is uniform, i.e.,
p(0) = p(1) = 0.5. We set the default number of data objects to m = 400. We average
results of this settings over 100 simulation runs with different random seeds.
4.4.2. Simulation Setting SKEWED
This setting represents an open online community with a highly skewed rating rate and a
skewed prior. To this end we draw the number of ratings per rater from a Power-law
distribution. The main characteristic of such a distribution is that most ratings come from
a small fraction of the raters while most raters issue only very few ratings each. Power-law
distributions are frequently observed in open online communities [MMM+11, MJD09].
See also Section 2.1.1. Since the number of ratings is bounded by the number of data
objects, we draw the number of ratings xi for each rater i from a truncated Pareto
distribution [AMP06] defined by the density function
p(xi) =
αxαminx
−α−1
i
1− (xmin/xmax)α
for 0 < xmin ≤ xi ≤ xmax < ∞, where xmin < xmax. The upper bound is xmax = m
since each rater can issue at most one rating per data object. We set m to 2000 for this
setting. Further, we set the lower bound for the number of ratings per rater to xmin = 10.
Estimating the competencies of raters who have issued less than 10 ratings becomes
unnecessarily inaccurate (we argue). We set the shape parameter of the distribution to
a typical value of α = 1. To obtain discrete values for the number of ratings we round
to the nearest integer [CSN09]. This results in a highly right-skewed distribution of xi
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with a skewness of approx. 5.29 and a mean rating rate of approx. 0.026 (see Figure 4.3).
We set the prior for this setting to p(1) = 0.7 because we assume that a typical online
community has an uneven ratio of good vs. bad data objects. Finally, we set the number
of raters to n = 100.4 As in UNIFORM we average the results of 100 simulation runs
with different random seeds.
4.5. Analyzing the Estimation Quality of the Dawid-Skene
Algorithm
We conduct a series of simulation experiments to find out how accurately DSA estimates
• the true type of the data objects, and
• the competence of the raters.
In the following, we call the ratio of data objects that DSA classifies correctly classi-
fication accuracy or simply accuracy. Alternatively, we measure the error rate, which
equals one minus the accuracy. Further, we measure the error rate of the competence
estimates. To this end, we define the mean absolute difference between the competencies
of the raters and their estimated competencies
madc =
n∑
i=1
|ci − cˆi|/n.
where cˆi denotes the estimate of the type-independent competence of rater i obtained by
means of Equation (4.7).
4.5.1. Effect of the Number of Data Objects on the Estimation Quality of
the Dawid-Skene Algorithm
How does the number of data objects m influence the estimation quality of DSA? Or, put
differently: If the community size stays constant but the number of contributions created
and rated by the community grows over time, then how many contributions does it take
for DSA’s accuracy and madc to stabilize? To answer this question, we conduct one
simulation experiment for each basic setting. For both settings we draw the ci uniformly
at random from the interval [0.3, 0.95].
Figure 4.4 shows the effect of the number of ratings on the error rate and madc. For
setting UNIFORM (see Figure 4.4a) the error rate as well as madc of DSA converge
for m > 400. For SKEWED we set the lower bound for the number of ratings per
rater proportional to m, xmin = m/200, to keep the rating rate approximately equal for
different values of m. The DSA error rate in SKEWED shows less convergent behavior
(see Figure 4.4b). Nevertheless, there is a strong reduction of the error rate and the madc
4We chose n = 100, since we deem smaller, more unstable communities the more interesting case.
Further, our results (not shown) indicate, that larger n do not change the simulation results to a
significant degree.
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Figure 4.4.: Error rate and mean absolute difference between estimated and real compe-
tence madc. Bands show 95% percent confidence intervals.
of DSA for increasing numbers of data objects up to about 2000. Consequently, in the
following simulations we set m = 400 for UNIFORM and m = 2000 for SKEWED.
In simple terms, this means that in more homogeneous settings, where raters have
roughly the same rating rate and the rating rate is high, DSA stabilizes relatively early.
In a more open setting with a low rating rate and a skewed rating distribution that is
typical for open internet communities, this is different. Here, DSA requires a much higher
number of data objects to stabilize.
4.5.2. Effects of the Number of Raters and of the Competence Distribution
on the Estimation Quality of the Dawid-Skene Algorithm
As we have seen, the accuracies of MV and WMV depend on the number of raters and
on their competencies (Section 4.2.4). To find out how these two parameters affect
the estimation accuracy of DSA, we conduct a simulation experiment using the same
procedure as in Section 4.2.4. That is, we draw the competencies of the n raters uniformly
at random from the interval [c¯− w/2, c¯+ w/2], with mean c¯ and interval width w. We
vary the mean competence c¯ from 0 +w/2 to 1−w/2 in 0.05 steps. The accuracy of MV
serves as a baseline.
Unsurprisingly, DSA’s accuracy increases with increasing mean competencies (Fig-
ure 4.5). For the narrow competence range w = 0.2, the accuracies of MV and DSA are
similar.
For higher w, DSA’s accuracy differs markedly from MV’s accuracy. Here, depending
on the mean competence c¯, DSA’s accuracy is either (1) worse than MV’s accuracy, for
c¯ < 0.5, or (2) better than MV’s accuracy, for c¯ > 0.5. The reason for this effect is
that DSA uses the type estimates Pˆ (ok = t) to compute the competence estimates c(t)i ,
and vice versa. For c¯ < 0.5, DSA performs worse than MV because in this case the
type estimates are highly inaccurate. This in turn causes DSA to invert the competency
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Figure 4.5.: Accuracy and madc as a function of the mean competence c¯ for different
numbers of raters n and different competence interval widths w.
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estimates to some degree: it assigns a low competence to high-competence raters and
vice versa. This leads to even more inaccurate type estimates, and so on. The opposite is
the case for c¯ > 0.5. Here, DSA estimates the types more accurately. This in turn yields
more accurate competence estimates. This is reflected in the error rate of the competence
estimates madc. For UNIFORM, madc drops almost to 0 for c¯ > 0.6. In that case,
DSA’s accuracy approaches that of WMV for known rater competencies (Figure 4.2).
The higher w and n, the more pronounced this effect becomes.
The curves for the accuracy of both DSA and MV are flatter in the SKEWED setting
(Figure 4.5b) than in the UNIFORM setting (Figure 4.5a). This means that, for the
same c¯, the accuracy in SKEWED is higher than in UNIFORM for c¯ < 0.5 and lower for
c¯ > 0.5. Consequently, the madc curves are flatter in SKEWED than in UNIFORM as
well.
4.6. Using Gold Strategies to Increase the Accuracy of the
Dawid-Skene Algorithm in Low-Competence Settings
As we have seen, for mean competencies c¯ < 0.5 DSA’s accuracy is low. Gold objects, i.e.,
data objects which we know the true type of, can increase the accuracy of DSA in such
low-competence settings. The idea behind using gold objects for DSA is the following.
An accuracy of DSA of less than 1.0 means that DSA misclassifies some data objects.
Knowing the true type of these data objects with certainty allows DSA to estimate more
accurately the competence of the raters who have given ratings to these data objects.
This in turn leads to a higher accuracy for the type estimates of non-gold objects these
raters have rated. This increases the accuracy of competence estimates even further and
so on.
We obtain gold objects by selecting some data objects and letting trusted experts rate
these data objects.
We use Kgold ⊆ K to denote the set of gold objects. To integrate gold objects into
DSA we use the same straightforward procedure as [WIP11] and simply set the type
estimates of the gold objects to their known values at the end of the repeat until loop
in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 shows the resulting modified DSA. For simplicity it shows
mostly the modified parts. Dots (. . .) indicate unchanged parts from Algorithm 1.
Since gold objects are costly we want to use them effectively. For crowdsourcing services
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, Wang et al. propose to achieve this by actively forcing
crowdsourcing workers to rate predefined gold objects [WIP11]. However, forcing raters
to rate particular contributions is not possible in an open community scenario like ours.
Instead, we propose gold strategies to determine which existing contributions of the
community to choose as gold objects. We use the following procedure to incorporate
gold strategies into an open community scenario. (1) Select contributions as gold objects
based on the selection criterion of the respective gold strategy. (2) Determine the true
type of these gold objects by means of trusted experts.5 (3) Run the modified DSA
5 For domains where we do not trust experts to be completely accurate we could combine the ratings of
several experts, for example by means of DSA, to achieve a higher accuracy.
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Algorithm 2: Modified Dawid-Skene algorithm with gold objects.
/* dots (. . .) indicate unchanged parts from Algorithm 1. */
Input: . . . ; set of known types for gold objects {ok′}k′∈Kgold
1 . . .
2 repeat
3 . . .
4 foreach contribution k′ ∈ Kgold and each type t ∈ T do
5 if ok′ = t then
6 Pˆ (ok′ = t)← 1
7 else
8 Pˆ (ok′ = t)← 0
9 until {Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)}i∈I,q∈T,t∈T converges;
10 . . .
(Algorithm 2) with the gold objects to estimate the types of all contributions.
The most straightforward of the gold strategies, the uni strategy, selects gold objects
uniformly at random.
4.6.1. Gold Strategies Based on the Level of Agreement
Additionally to uni, we propose gold strategies that take the level of agreement between
raters into account, i.e., to what extent the raters agree on the type of a given data object.
The strategies select data objects as gold objects that either have a high (hi) or a low
(lo) level of agreement. The rationale for using a high level of agreement is the following.
In low-competence communities, i.e., communities with c¯ < 0.5, a high level of agreement
on a type t of data object k indicates that t is likely not the correct type of k. This is
because raters with competence less than 0.5 have a higher chance of being incorrect than
of being correct. Thus, DSA will likely compute the estimate Pˆ (ok = t) inaccurately and,
as a consequence, inaccurately estimate the competencies of the raters who have rated k.
So the benefit of selecting k as a gold object is potentially high. Conversely, if c¯ > 0.5,
the probability of estimating Pˆ (ok = t) inaccurately is highest for data objects with a
low level of agreement. Below, we quantify the exact error probability given a certain
level of agreement for a simplified setting using MV and homogeneous competence.
In this section, we introduce two methods to measure the level of agreement: the
absolute rating sum (ars) and the estimated absolute posterior log-odds (alo). Based
on the two measures, we define four gold strategies: hi-ars, lo-ars, hi-alo, lo-alo
(prefix hi-/lo- for the level of agreement).
In the following, we use g to denote the gold ratio. The gold ratio is the ratio of gold
objects among all data objects, i.e., g = mgold/m, where mgold = |Kgold| is the number
of gold objects.
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Figure 4.6.: Probability of incorrect classification by MV given the absolute rating sum
(arsk) for five raters with homogeneous competence c.
Gold Strategies Based on the Absolute Rating Sum
We define the absolute rating sum of data object k as arsk =
∣∣∣∑ri,k∈Rk ri,k∣∣∣, where
ri,k ∈ {−1, 1}. Low and high values of arsk indicate low and high levels of agreement,
respectively. Consequently lo-ars selects the first mgold data objects ordered by arsk
ascending, while hi-ars selects the first mgold data objects ordered by arsk descending.
As an example, consider a setting with two data objects 1 and 2 and their ratings
R1 = {1,−1, 1} and R2 = {1, 1,−1,−1}. Assume a gold ratio of g = 0.5, i.e., half of the
data objects are selected as gold objects. The absolute rating sums are ars1 = 1 and
ars2 = 0. Thus, hi-ars selects data object 1 as gold object while lo-ars selects object 2.
Error probability given arsk using MV and homogeneous competence. Above we
have given an intuition why the level of agreement is a useful criterion for selecting data
objects as gold objects: it can identify data objects whose type DSA will likely estimate
inaccurately. To further strengthen this intuition, we now quantify – even though only for
a simplified setting – the probability that MV will classify a data object incorrectly given
the absolute rating sum. We use MV because (1) it allows for an analytical quantification,
and (2) it has roughly a similar accuracy as DSA for a given mean competence (see
Section 4.5).
Proposition 2. Let an odd number of ratings sk for data object k, and homogeneous
competence c be given. Then, the probability that MV estimates the type of k incorrectly
given the absolute rating sum arsk is
PMV(oˆk 6= ok | arsk) = c
lk · (1− c)sk−lk
clk · (1− c)sk−lk + (1− c)lk · csk−lk
where lk = (sk − arsk)/2 is the number of correct ratings for k.
See Appendix B.2 for the proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 4.6 illustrates this relationship for sk = 5. Depending on the competence c,
the probability of incorrect classification either increases or decreases with an increasing
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absolute rating sum: It increases for c < 0.5, and it decreases for c > 0.5. This is what
the intuition suggests. If the (mean) competence is below 0.5, a high level of agreement
indicates a high error probability. Conversely, if the competence is above 0.5, a low level
of agreement indicates a high error probability.
Gold Strategies Based on the Estimated Absolute Posterior Log-Odds
The absolute posterior log-odds for data object k are the absolute value of the posterior
log-odds (see Equation (4.4) for the posterior log-odds)
alok =
∣∣∣∣log P (ok = 1 | Rk)P (ok = −1 | Rk)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣log p(1)p(−1) +
∑
ri,k∈Rk
log P (ri,k | ok = 1)
P (ri,k | ok = −1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣.
Like the posterior log-odds, the absolute posterior log-odds are a weighted measure of
the agreement level. In addition to summing up the ratings like arsk, alok weighs each
rating by the log ratio of the response likelihoods of its rater. See Section 4.2.3 for a
discussion of the weights.
We cannot calculate alok directly because the true competencies and the true type
priors are unknown parameters. Instead we run DSA to obtain estimates of the posterior
probability Pˆ (ok = t | Rk) = Pˆ (ok = t) for data object k being of type t (see line 9 of
Algorithm 1) and use these estimates to calculate the estimate of alok
âlok =
∣∣∣∣∣log Pˆ (ok = 1 | Rk)Pˆ (ok = −1 | Rk)
∣∣∣∣∣.
High values of âlok indicate a high level of agreement for data object k, while low
values indicate a low level of agreement. Thus, lo-alo selects the first mgold data objects
ordered by âlok ascending, and hi-alo selects the first mgold data objects ordered by
âlok descending.
4.6.2. Evaluation of Gold Strategies
How much does the accuracy of DSA benefit from the different gold strategies? Ideally,
the use of gold objects increases the number of non-gold objects that DSA classifies
correctly. To study to which extent this indeed occurs, we define the net accuracy as the
ratio of correctly classified non-gold data objects
netacc =
∑
k∈K\Kgold 1(oˆk = ok)
|K \Kgold| . (4.8)
To quantify the accuracy gains of DSA with gold objects compared to the vanilla DSA
without gold objects, we do the following. For each c¯ and each gold strategy, we calculate
the net accuracy that DSA achieves using gold objects netaccgold. For the same input
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data, we then run DSA without gold objects (g = 0) and measure its net accuracy
netaccnogold (which is equal to its accuracy). The net accuracy gain is the difference
between the net accuracy of DSA with gold and the net accuracy of DSA without gold
netaccgain = netaccgold − netaccnogold. (4.9)
To find out which mean competencies benefit most from the use of gold strategies, we
simulate the net accuracy gains as a function of the mean competence. As in the previous
sections, we vary the mean competence c¯ from 0 + w/2 to 1− w/2 in 0.05 steps and set
w = 0.5. For setting UNIFORM, we simulate the gold ratios g ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.15}. Our
results indicate that SKEWED requires fewer gold objects than UNIFORM for similar
gains. Consequently, for this setting, we simulate gold ratios g ∈ {0.02, 0.04, 0.06}.
Figure 4.7 presents the results of the simulation experiments. In particular, Figures 4.7a
and 4.7b show the net accuracy gains of gold strategies for setting UNIFORM with
20 raters and 50 raters, respectively. Figure 4.7c shows the net accuracy gains of gold
strategies for setting SKEWED.
As we have expected, the net accuracy gains, both for UNIFORM and SKEWED, are
higher for higher gold ratios. For all strategies, the gains for c¯ greater than approximately
0.55 are close to zero. The reason is that the accuracy of DSA without gold objects is
already high for c¯ > 0.55 (cf. Fig. 4.5) so there is not much room for improvement. For
c¯ < 0.55, hi-alo has gains greater than or equal to all other gold strategies. For some
c¯ < 0.55, hi-alo outperforms the other strategies by a wide margin. In the setting with
a high number of ratings per data object (UNIFORM with 50 raters), the highest gains
concentrate near c¯ = 0.5 for low gold ratios. In settings where ratings are sparse – either
because the number of raters is low (UNIFORM with 20 raters) or because the rating
rate is low (SKEWED) – and which have a high gold ratio, hi-alo achieves high gains
also for very low c¯. In these settings, hi-ars has a performance as good as or slightly
worse than hi-alo. We discuss the implications of these findings in Section 4.10.
4.7. Optimizing the Net Benefit of Gold Objects with an
Adaptive Gold Algorithm
What is the optimal number of gold objects for DSA? This number not only depends on
the benefits but also on the costs. As we have seen above, DSA benefits from gold objects
by an increase in correctly classified non-gold data objects. This benefit is offset by the
costs to obtain the gold objects. The exact costs and benefits depend on the specific
scenario. For simplicity, we assume a benefit of 1 per correctly classified data object
and costs of 1 per gold object. We define the net benefit as the difference of correctly
classified non-gold data objects and the number of gold objects used by DSA
netbenefit =
∑
k∈K\Kgold
1(oˆk = ok)− |Kgold|.
In the following, we discuss how to maximize the net benefit.
89
4. Accuracy of Classification Schemes in Peer-Rating Online Communities
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
n
et
a
cc
ga
in
g = 0.05
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Mean Competence c
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
g = 0.10
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
g = 0.15
lo-ars hi-ars lo-alo hi-alo uni
(a) Setting UNIFORM with 20 raters.
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(b) Setting UNIFORM with 50 raters.
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(c) Setting SKEWED.
Figure 4.7.: Net accuracy gains of DSA with different gold strategies using gold ratio g
compared to DSA without gold objects (g = 0).
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4.7.1. Adaptive Gold Algorithm
As before, we select gold objects by means of a gold strategy. But instead of fixing a
gold ratio a priori, we let an algorithm decide how many gold objects to use in order to
achieve the highest net benefit. The algorithm is adaptive, i.e., it decides when to stop
based on runtime information. It works iteratively: Starting with zero gold objects, it
adds one gold object per iteration. The goal of the algorithm is to stop adding further
gold objects when the net benefit is highest. Of course, in the real world, the net benefit
is unknown. Therefore, we cannot use it as a stop condition for the algorithm. Instead,
we can only observe how the output of DSA changes in order to decide when to stop
adding further gold objects. The adaptive gold algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 3. In
Algorithm 3: Adaptive Gold Algorithm for DSA.
Input: set of ratings {ri,k}, gold strategy gs
Output: set of estimated types {oˆk}k∈K , set of estimated response probabilities
{Pˆ (ri,k = q | ok = t)}i∈I,q∈T,t∈T
1 {d1, d2, . . . , d|K|} ← set of data objects ordered according to gs
2 Kgold ← ∅
3 itr ← 0
4 {oˆitrk }k∈K ← run Algorithm 2 with {ri,k} and Kgold as input
5 repeat
6 itr ← itr + 1
7 select data object ditr as gold object
8 obtain expert ratings for ditr
9 Kgold ← Kgold ∪ ditr (add ditr to set of gold objects)
10 {oˆitrk }k∈K ← run Algorithm 2 with {ri,k} and Kgold as input
11 until Eq. stop condition is satisfied ∨ itr ≥ |K|;
the following, we derive the stop condition.
Stop Condition Based on the Output of DSA
A stop condition that yields good results based on the DSA outputs is not obvious. This
is because the changes of the output do not decrease monotonically over the iterations, as
one might expect. Instead, they can vary strongly in either direction from one iteration to
the next (cf. rightmost plot in Fig. 4.8). Further, they behave very differently in different
simulations. Consider the docchange (data object classification change), i.e., the number
of data objects whose classification has changed in iteration itr compared to iteration
itr − 1 of the adaptive algorithm
docchange(itr) =
∑
k
1(oˆitr−1k 6= oˆitrk ),
where oˆitrk denotes the estimated type of data object k in iteration itr , itr ≥ 1. In
the simulation run displayed in the leftmost plot in Fig. 4.8, the docchange does not
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Figure 4.8.: Behavior of docchange (normalized), accuracy, and netbenefit over single
runs of the adaptive algorithm. The vertical lines show the itr of the
maximum netbenefit (black, dashed), and the itr where the stop condition
with parameters stwidth = 4, stmaxsum = 2 stops (magenta).
change much until iteration 63. Adding the 63rd gold object, however, gives DSA enough
“knowledge” about the competence of the raters to reverse the classification of the data
objects almost completely. This results in a large increase of the netbenefit and a large
jump of the docchange. In the middle plot, the docchange is flat in the beginning as
well, but there is no reversal of the classification later. In the rightmost plot, docchange
changes with almost every iteration. The other outputs of DSA, e.g., the change of the
competence estimates, behave similarly.
To gain robust results, our stop condition computes the sum of changes of the last
stwidth (“stop width”) iterations. Let itr ′ be the current iteration. The stop condition
tests if the sum of the docchange values of the previous stwidth iterations is below the
threshold stmaxsum
itr ′∑
itr=itr ′−stwidth
docchange(itr) ≤ stmaxsum. (stop condition)
Finding Parameters for the Stop Condition
We have created a training dataset that contains the results of more than 1000 simulation
runs of the adaptive algorithm to obtain values for stwidth and stmaxsum that maximize
the net benefit. For this training dataset, we have varied the rating distribution (uniform,
Pareto with different parameters), the mean competence, the number of data objects, the
number of raters, and the random seeds. Table 4.1 shows for each setting the combinations
of stwidth and stmaxsum that maximize the mean netbenefit over all simulation runs. We
consider the hi-strategies only. This is because the lo-strategies and the uni strategy
perform strictly worse with the adaptive algorithm than the hi-strategies. Besides the
training dataset, we have applied the adaptive algorithm to the test data we used in the
previous evaluations of the gold strategies (cf. Section 4.6.2). We have computed the “net
benefit to maximal net benefit ratio” ntmnr , i.e., the ratio of the netbenefit achieved by
the stwidth, stmaxsum combination and the maximum achievable netbenefit for each run
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mean ntmnr
Setting Gold Strategy stwidth stmaxsum training test
UNIFORM hi-ars 3 0 0.96 0.95
UNIFORM hi-alo 1 0 0.98 0.98
SKEWED hi-ars 2 1 0.94 0.96
SKEWED hi-alo 2 1 0.89 0.94
Table 4.1.: Combinations of stwidth and stmaxsum that maximize the mean ntmnr for
different settings and gold strategies of the training dataset.
of the adaptive algorithm. Table 4.1 shows the mean ntmnr that the stwidth, stmaxsum
combination reached in the training dataset and when applied to the test dataset.
Further, the combination stwidth = 2, stmaxsum = 0 yields ntmnr values almost as high
as the values identified in Table 4.1. It is among the top-five combinations in each setting
and each strategy tested. Using it might avoid overfitting to some degree, thus giving
way to more robust results compared to the maximizing combinations when applied to
other datasets.
4.7.2. Net Benefit Gains of the Adaptive Algorithm
We evaluate the adaptive gold algorithm by comparing its net benefit to the net benefit
of the DSA without gold objects. As above, we consider the hi-strategies only. Similarly
to Eq. 4.9, we define the net benefit gain as the normalized difference between the net
benefit of the adaptive algorithm netbenefitadaptive and the net benefit of the vanilla DSA
without gold netbenefitnogold:
netbenefitgain = netbenefit
adaptive − netbenefitnogold
|K| .
We evaluate the adaptive algorithm with the same simulation experiments detailed
in Section 4.6.2. We use the robust parameters values stwidth = 2 and stmaxsum = 0 for
the stop condition of the adaptive algorithm. Figure 4.9 shows the net benefit gains
and the gold ratio used. In general, the adaptive algorithm achieves very high gains for
c¯ ≤ 5. The hi-alo strategy outperforms hi-ars in the UNIFORM settings, while hi-ars
performs slightly better than hi-alo in SKEWED. For each strategy in the UNIFORM
settings, the adaptive algorithm uses a relatively high gold ratio for the lower competence
range c¯ < 0.5. In this range, it also achieves the highest gains. In SKEWED, the adaptive
algorithm uses a much lower gold ratio than in UNIFORM. Finally, for c¯ > 0.6 the gold
ratio used by the adaptive algorithm is close to zero in all settings and for both gold
strategies. The net gain in this range is zero or slightly negative.
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Figure 4.9.: Net benefit gains and gold ratio g used by adaptive gold algorithm compared
to DSA without gold objects. Stop condition with parameters stwidth = 2
and stmaxsum = 0.
4.8. Using Gold Strategies to Counter Collusion Attacks
against the Dawid-Skene Algorithm
The previous discussion focused on improving the accuracy and the net benefit of
DSA in particular in the presence of low-competence raters. A potential problem that
has a negative impact on the accuracy of DSA as well are collusion attacks. In a
collusion attack, raters coordinate to rate the same data objects with the same value to
artificially increase their estimated competence. This is beneficial for the colluders if
they receive a remuneration for their ratings that is based on their estimated competence.
For example, many online communities remunerate users with reputation or Karma
points for high-quality contributions. We propose to compute remunerations in such
communities contingent on the competence estimates by DSA. Similarly, Wang et al.
propose an algorithm that pays crowdsourcing workers based on, among other metrics,
the competence estimates calculated by DSA [WIP]. (However, as mentioned, they
do not address collusion attacks.) In such settings a collusion attack allows colluders
to artificially increase their remuneration while saving cognitive effort for determining
the truthful value of the data objects. Since DSA assigns an inflated weight to their
low-competence ratings colluders can also severely damage the accuracy of DSA.
Gold objects can counter a collusion attack. They allow for more precise competence
estimates. Thus, they correct the overly high competence estimates of colluders. This
reduces the benefit gained by colluders, thereby making collusions less desirable. It also
reduces the damage of collusions on the accuracy of DSA.
4.8.1. Model of a Collusion Attack
We extend the model of a peer-rating online community introduced in Section 4.1.
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Our model of a collusion attack partitions the set of raters into a set of colluders
Icol ⊆ I and a set of honest raters, i.e., raters that do not collude, Ihon = I \Icol. Colluders
coordinate – for example by using the internet as a communication channel – to give the
same ratings for each data object in a subset of the data objects. We call the subset of
data objects that colluders use for the collusion attack collusion data objects and denote
it Kcol. For simplicity, we assume that every colluder rates all data objects from the set
Kcol but no other data objects. The set of non-collusion data objects Khon = K \Kcol
is the set of data objects that colluders do not rate. (Honest raters rate objects from
both Khon and Kcol.) Without loss of generality, we assume that colluders always assign
ratings with value 1 independent of the true type of the data object in question. I.e.,
ri,k = 1 for all i ∈ Icol and for all k ∈ Kcol. Other collusion strategies – like coordinating
on a rating value per data object or, if the prior is highly skewed, choosing the a priori
most likely value – add little to the discussion at hand (we argue).
We use ncol = |Icol| and mcol = |Kcol| to denote the number of colluders and the
number of collusion data objecs, respectively. We define the ratio of collusion objects as
the ratio of the number of collusion data objects to that of all data objects, i.e., mcol/m.
Further, we define the ratio of colluders as the proportion of colluders among all raters,
i.e., ncol/n.
To simplify the discussion, we assume type-independent competencies ci of raters and
colluders. We use the collusion rent as a metric for the benefit raters gain from colluding.
The collusion rent of a colluder i is the difference between his estimated competence and
his real competence cˆi − ci.
Since we assume that all ratings of colluders are 1, their competence equals the prior
probability of type 1, that is, ci = p(1) for all colluders i ∈ Icol. In other words, collusion
ratings are correct with probability p(1). From the definition of the colluders rent it
follows that the maximum collusion rent is 1− p(1).
4.8.2. Influence of Colluders and Honest Raters on the Outcome of a
Collusion Attack
Honest ratings, i.e., the ratings of honest raters, are a countermeasure against collusions.
A high number of honest ratings for a given data object makes it less likely for colluders
to influence the classification of the data object.
We conduct a simulation experiment to gain intuition on how the number of honest
ratings and the number of collusion ratings influence the outcome of a collusion attack. In
particular, we focus on the number of both honest and collusion ratings per collusion data
object. In the simulation, we vary three parameters: (1) the number of colluders ncol,
(2) the number of honest raters nhon, and (3) the rating rate of honest raters rrhon. All
three parameters determine the ratio of honest ratings to collusion ratings per collusion
data object. The parameter rrhon is not an exogenous parameter of SKEWED, i.e.,
we can only indirectly manipulate it by changing the parameters of the Pareto rating
distribution. This is why we use the setting UNIFORM for this simulation only. Our
intention behind the simulation at hand is solely to build intuition. Therefore, we do
not deem the omission of SKEWED limiting. We simulate both settings below where
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Figure 4.10.: Average collusion rent and error rate of DSA as functions of the rating rate
of the honest raters and the ratio of colluders.
we evaluate how gold strategies can reduce collusion attacks. In the simulation, we vary
rrhon from 0 to 1 in 0.05 steps and assign each honest rater i ∈ Ihon the same rating rate
rr i = rrhon (see Section 4.4 for the definition of rr i). We fix the number of raters to
n = 50 and vary the ratio of colluders ncol/n from 0 to 1 in 0.04 steps. Note that this
varies both the number of colluders ncol and the number of honest raters nhon. We set
the ratio of collusion objects to mcol/m = 0.3, i.e., colluders coordinate on 30 percent
of the data objects. The simulation draws the competence of the honest raters from a
uniform distribution on the interval [0.35, 0.95].
Figure 4.10 shows the average collusion rent (left-hand side) and the error rate of DSA
(right-hand side) resulting from a collusion attack. Both collusion rent and error rate
are shown as a function of the rating rate of the honest raters rrhon and of the ratio of
colluders among all raters ncol/n. As expected, a collusion attack requires more colluders
to maximize the collusion rent the higher the rating rate of honest raters.
Once the ratio of collusion ratings to honest ratings (determined by the combination
of rrhon and ncol/n) reaches a certain threshold, the collusion rent rises sharply. For
example, in the left-hand plot, this threshold runs approximately from (0, 0.2) to (1, 0.4)
through the rrhon-ncol/n plane. Intuitively, if there are enough collusion ratings for a
data object k ∈ Kcol, DSA shifts the type estimate of k in favor of the collusion ratings.
Because of this, DSA assigns higher competence estimates and thus higher weights to
the colluders. The higher weights increase the influence of the collusion ratings on the
other collusion data objects, and so on.
Effect of Collusions on the Error Rate of Non-Collusion Data Objects
The effect of collusions on the error rate is two-fold: they directly affect the error
rate of collusion data objects and indirectly affect the error rate of non-collusion data
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Figure 4.11.: Error rate of different subsets of data objects for colluders and proxy
colluders.
objects. The indirect effect is as follows. Colluders decrease DSA’s accuracy of the type
estimates of collusion data objects. This in turn lowers DSA’s accuracy of the competence
estimates of those honest raters who have also rated the collusion data objects. The
lowered accuracy of the competence estimates of honest raters decreases the accuracy of
non-collusion data objects.
Figure 4.11 represents the two-dimensional slice of Figure 4.10 where the rating rate of
honest raters is 1.0. It differentiates between the error rates of three different subsets of
data objects – of all data objects (K), of collusion data objects (Kcol), and of non-collusion
data objects (Khon). The error rates are shown as a function of the ratio of colluders.
To visualize the indirect influence of colluders on the error rate of Khon we simulate a
proxy collusion. For this purpose, we run the simulation experiment of a collusion attack
described above again and replace the colluders with proxy colluders. Proxy colluders
are regular raters, i.e., they do not coordinate. To make them comparable to colluders,
they rate the same number of data objects as the colluders do – but not necessarily from
the set Khon only. Further, they have the same observed error rate as colluders, i.e., they
rate as many data objects incorrectly as colluders. The other simulation parameters are
the same as before.
Figure 4.11 shows the error rate for all data objects K in a proxy collusion as a function
of the ratio of proxy colluders. Note that there are no equivalents to Khon and Kcol in a
proxy collusion. This is because proxy colluders do not coordinate on a subset of K. For
the collusion attack, the error rates of K, Kcol, and Khon are all higher than the error
rate of K in a proxy collusion. Just by coordinating, colluders cause higher error rates –
even for the data objects Khon they did not rate – than the otherwise identical proxy
colluders.
4.8.3. Reducing the Collusion Rent with Gold Objects
We show that gold objects can reduce the collusion rent and the error rate which result
from a collusion attack. As an example, we simulate the setting discussed in the previous
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Figure 4.12.: Colluders rent and the error rate of DSA with five percent gold objects.
Otherwise same setting as in Figure 4.10.
section but using five percent randomly chosen data objects as gold objects. This (see
results in Figure 4.12) reduces the collusion rent to almost zero. It also reduces the error
rate significantly compared to the collusion attack without gold objects (cf. Figure 4.10).
In the following, we analyze the influence of gold strategies as a means to reduce
the collusion rent. The analysis focuses on reducing the collusion rent for the following
reason. We assume that raters consider the collusion rent an incentive for colluding.
Therefore, a reduced collusion rent makes colluding less desirable and thus should lower
the occurrence of collusions.
To investigate the effects of gold strategies on the collusion rent, we conduct several
simulation experiments for UNIFORM and SKEWED. In these experiments we vary the
gold ratio g and the ratio of colluders ncol/n. We fix the other simulation parameters
of UNIFORM and SKEWED to their default values defined in Section 4.4. As in the
previous section, we set the ratio of collusion objects mcol/m for the setting UNIFORM
to 0.3. In setting SKEWED, honest raters rate approximately 2.6 percent of the data
objects. This is a much lower rating rate than in setting UNIFORM where honest raters
rate 40 percent of the data objects. Accordingly, we adjust the ratio of collusion data
objects for SKEWED to a lower value as well and set it to mcol/m = 0.1, i.e., colluders
coordinate on 10 percent of the data objects.
As we have seen in the previous section, the maximum achievable collusion rent depends
on the type prior p(t). The type priors of UNIFORM and SKEWED differ. To make
the results comparable between the two settings, we calculate the normalized collusion
rent. The normalized collusion rent for a simulation is the collusion rent divided by the
maximum collusion rent observed in that simulation.
Figure 4.13 shows the normalized collusion rent (0/black: best, 1/white: worst outcome)
as a function of the colluders ratio and the gold ratio, for the different gold strategies.
For SKEWED (Figure 4.13b), hi-ars pushes the collusion rent to 0 for gold ratios larger
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(a) Setting UNIFORM with ratio of collusion objects 0.3.
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(b) Setting SKEWED with ratio of collusion objects 0.1.
Figure 4.13.: Collusion rent for different gold strategies as a function of the ratio of
colluders and the gold ratio.
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than 0.1 independent of the ratio of colluders. hi-alo reduces the collusion rent to almost
0 for most of the area of the contourplot as well. The lo strategies, on the other hand,
can only reduce the collusion rent to close to 0 for very high gold ratios (> 0.95) or
very low colluder ratios (< 0.02 and < 0.08 for lo-ars and lo-alo, respectively). The
strategy uni performs better than the lo strategies but worse than the hi strategies in
this setting.
For UNIFORM the differences between hi and lo strategies are lower but still pro-
nounced (Figure 4.13a). Here, hi strategies perform better than lo strategies as well.
Colluders in this setting gain rent > 0.05 only if their ratio is larger than 30 percent,
independent of the gold strategy. The uni strategy performs best in this setting. It
reduces the collusion rent to 0 for gold ratios > 0.05. hi-ars performs only slightly worse
than uni.
The reason why the hi strategies are so effective in reducing the effects of a collusion
attack is that they select data objects as gold objects that have a high level of agreement.
A high level of agreement is a property of collusion data objects since all colluders agree
on those data objects. I.e., hi strategies are a collusion detection mechanism.
4.9. Related Work
There exists a large body of literature on the accuracy of MV. The earliest work on the
accuracy of MV, the Condorcet jury theorem, dates back to 1785 [Con85]. Grofman et
al. review results on the accuracy of voting processes as a function of the competences of
the individual voters, the decision procedure, and the number of voters [GOF83]. The
optimal weights for raters with type-independent competence in binary choice situations
(Equation (4.6)) have been identified several times independently [MP69, DH73, NP82].
Lam et al. generalize the Condorcet jury theorem to cases where even numbers of voters
are allowed, where the number of choices is greater than two, and thus ties are possible
[LS97]. Kuncheva et al. derive upper and lower limits on the accuracy of MV for both
dependent and independent classifiers [KWS03].
Li et al. derive theoretical error bounds (approximate and expected) on linear threshold
rules, such as MV and WMV, for binary labeling tasks [LYZ13]. This includes bounds
on the expected error rate of the MAP rule with known competencies.
[DS79] have developed the Dawid and Skene algorithm for the estimation of error rates
made by clinicians in the assessment of patients. The algorithm is based on the general
algorithm for expectation maximization (EM) developed by Dempster et al. [DLR77].
Whitehill et al. introduce an EM algorithm similar to DSA that takes varying difficulties
between the data objects of the same type into account [WRW+09].
Snow et al. discuss an experiment for the estimation accuracies of AMT workers for
word annotation tasks [SOJN08]. Similarly to DSA, their method estimates the worker
competencies based on comparisons with gold standard examples, and uses a MAP
estimate to infer the annotation quality.
[IPW10] develops an algorithm based on so-called soft labels and expected costs of
each soft label to differentiate between biased raters (c < 0.5) and spammers (c = 0.5).
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The algorithm uses DSA to estimate rater competencies. In an experiment, the algorithm
performs better at detecting those spammers that always rate the class with the highest
type prior. This leads to a higher accuracy (0.998) compared to DSA (0.95). The algorithm
assumes that DSA returns “some reasonably accurate estimates” of the competencies.
However, this assumption does not hold true for c¯ < 0.5, as our results show.
Similarly, Raykar et al. [RY12] propose an algorithm to eliminate spammers and
malicious raters. They compare their algorithm to MV and DSA and find that it has
a better area under the ROC curve than MV and DSA, in particular if the fraction
of spammers is high. Further, they find that their algorithm is better at detecting
spammers than MV and DSA. However, their algorithm (implicitly) assumes that the
mean competence c¯ is higher than 0.5. For example they state that “the methods
proposed in Dawid and Skene [ . . . ] can automatically flip the labels for the malicious
annotators”, which is clearly not true if c¯ < 0.5 as our results show. Further, it is clear
from the description of their simulation experiments that the settings they study to show
the effects of their method have a mean competence greater than 0.5.
Wang et al. [WIP11] propose an integration of gold objects into DSA. Further, they
develop an algorithm that integrates gold objects in a setting with Amazon Mechanical
Turk workers, as opposed to an open community setting like ours. Their method tells
AMT workers to label a priori created gold objects based on the expected utility of
additional ratings by these workers. However, forcing members of the community to rate
particular contributions is not possible in our setting.
4.10. Discussion
To discuss the implications of our findings, we distinguish between four situations where
a community of raters classifies data objects.
The first situation is a typical crowdsourcing setting with payments such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk that lets the employer decide which data objects a crowd worker has to
rate. There, the method proposed by [WIP11] might allow using gold objects efficiently
based on the expected utility of additional ratings issued by the crowd worker.
The second and the third situation occur in an open community setting where it is
not possible to force raters to rate specific data objects. Here, we have to differentiate
between communities with a high probability that the mean competence is greater than
0.5 and those with the risk of having a mean competence less than 0.5. If there is a high
probability that the mean competence is greater than 0.5, DSA will classify data objects
with high accuracy. Our results show that gold objects cannot improve this situation
much.
If, on the other hand, the open community faces the risk that its mean competence is
near 0.5 or lower, DSA or related methods will not suffice. Such a low mean competence
occurs whenever the community is aﬄicted by a large fraction of low-competence raters,
such as spammers, biased raters, malicious raters, and raters with a consistent misunder-
standing. In that case, the gold strategies we have proposed can increase the classification
accuracy considerably, compared to the vanilla DSA without gold objects. Here, the
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preferred gold strategies are hi-alo and, to a lesser degree, hi-ars. The accuracy gains
achieved by a given gold ratio depend on the characteristics of the community. Roughly,
the more homogeneous the community, the higher the rating rate, and the lower the
competence, the higher the gold ratio required to achieve high accuracy gains compared
to the vanilla DSA. In case of a typical open online community with sparse ratings and
a skewed rating distribution, a gold ratio as low as two percent can be enough to offset
the impact even of a large number of spammers and biased raters. Further, if we also
take the costs of gold objects into account, the adaptive gold algorithm can determine
the optimal gold ratio with high accuracy.
As the fourth situation, communities face the risk of collusion attacks, in particular if
raters are remunerated based on their competence inferred by DSA. Here, gold strategies
can successfully counter collusion attacks. hi-ars is particularly effective against collusion
attacks, both in homogeneous settings and in settings with a skewed rating rate that is
typical for open communities.
In summary, hi-ars and hi-alo can safeguard against the risk of both the impact
of (i) a large fraction of low-competence raters, and (ii) of collusion attacks. In such
circumstances, a low ratio of gold objects together with the hi-alo and hi-ars strategies
can be much more effective than simply selecting gold objects randomly. Further, the
optimal gold ratio does not need to be guessed but can be determined with high accuracy
by our adaptive gold algorithm.
4.11. Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the problem of classifying contributions in an open
peer-rating online community. We have discussed the accuracy of majority voting schemes
under homogeneous competencies and known heterogeneous competencies. We have
analyzed the estimation quality of DSA in various settings. We find that in a homogeneous
setting, where raters have roughly the same, relatively high, rating rate, DSA stabilizes
after it has classified a relatively low number of data objects. In a more open setting, on
the other hand, with a low rating rate and a skewed rating distribution that is typical
for open internet communities, DSA requires a much higher number of data objects
to stabilize. Further, we find that for a mean competence higher/lower than 0.5, DSA
performs better/worse than majority vote. This effect becomes more pronounced, the
more widespread the competence distribution is, and the higher the number of raters is.
We have proposed and tested gold strategies based on the level of agreement to
increase the accuracy of DSA in low-competence settings. Further, we have proposed and
evaluated an adaptive algorithm to maximize the net benefit of gold objects. Finally, we
have discussed the damage done by collusion attacks against DSA and have tested how
gold strategies can reduce this damage. A main finding of ours is that the hi-alo gold
strategy is very effective in increasing the accuracy of DSA in low-competence settings.
Further, the adaptive algorithm determines the optimal gold ratio for each strategy and
each setting with high accuracy. Finally, we find that the hi-ars and the uni strategy
are effective in reducing the benefit gained by colluders. Thus, they render collusions
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less attractive for raters. We have discussed the implication of these findings and have
found that hi-alo and hi-ars can effectively safeguard typical open online communities
against the risk of both the impact of (i) a large fraction of low-competence raters, and
(ii) of collusion attacks. In such circumstances, a low ratio of gold objects together with
the hi-alo or hi-ars strategy can be much more effective than simply selecting gold
objects at random.
We have focused on a binary setting in this chapter. However, the methods we have
discussed are also applicable to multi-type settings, i.e., |T | > 2. In particular the gold
strategies can be readily modified to work in multi-type settings. In this case, arsk
would have to be computed for each type t of a given data object individually. For this
computation each rating needs to be encoded as 1 if it is in favor of t, as -1 otherwise. The
modification of strategies based on alok is straightforward as well: instead of using alok
the modified strategies select data objects that have the highest/lowest MAP estimate
for any of their types.
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5. Reviewing the Reviewers: a Study of
Author Perception on Peer Reviews
One of the most long-standing models of peer production is that of the scientific commu-
nity [Hay09]. To meet the problem of quality assurance and assessment in peer production
(Chapter 1), science uses peer review.
Perhaps the first description of a peer-review process can be found in the book Ethics
of the Physician by Isha¯q ibn ’Al¯ı al-Ruha¯w¯ı (CE 854–931) of Al Raha, Syria [Spi02].
The book states that it is the duty of a physician to take notes about a patient on each
visit. After the patient had been cured or had died, a local council of physicians examines
the notes. Based on their judgment, for example, a maltreated patient or the patient’s
relatives (in case of death) could sue the practicing physician for damages: “[ . . . ] the
physician meets with the experienced people, he brings out the record to be examined by
knowledgeable professionals in medicine. If the disease proves to be the same as was told,
and the signs were the signs of the disease that are characteristic for it, and the drugs
and management were satisfactory, the physician would be thanked and would leave. If
not, he shall get what he deserves” [AK97].
Peer review was introduced into the field of science in 1731 by the Royal Society of
Edinburgh that published a collection of peer-reviewed medical articles [Kro90]. The
broad adaption of the peer-review process in the sciences occurred in the middle of the
twentieth century, presumably because at that time (a) the number of articles increased
strongly and so did the competition for publication space in scientific journals, and (b) the
availability of photocopiers made replication for the purpose of reviewing feasible [Spi02].
Today, peer review is the de facto standard for ensuring quality in science. Reviewing a
scientific paper requires considerable intellectual effort and time. However, the incentive
to write high-quality reviews tends to be somewhat low, as reviewers are not remunerated
for their efforts [BBC+07] and usually remain anonymous. While most reviewers do
provide high-quality reviews, there is a non-negligible rate of reviews of lower quality,
at least according to the perception of the authors. Personal communication with other
scientists as well as numerous discussions regarding the pros and cons of peer reviewing
in various scientific communities show this [CKG02, Nat06a, BBC+07].
We believe that feedback given by authors has potential to improve the review process.
More specifically, we deem it promising to rely on review ratings to identify high-quality
reviews and remunerate reviewers.1 However, the specifics of such a remuneration
mechanism are not obvious. For instance, assuming that accept/reject decisions affect the
perception of authors, simply remunerating reviewers based on the ratings they receive
1 The form of the remuneration is not a topic of this chapter. One possibility is to remunerate reviewers
with specific awards, e.g., ‘best reviewer award’, as some conferences have done already.
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from authors is not objective. To illustrate: A review of a rejected paper is likely to
obtain low ratings. Had the same paper been accepted, on the other hand, the review
would presumably receive higher ratings, should that assumption hold.
To gain insight into authors’ perception of reviews, we have conducted a study with
authors who had submitted papers to a peer-reviewed computer science conference. One
important goal was to determine which criteria may be useful to identify high-quality
reviews and thus to determine an adequate basis for reviewer remuneration. Based on our
study, one might be able to derive other measures as well, e.g., re-design of review forms,
or other measures which we have not come up with at this current point of time. In this
thesis, we keep the discussion focused on reviewer remuneration as the core objective.
Moreover, our study addresses the questions: How is author satisfaction with review
quality distributed? How strongly do the characteristics of the review, in particular the
review scores, as well as the accept/reject decision, affect author ratings? Which of the
different assessments of the reviewer influence author perception of overall review quality?
To this end, we incorporated review ratings into the review process. Authors could
assess each review they had received according to a broad selection of criteria, such as
helpfulness of review comments. We have also asked them to rate the review scores they
had received.
For the sake of clarity, we distinguish assessments by reviewers and those by authors.
We refer to values used for assessment with the following two terms:
• scores, when issued by reviewers for the articles, and
• ratings, when issued by authors for the reviews.
Further, we deem HRMs (Section 2.2) a promising means to reward reviewers based on
the assessments of other reviewers of the same submission. HRMs rely on the assumption
that respondents use their own opinion as evidence for the popularity of this opinion
among others (see ‘Empirical evidence for Bayesian updating’ on page 18). We test
whether this assumption holds in a scholarly peer-review setting.
Given our results, we discuss how a suitable metric to remunerate reviewers could look
like. This metric should neutralize possible effects of the review process, e.g., the effects
of review scores, on author ratings as much as possible.
We find that the authors’ satisfaction with review quality is good, though improvable.
We also find that authors rate reviews as good if they deem the review helpful, if they
deem the review comments justified, and if they have the impression that the reviewer
made an effort to understand the paper. Acceptance status and self-assessed reviewer
expertise only have a weak influence on perceived review quality. Unsurprisingly, authors
assess reviews more favorably if they assign high scores. We design a remuneration
function for reviews based on ratings and scores that, when applied to the data collected
in our study, neutralizes the effects of scores on the remuneration to a large degree.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 reviews related work.
Section 5.2 presents the questionnaire used for the study, its implementation and the
statistical methods we use for the analysis. Section 5.3 present the results of the analysis.
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Section 5.4 discusses the results. Section 5.5 studies the suitability of ratings as a basis
for remuneration of reviewers. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.1. Related Work
Criticism of peer reviewing has concentrated mainly on its efficacy and effectiveness. Some
studies [WKWea02, G+08, G+90] have surveyed authors who had submitted manuscripts
to journals. However, the results from the surveys differ from each other. Gibson et
al. report on an online survey of 445 authors of research manuscripts submitted to
the Obstetrics and Gynecology journal [G+08]. Authors were asked to rate six aspects
of editorial comments and three aspects of the review process. Further, they let the
journal’s senior editors rate the reviews as well. One result is that authors’ ratings
did not correlate with ratings of reviews by the journal’s senior editors. Further, they
find that the authors of accepted manuscripts give higher ratings for overall satisfaction
than authors of rejected manuscripts. Garfunkel et al. find a weaker correlation between
author ratings and manuscript fate [G+90]. Gibson argues that the difference (between
Garfunkel et al. and his own findings) results from the number of survey items and the
rating scales in the questions.
We see many exogenous factors which might influence author satisfaction with peer
reviewing, for instance the organization of the review process, the selection of reviewers
and the design of the review forms. In addition, the review process of a conference is
different from the one of a journal. As [SB94] has pointed out, at least for experimental-
ists, conference publication is preferred to journal publication. Moreover, the premier
conferences tend to be more selective than the premier journals. Hence, many conferences
have huge numbers of submissions combined with tight time constraints. Publication in
conferences needs shorter time to print (7 months vs. 1-2 years). However, there is a
lack of studies on conference reviews.
There also are various proposals to increase review quality. Some proposals attempt
to improve the review process itself, like allowing authors to submit feedback in the
rebuttal phase or supporting a rather open review process instead of double blind. In
the journal Biology Direct [Nat], to give an example, authors can select their reviewers
from the editorial board, and reviews are not only signed, but also published together
with author responses as part of each article. Analyses of different modes of peer-review
activities, e.g., online vs. face-to-face reviewing [B+09], exist as well. Van Rooyen et
al. study open peer review [VRGE+99]. They find that asking reviewers to reveal their
identity to authors had no important effect on the quality of the review, and on the
recommendation regarding publication. However, it significantly increased the likelihood
of reviewers declining to review.
Others have proposed to train reviewers. The British Medical Journal offers reviewers
a workshop which gives them clear briefs, including guidance on what to include in
the review etc. [Nat06b]. Callaham et al. try to improve reviewing skills by means of
feedback from the editorial board. In their study editors write short feedback in text to
the reviewers to comment on the quality of the reviews submitted [CKG02]. However, the
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performance of reviewers is hardly improved, i.e., simple written feedback to reviewers
seems to be inefficient as an educational means in this specific context. Another study
finds that reviewer ratings given by journal editors are moderately reliable, and that
they correlate modestly with the ability of reviewers to find flaws in a test manuscript
[CBWW98].
Peer reviewing not only is an important instrument in the scientific community to pick
good contributions, but also finds its usage in other disciplines. In software-engineering
processes, to give an example, peer reviews are used to detect deficiencies in the code
[Gal04, Wie02]. Other studies investigate the effect of peer reviewing on student learning.
In [B+09], students review papers written by their peers, and the results indicate that
students take peer reviews seriously and provide constructive reviews.
5.2. Materials and Methods
We have carried out our survey by means of an online questionnaire. Survey participants
were the authors of the CASES 2009 conference. In this section, we first describe details
of the conference and its peer-review process which are relevant to our study. Then we
describe the questionnaire and the implementation of the study. Finally, we list the
statistical methods we use in our analysis.
5.2.1. Conference and Peer-Review Process
We invited the authors of the CASES 2009 Conference for Emerging Technology in
Embedded Computing Systems to participate in our study. The conference is held
annually and focuses on compilers and architectures for embedded systems [CAS09].
Authors submitted 72 papers to the CASES 2009 conference overall. In all, 48 reviewers
wrote 311 reviews on the submissions. The number of reviewers per submission ranged
from 2 to 6 (avg.= 4.38 reviewers/submission). Out of the 72 submissions, the conference
rejected 47 and accepted 23 as full papers and 2 as short papers. The reviewers had not
been aware of our study beforehand.
The reviewers had to assign the following five detail scores: Originality, Technical
Contribution, Experimental Results, Description of Related Work, and Language and
Clarity. To assess the overall quality of the submission, each review contained one Overall
Score. Additionally, reviewers provided a numerical self-assessment of their own expertise
regarding the topic of the submission. Scores and self-assessment were based on the usual
1-5 scale, with 1 being the minimum and 5 the maximum score. In addition, reviewers
could provide written comments. The conference chairs based their accept/reject decisions
mainly on the Overall Score. However, they revised some of the ranking-based decisions
during a one day face-to-face meeting.
5.2.2. Questionnaire
Immediately after the authors had received their notification of acceptance/rejection, we
invited them to fill out a questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first
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part contained questions concerning each individual review the respective submission had
received. The second part contained general questions. The response formats were mostly
ordinal and differed depending on the question. Some questions elicited interval-level
data. See Appendix D for an oﬄine version of the questionnaire.
Survey Rating for # Choices Choices
Overall Quality 5 ‘very low’ to ‘very high’
Approp. of each review score 3 ‘too low’, ‘appropriate’, ‘too high’
Perceived expertise of reviewer 5 1-5
Helpfulness for future work 4 ‘not at all’ to ‘very helpful’
Approp. of review length 3 ‘too short’, ‘appropriate’, ‘too long’
Effort of reviewer 3 ‘low’, ‘average’, ‘high’
Percent of justified comments 5 0%, 25%, .., 100%
Table 5.1.: Review specific ratings and response formats.
Part I – Review specific ratings. Regarding the individual reviews for a submission,
the following assessments were part of our questionnaire (see also Table 5.1):
• Overall Quality. We asked to the authors to assess the overall quality of the review
(“What is your overall rating of the quality of Review?”).
• Appropriateness of each of the six review scores. We elicited ratings regarding the
appropriateness of the five detail scores, as well as of the Overall Score.
• Perceived expertise of reviewer. We also let the authors rate the expertise level of
the reviewer on the same scale as the reviewers’ self-assessment.
• Further criteria that might influence review quality. Additionally, we asked questions
addressing the criteria which might influence review quality: helpfulness of the
review comments for future work, appropriateness of review length, perceived effort
of the reviewer to understand the paper, percentage of justified comments.
Part II – General questions. To test whether authors act in line with Bayesian updating,
we let them estimate the ratio of reviews rated ‘very low’ or ‘low’ among (i) all authors,
(ii) authors whose submissions had been accepted, and (iii) authors whose submissions
had been rejected. Finally, we asked authors whether they deem ratings likely to improve
review quality.
5.2.3. Implementation of the Survey
As mentioned, we sent out invitations to participate in the survey immediately after the
notifications. We invited the contact author, i.e., one author per submission. We did not
invite multiple authors per submission to avoid that authors distort results by answering
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questionnaires for their co-authors. Moreover, we assume the opinions of co-authors to
be highly correlated.
Recall that the number of reviews per submission varied from two to six. We set
up the questionnaire software so that the number of questionnaire items matched the
numbers of reviews a submission had received. For example, if a submission x had
received three reviews, the questionnaire for x solicited the review specific ratings (Part I
of the questionnaire) three times – one time for each review. Authors had ten days to
complete the questionnaire. We sent out one reminder eight days after the invitation.
As an incentive to participate in the study, besides that of helping the scientific
community, we raﬄed off six Amazon gift certificates of USD 20,– each among all survey
participants. We had announced the raﬄe in the invitation to the survey.
5.2.4. Statistical Methods
To quantify the pairwise relationships between variables, such as the characteristics
of the reviews, the ratings, the accept/reject decision, etc., we perform a correlation
analysis. Because most of the variables are ordinal in nature, we use Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient ρ to calculate correlations between two variables [HWC13]. In line
with the common practice, we refer to effects that have a significance level of p ≤ 0.05
as statistically significant. Note that statistical significance does not refer to the size
of the effect in question or its practical relevance. E.g., a weak correlation can still be
statistically significant. In some situations we are interested in removing the effect of a
third, confounding, variable on the correlation between two variables. To control for the
effects of the third variable, we use partial correlation. We use Pearson’s χ2 test with
Yates’ continuity correction to compare differences in ratings and response rates between
accepted and rejected submissions [FLP13].
5.3. Results
In the following, we present the results of our statistical analyses. To begin with, we
present the response rate and an overview of the author ratings dealing directly with
review satisfaction. Afterwards, we analyze the effects of review characteristics on ratings.
Finally, we examine whether author estimates on rating distributions are in line with the
common prior assumption.
5.3.1. Response Rate
We invited 72 authors of distinct papers to participate in the survey. In all, 39 out of the
72 invited authors completed the questionnaire, resulting in an overall response rate of
0.54. Authors of accepted papers were 2.2 times more likely to complete the questionnaire
than authors of rejected papers (odds ratio 8.46, χ2(1) = 11.95, p < 0.001). Nevertheless,
46% of the respondents were authors of rejected papers. [G+08] reports similar response
rates. Overall, the authors assessed 175 reviews. The average number of assessed reviews
per participating author was 4.49.
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Figure 5.1.: Distributions of author ratings for review quality. Differences between ratings
for accepted (filled) and rejected submissions are statistically significant
(* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01) except for ratings of review length.
Rating Correlation with Overall Score
Overall Quality 0.591**
Justified Comments 0.506**
Helpfulness 0.360**
Expertise Reviewer 0.417**
Effort Reviewer 0.482**
Table 5.2.: Correlations of quality ratings with the Overall Score. (** p < 0.01)
5.3.2. Distribution of Review Satisfaction among Authors
Figure 5.1 shows an overview of the distributions of the four author ratings that are
related to review quality, categorized by accepted and rejected submissions. The mean
value of the fifth rating related to review quality, Percentage of Justified Comments, is
63.67 (standard deviation 17.67). Authors find 39% of reviews to be of high or very high
quality and deem 45% of review comments helpful or very helpful. Further, they think
that 34% of the reviews show that reviewers made a high effort to understand their paper.
Finally, they deem 71% of the review comments to be of appropriate length. These
findings suggest that authors are quite satisfied with the quality of the reviews their
submissions received. Nevertheless, there seems to be room for improvement: authors
rate 22% of reviews to be of low or very low quality, and 15% of the reviews as being not
helpful at all.
5.3.3. Influence of the Overall Score on Quality Ratings
Table 5.2 shows the dependency of the ratings related to review quality on the Overall
Score. All ratings show a statistically significant positive correlation with the Overall
Score. In other words, unsurprisingly, authors tend to assign higher ratings to reviews
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that assign high scores. But the correlations are not perfect and vary between rating
categories. The Overall Quality rating shows the highest correlation, helpfulness has the
lowest one.
5.3.4. Which Ratings Do Explain the Overall Quality?
The Overall Quality rating reflects the overall quality of the review as perceived by the
author. By computing the correlation between the Overall Quality rating and each of
the other author ratings, we can determine the criteria with the highest influence on the
review quality as perceived by the author. However, as Section 5.3.3 shows, the author
ratings for review quality depend on the Overall Score assigned by the reviewer. To
remove this effect, we also computed the partial correlations between Overall Quality
and each of the other author ratings, while controlling for the Overall Score.
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
Effort Reviewer
Helpfulness
Expertise Reviewer
Justified Comments
Length of Review
Overall Score
Experimental Results
Technical Contribution
Language and Clarity
Related Work
Originality
bi-variate ?
partial ?
Figure 5.2.: Correlation of ratings with Overall Quality – bi-variate and controlled for
Overall Score.
Figure 5.2 shows the results of both the bi-variate and the partial correlations. The
light bars show the correlation between the respective rating of the authors and their
Overall Quality rating. The filled bars show the same correlation when controlled for the
effect of the Overall Score. The difference between the respective bars shows how big this
effect is. For instance, the difference for the helpfulness rating is relatively small. This
means that the correlation of Helpfulness with Overall Quality is rather independent of
the Overall Score. In contrast, the Overall Score strongly influences the correlation of the
rating for Technical Contribution with Overall Quality. All correlations between Overall
Quality and the other author ratings are statistically significant. Ratings for Effort of
Reviewer, Helpfulness, and Expertise of Reviewer show the highest correlation with the
perceived review quality – both in the bi-variate case and when controlled for Overall
Score.
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5.3.5. Influence of Acceptance Status on Author Ratings
As Figure 5.1 shows, authors of rejected submissions assign lower quality ratings than
those of accepted ones. This effect is statistically significant.
Further, we quantify the dependence of all rating categories on the accept/reject decision
per correlation analysis. The acceptance status refers to the submission (as opposed
to the review scores and author ratings that refer to individual reviews). Therefore,
we computed averages of the review-specific author ratings per submission to test for
correlation with the acceptance status.
We find that the correlations of acceptance status with the respective mean ratings per
submission are rather low. They range from 0.06 to 0.253. In particular, the correlations of
acceptance with the mean values of Overall Quality and Effort of Reviewer are ρ = 0.236
and ρ = 0.182, respectively. Thus, the effect of accept/reject decisions on author ratings
is weaker than the effect of the Overall Score (cf. Section 5.3.3).
This finding was unexpected to us to some degree, as we had anticipated a stronger
effect. However, in retrospect it might be explainable by the following facts. In our study,
authors rated individual reviews. Thus, they could differentiate between reviews that
assigned scores in their favor and those that did not. Since reviews per submission vary
in their scores, and authors apparently take this into account, acceptance has a weaker
effect on ratings than the scores.
5.3.6. Influence of Review Length
Minimum, maximum, and mean length of review comments in characters were 0, 11604,
and 1488 respectively (standard deviation=1213, median=1258). Review comments
are very rarely perceived as too long. But in over one fourth of the cases, authors
perceive them as too short (see Figure 5.1). The length of a review comment is positively
correlated with the rating for review length (ρ = 0.501, p < 0.01). The partial correlation
controlled for Overall Score is slightly less (ρ = 0.433). Thus, authors appear to prefer
longer reviews.
5.3.7. Expertise of Reviewer – Self-Assessed vs. Perceived
Authors rated the reviewer expertise on the same scale as the reviewer. The self-assessment
by the reviewer and the assessment by the author are moderately correlated (ρ = 0.360,
p < 0.001). This is the only non-negligible correlation of the self-assessed expertise with all
other variables we analyzed. In particular, we do not find any correlation of self-assessed
expertise with ratings for Review Quality, Helpfulness, and Justified Comments.
On the other hand, the perceived expertise, as measured by the authors’ ratings, is
significantly (p < 0.01) partially correlated (controlled for the Overall Score) with Effort
of Reviewer (ρ = 0.571), Helpfulness (ρ = 0.523), and Justified Comments (ρ = 0.434).
Like other ratings, Expertise of Reviewer moderately depends on the Overall Score
(ρ = 0.417, p < 0.001). In other words, authors deem reviewers that give them higher
scores more competent.
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Score Correlation with Respective Rating
Overall Quality 0.612**
Originality 0.596**
Technical Contribution 0.672**
Experimental Results 0.620**
Related Work 0.568**
Language and Clarity 0.655**
Table 5.3.: Correlation of review scores with their respective ratings. (** p < 0.01)
5.3.8. Rating of Review Scores
Interestingly, given the choices ‘too low’, ‘adequate’, and ‘too high’, authors rate the six
scores their submissions had received per review mostly as adequate. The number of
ratings per score with value ‘adequate’ ranges from 66% to 77% for the respective scores.
Authors almost never perceive the scores they received as too high. Out of 175 ratings
for Overall Quality, 4 had the value ‘too high’. All 4 were assigned by different authors.
Further, 18 of the 875 ratings on the five detail scores had the value ‘too high’, 8 of which
were assigned in category Language and Clarity.
Review scores are significantly positively correlated with their respective ratings (see
Table 5.3). This means that authors tend to rate high scores as adequate and low scores
as too low. But considering that authors have rated scores directly, the correlations are
lower than we had expected.
5.3.9. Authors’ Estimations of Rating Ratios
To test whether authors’ ratings are in line with Bayesian updating (see ‘Empirical
evidence for Bayesian updating’ on page 18), we asked authors to estimate the ratios of
reviews rated unfavorably, i.e., as ‘very low’ or ‘low’, for three different subsets of authors.
That is, we asked authors the following three questions: “What is your estimate of the
percentage of reviews rated ‘low’ or ‘very low’ in this survey for” (i) all papers, (ii) for
papers that have been accepted, and (iii) for papers that have been rejected.
Authors’ mean estimates for the three ratios are higher than the mean values observed
(Table 5.4). In other words, authors think that their peers rate more unfavorably than
they actually do. However, the overall tendency of the estimated ratios is the same as in
the ratios observed, i.e., accepted submissions yield less unfavorable ratings on average
than all ratings combined, and all ratings combined yield less unfavorable ratings on
average than rejected submissions.
More importantly, regarding Bayesian updating, there is a statistically significant effect
of an author’s own Overall Quality ratings on his estimations regarding the Overall
Quality ratings issued by other authors. We obtained this result by calculating the
share of unfavorable Overall Quality ratings issued by an author and comparing it to his
estimates. The respective correlations of this share with the three estimates are significant
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Observed Estimated
Mean Mean Std. Deviation
Accepted 0.106 0.238 0.165
Rejected 0.346 0.474 0.174
All 0.217 0.354 0.176
Table 5.4.: Observed and estimated values of unfavorable ratings for Overall Quality.
and range from 0.374 to 0.422 (p < 0.05 for all). Put simply, the more unfavorable ratings
an author issues, the more he expects others to do the same. This suggests that authors
do indeed behave like Bayesian learners who use their own opinion to update a (common)
prior.
5.4. Discussion
The analysis confirms our expectations regarding this variant of peer production to a
large extent. Authors’ assessments of reviews are biased. They depend on review scores –
on the overall scores as well as on the detail scores – but only weakly on the acceptance
status. We think that this is because the granularity of assessment was the review, not
the submission. That is, authors are not so much affected by a rejection per se, but they
differentiate between reviews in their favor and reviews not in their favor.
The correlations of the authors’ ratings with the reviewers’ scores are relatively
moderate. We had expected them to be stronger. In so far, authors appear to be ‘decently
honest’. Some author ratings are relatively ‘neutral’ towards the review scores. These
ratings are Effort of Reviewer, Percentage of Justified Comments, and the Helpfulness of
the comments. They are relatively weakly influenced by the Overall Score of the review,
compared to the other ratings. Moreover, their respective correlations with Overall
Quality hold when controlled for the Overall Score.
We are surprised to find that the reviewer’s self-assessed expertise is not correlated
with any of the ratings except for one: the assessment of the reviewer’s expertise by the
author. Therefore, we speculate that revealing the reviewers’ self-assessment to authors
affects the opinion of the authors. This is akin to the ‘seeing is believing’-effect discussed
in [CLA+03]. To examine this issue further, future experiments could divide authors
into two groups, and display the self-assessed expertise level of reviewers to one group
only. Comparing the results of both groups would yield insights as to whether authors
are indeed affected by the display of the self-assessment.
Next, in our study, we provided the authors with three choices to assess review scores:
‘too low’, ‘adequate’, and ‘too high’. We did this mainly to find out how many authors
would choose ‘too high’. As we have learned from our study, these choices appear to
be rather inadequate for a real rating system: the number of ratings being ‘too high’ is
negligible, resulting effectively in a boolean rating scale.
Objective criteria to identify and remunerate high-quality reviews are difficult to find.
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In the end, quality and helpfulness can only be perceived and assessed by authors. Other
parties that are assumed to be objective in their assessment – such as journal editors –
are rather unsuitable [CKG02] to increase the quality. On the other hand, authors are
not objective either. Their assessments are influenced by review comments and scores.
For example, with the exception of Language and Clarity, ratings for scores are relatively
strongly affected by their respective score, as well as by the Overall Score. How much of
this influence is due to the scores and how much is due to the written comments is hard
to determine. To examine this, a future experiment would have to introduce experimental
groups of authors who only see review comments and do not see the scores and vice versa.
However, in a real-world review process, it is very difficult to split the authors into
two groups which are then treated differently. One could, however, try to eliminate the
influence of the scores on the quality ratings. How this could be achieved is the topic of
the next section.
5.5. Remuneration for Reviews
One important objective of ours behind this study was to identify criteria that might be
suitable to reward high-quality reviews. The main question in this context is: how to
decouple incentives to write high-quality reviews from incentives to give accurate scores?
We have shown that there is a positive correlation between reviewers’ scores and
authors’ ratings of reviews. That is, authors like reviews that like their submissions.
Thus, if one simply remunerated reviews based on how highly authors rate them, it would
create incentives for reviewers to give inaccurately high scores. Consequently, we propose
to remunerate relatively highly rated reviews, i.e., reviews that receive high ratings by
authors despite assigning low scores. In the following, we formalize one possible function
that achieves this. We explicitly write down this function for illustration purposes, and
to indicate a potential direction of future research.
Let r ∈ {1, . . . , k} denote the value of the author rating of a given review. Let
s ∈ {1, . . . , l} denote that review’s score. The remuneration function t(r, s) = r − s
removes the influence of the score on the remuneration.
The function t can be further refined. For example, one could normalize the rating
scales if k 6= l. Further, reviewers might be deterred from reviewing if threatened by
penalties. So one could only remunerate good reviews, but refrain from any penalization.
Alternatively, one could scale t such that all values t(r, s) are non-negative.
In order to see whether our proposed remuneration indeed neutralizes the effects of
scores, we apply t to the data of our study. Let r be the Overall Quality rating by
an author and s the Overall Score of the respective review. Further, according to the
number of different choices for ratings and scores in our study, we fix k, l = 5. Table 5.5
shows the results. The remuneration is quite symmetrically distributed. About 44.6% of
the reviews would not be remunerated at all. Moreover, t(r, s) is positively correlated
with Overall Quality (ρ = 0.526) and weakly negatively correlated with Overall Score
(ρ = −0.333).
A further decoupling of the incentives from scores could be achieved by choosing a
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t Reviews receiving t
-2 1.1%
-1 24.0%
0 44.6%
1 24.6%
2 5.7%
Table 5.5.: Function t applied to the data of our study. (Values less than −2 and greater
than 2 did not occur.)
rating category for r that is only weakly dependent on s. One candidate, for example,
is the Helpfulness of the comments for future work, because, of all author ratings, its
dependency on the Overall Score is the weakest one. To demonstrate this, we use a
normalized variant of the remuneration function above and apply it to the data of our
study: Let rhelp ∈ {1, . . . , 4} be the rating for the helpfulness of a given review, and let s
be that review’s Overall Score. The resulting remuneration for helpfulness
thelp(rhelp, s) =
rhelp
4 −
s
5
is only negligibly dependent on the Overall Score (ρ = −0.126, p = 0.096), while still
being strongly correlated with Helpfulness (ρ = 0.761, p < 0.01) and Overall Quality
(ρ = 0.591, p < 0.01). Thus, it decouples the incentive to give accurate scores from the
incentive to write high-quality reviews to a large degree. Of course, we formulated the
functions t and thelp based on the data of our study. To ensure their validity, they need
to be tested on data that are independent of the study at hand.
Two potential problems might arise given a remuneration function such as the one
above:
(1) In our study, the perceived Helpfulness of review comments was weakly correlated
with Overall Score. That is, authors appreciated helpful comments even if the reviewer
gave them a low score. Now, if thelp is employed, authors might resort to assigning
inaccurately low ratings for Helpfulness in order to punish reviewers for low scores. In
that case, the weak association between Helpfulness and Overall Score would turn into
a strong one. However, we deem such behavior of authors unlikely since it would be
irrational: As long as authors do not pay the reviewers’ remuneration themselves, they
have no incentive to resort to assigning dishonestly low ratings. Moreover, they cannot
incentivize reviewers to assign a higher Overall Score by threatening them with low
Helpfulness ratings, since thelp specifically removes the effects of high scores from the
remuneration.
(2) According to t and thelp, all else being equal, reviewers could increase their chance of
being remunerated by assigning lower scores. In the worst case, all reviewers would assign
minimum scores while still trying to write helpful comments. Clearly, this is undesirable.
To counter artificially low scores, conferences could use an HRM (cf. Section 2.2). In this
case, some of the remuneration for a review would be based on its score in comparison to
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the scores of other reviews for the same submission. Reviewers would then face a trade-off
between two factors: Some of the remuneration would be based on author ratings, some
based on review scores. Studying the question how this trade-off influences reviewer
behavior is beyond the scope of this chapter: The specifics of the remuneration function,
in particular the proposal how it might depend on review scores, are a result of our study.
We had not foreseen them prior to the study and hence had not incorporated them in
the questionnaire. Thus, the reviewers in our study did not face the trade-off described
above. Consequently, we could not study the trade-off based on the data we collected
about them.
Finally, for future work, we deem experiments the most promising way to study reviewer
behavior in presence of the trade-off described above. I.e., we would let reviewers know
the remuneration function(s) and measure how this affects their behavior.
5.6. Conclusions
Selecting conference articles is an important instance of peer production. Today, this is
typically done by means of peer reviewing. Review ratings by authors have potential
to improve the quality of peer reviews. A significant problem, however, is that authors’
perception is hardly neutral, but might in turn be affected by the reviews. To gain
empirical insight into authors’ perception of reviews, we have conducted a study with
39 authors of a computer science conference who rated 175 reviews they had received.
The results of this study show that the authors’ satisfaction with review quality is good,
but leaves some room for improvement. Review scores affect author ratings to different
degrees. Authors rate reviews as good if they deem the review helpful for their future
work, if they deem the review comments justified, and if they have the impression that
the reviewer made an effort to understand the paper. By and large, these results hold
when controlled for the overall score. Acceptance and self-assessed reviewer expertise only
have a weak influence on perceived review quality. Finally, we find that the assumption
that authors act in line with Bayesian updating, which is crucial for HRMs, holds with
respect to authors. Given these results of the study, we have discussed suitable metrics
to compute remunerations for reviews based on ratings and scores. As discussed, such
metrics are not obvious without studying author behavior first. Applied to the data
collected in our study, one of these metrics neutralizes the effects of scores to a large
degree. A possible limitation of our study is that we only looked at one conference. The
findings might differ for other conferences. Even though, we belief that it is reasonable
to assume that results for other conferences would point into the same direction. Future
work would have to verify this.
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In this dissertation, we have investigated the problems of user motivation and quality
assurance in three related peer-production settings.
To meet the problems of user motivation and contribution quality, we have proposed
the usage of ratings and rating-based incentive mechanisms for the creation of structured
knowledge. To evaluate our approach, we have developed a platform and conducted
a study consisting of six different controlled field experiments. The results of the
experimental study show that our platform is well-suited for the collaborative creation
of structured knowledge. We find that the usage of rating mechanisms, as well as fully
rating-dependent rewards for good contributions, increase the quality of contributions.
Further, we find that an honest rating mechanism improves the quality of ratings in most
of the experiments. Thus, our results provide a contribution to the fundamental research
issue of how to create high-quality structured knowledge on a large scale.
We have investigated the problem of classifying contributions in an open peer-rating
online community. In particular, we have studied how to increase the classification
accuracy of the Dawid-Skene algorithm in the presence of low-competence raters, such as
spammers or biased raters. We have proposed and evaluated gold strategies based on the
level of agreement to increase the accuracy of the Dawid-Skene algorithm. Further, in
order to maximize the net benefit of gold objects, i.e., their benefit minus their costs, we
have proposed and evaluated an adaptive algorithm. It determines the number of gold
objects based on runtime information Our main finding is that the hi-alo gold strategy is
very effective in increasing the accuracy of the Dawid-Skene algorithm in low-competence
settings. Further, we find that the hi-ars and the uni strategy are effective in reducing
the benefit gained by colluders, thus, rendering collusions less desirable. Moreover, the
adaptive algorithm determines the optimal gold ratio for each strategy and each setting
with high accuracy.
We have conducted an empirical study on how authors rate the peer reviews they have
received, and how the author’s ratings, in turn, can be used to increase the quality of the
reviews. To this end, we have incorporated review ratings into the review process of a
computer science conference. We find that review scores affect author ratings to different
degrees. Further, we find that authors rate reviews as good if they deem them helpful
for their future work, or if they have the impression that the reviewer made an effort
to understand the paper. By and large, the latter results hold when controlled for the
overall review score. Surprisingly, acceptance and self-assessed reviewer expertise only
have a weak influence on perceived review quality. Given these results of the study, we
have discussed suitable metrics to compute remunerations for reviews based on ratings
and scores. Applied to the data collected in our study, on of the metrics neutralizes the
effects of scores to a large degree. In the future, remunerations based on this metric
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could increase the quality of the peer-review process.
In summary, this dissertation has shown how ratings and rating-based incentive
mechanisms can increase the quality and the quantity of contributions in peer-production
settings.
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Appendix A.
Further Figures of Consensus Builder
Figures A.1 to A.3 show further screenshots of Consensus Builder.
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Appendix B.
Proofs
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For simplicity and brevity, we omit the subscript k in the following. Thus, sk
becomes s, Rk becomes R, ok becomes o, ri,k becomes ri, and so on. Further, let i refer
to the s raters of the data object in question.
The posterior probability that the object is of type t given the ratings is
P (o = t | R) = P (R | o = t)P (o = t)
P (R) .
Since P (R) is the same for both types, the ratio of the posterior probabilities (or posterior
probability ratio, ppr) of the data object being of type -1 and being of type 1 given its
ratings is
ppr = P (o = −1 | R)
P (o = 1 | R) =
P (o = −1)
P (o = 1)
P (R | o = −1)
P (R | o = 1) .
Since we assume conditional independence of the ratings given a type, their joint proba-
bility can be written as a product
ppr = P (o = −1)
P (o = 1)
s∏
i=1
P (ri | o = −1)
P (ri | o = 1) . (B.1)
Per definition of the homogeneous competence we have P (ri = q | o = t) = c, if q = t,
and 1− c otherwise. Thus, we can express each likelihood ratio as
P (ri = q | o = −1)
P (ri = q | o = 1) =
{
c/(1− c) if q = −1
(1− c)/c if q = 1.
Let lrr = ∏si=1 P (ri | o = −1)/P (ri | o = 1) denote the product of the likelihood ratios
of all s ratings. Since s is odd and c > 0.5 and therefore c/(1− c) > 1 the likehood ratio
l lr cannot be equal to 1. Instead either
• lrr ≥ (c)/(1− c) > 1, if more ratings are in favor for type -1, or
• lrr ≤ (1− c)/c < 1, if more ratings are in favor for type 1.
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The same is true for the ppr . This is because we assume that 1− c < P (o = t) < c for
both types t ∈ {−1, 1}. Thus, the ratio of the priors is (1 − c)/c < P (o = −1)/P (o =
1) < c/(1− c) and therefore cannot “reverse the direction” of the ppr : If lrr > 1, then
ppr = lrr · P (o = −1)/P (o = 1) > 1. Likewise, if lrr < 1, then ppr = lrr · P (o =
−1)/P (o = 1) < 1.
Thus, the posterior probability is greater for the type that receives the majority of
ratings in its favor.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For simplicity and brevity, we omit the subscript k in the following. Thus, sk
becomes s, lk becomes l, arsk becomes ars, and so on.
Let corr(oˆ = o) denote the number of correct ratings for a correct classification by MV.
Correspondingly, let corr(oˆ 6= o) denote the number of correct ratings for an incorrect
classification by MV. We first proof the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given ars and a given odd s, if the number of correct ratings for an
incorrect classification by MV is corr(oˆ 6= o) = l, then the number of correct ratings for a
correct classification by MV is corr(oˆ = o) = s− l. Further, l = (s− ars)/2.
Proof. Let rs denote the rating sum for a given ars, i.e.,
ars = |rs| =
{
−rs if rs < 0
rs if rs > 0
. (B.2)
Note that since the number of ratings is odd, rs cannot be 0. Let rs+ denote positive
rating sum, i.e., the rating sum rs > 0 in Equation (B.2). Further, let s− be the number
of negative ratings of rs+, that is, the number of ratings that equal -1 if rs > 0. Thus,
the number of negative ratings for rs+ is (s− s−). The positive rating sum is the sum of
the negative ratings and the positive ratings
rs+ = −s− + (s− s−) (B.3)
with the number of negative ratings of rs+ being the smaller of the two summands
0 ≤ s− < s− s−.
Note, that there is at most one s− for a given rs+ and a given s. To see why this is
true, suppose, for contradiction, there is a second s− := s− + k, for some integer k 6= 0.
Then, the number of positive ratings for rs+ is (s− (s−+k)). But the sum of the number
of negative ratings and the number of positive ratings must be s = s−+k+ (s− (s−+k))
which can only be true if k = 0.
The negative rating sum rs−, i.e., the rs < 0, is
rs− = −rs+
= −(s− s−) + s−. (B.4)
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Hence, s− is the number of positive ratings of rs− and (s− s−) is the number of negative
ratings of rs−.
For a given ars and a given s, let corr(oˆ 6= o) = l be the number of correct ratings for an
incorrect classification. For incorrect classification by MV, the number of correct ratings
must be less than the number of incorrect ratings. Thus, l must be the smaller one of the
two terms s− and (s− s−), i.e., l = s−. For the correct classification by MV, the number
of correct ratings must be the larger of the two terms, i.e., corr(oˆ = o) = s− s− = s− l.
To prove the second part of Lemma 1, we use the relationship between ars and rs− and
rs+ defined in Equation (B.2). We substitute s+ = s− l and s− s+ = l in Equation (B.3)
ars = rs+ = −l + (s− l)
= s− 2l
and in Equation (B.4)
ars = −rs− = −(−(s− l) + l)
= s− 2l.
Rearranging, either one of the above equations proves the second part of the lemma:
l = (s− ars)/2.
The probability of an incorrect classification by MV given ars is
P (oˆ 6= o | ars) = P (oˆ 6= o, ars)
P (ars) =
P (oˆ 6= o, ars)
P (oˆ 6= o, ars) + P (oˆ = o, ars) . (B.5)
As Lemma 1 shows, to obtain a given ars out of s ratings, we need exactly l = (s−ars)/2
correct ratings. The probability that exactly l out of s ratings are correct for a given
competence c, is
(s
l
)
cl(1− c)(s−l) (see Equation (4.2)). Thus, the joint probability of MV
classifying the data object incorrectly and having rating sum ars is
P (oˆ 6= o, ars) =
(
s
l
)
cl(1− c)s−l.
where l = (s − ars)/2. By Lemma 1, the joint probability of MV classifying the data
object correctly and having rating sum ars is
P (oˆ = o, ars) =
(
s
s− l
)
cs−l(1− c)l.
Substituting the two equations above in Equation (B.5), we obtain
P (oˆ 6= o | ars) =
(s
l
)
cl(1− c)s−l(s
l
)
cl(1− c)s−l + ( ss−l)cs−l(1− c)l .
P (oˆ 6= o | ars) = c
l(1− c)s−l
cl(1− c)s−l + cs−l(1− c)l ,
where l = (s− ars)/2.
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Appendix C.
Summary of Notation of Chapter 4
Table C.1 summarizes the most frequently used symbols of this chapter and their meanings.
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Symbol Meaning
T = {−1, 1} Binary set of types
q, t ∈ T Type q and type t
p(t) Prior probability of type t
K = {1, . . . ,m} Set of data objects
k ∈ K Data object
ok True type of k
m = |K| Number of data objects
I Set of raters I = {1, . . . , n}
i Rater i
n = |I| Number of raters
ri,k Rating that rater i gives to data object k
R = {ri,k} Set of all ratings
Rk = {ri,k′ | k′ = k} The set of ratings of data object k
sk = |Rk| Number of ratings given to data object k
lk Number of correct ratings for k
c
(t)
i Type dependent competence, i.e., probability P (ri,k = t | ok = t)
that rater i rates objects of type t correctly
ci Type-independent competence, i.e., probability that rater i
rates correctly
c Homogeneous competence, i.e., competence c = ci that is the
same for all raters i
g Gold ratio, i.e., ratio of gold objects
Kgold Set of gold objects
mgold = |Kgold| Number of gold objects
Icol ⊆ I The subset of colluders among all raters
Kcol ⊆ K The subset of data objects that the colluders use for the collusion
attack
Khon = K \Kcol The set of data objects rated by honest raters only
ncol = |Icol| Number of colluders
mcol = |Kcol| Number of collusion objects
mcol/m Ratio of collusion objects
θˆ An estimator of a given parameter θ
1(·) Indicator function, i.e., 1(·) is equal to one if its argument holds
true, and equal to zero otherwise
Table C.1.: Symbols and meanings.
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CASES 2009 Review Survey
The following is an oﬄine version of our CASES 2009 survey.
Welcome to our survey of the CASES 2009 reviews!
In the following we ask nine questions for each review having to do with review quality.
The numbering of the reviews in this survey refers to the order of the reviews in your
notification email/in the invitation email for this survey. Of course, we would like to hear
your honest opinion.
Questions marked with a * are mandatory.
Review 1
What is your overall rating of the quality of Review 1?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• very low
• low
• average
• high
• very high
How do you assess the overall score that Review 1 has given to your paper?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• too low
• adequate
• too high
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How do you assess the detail ratings that Review 1 has given to your paper?*
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
too low adequate too high
Originality ◦ ◦ ◦
Technical Contribution ◦ ◦ ◦
Experimental Results ◦ ◦ ◦
Description Related Work ◦ ◦ ◦
Language and Clarity ◦ ◦ ◦
What is the percentage of comments in Review 1 which you find justified?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• 0%
• 25%
• 50%
• 75%
• 100%
Do you find Review 1 helpful for your future work?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• not at all helpful
• a few points are helpful
• helpful
• very helpful
What is your opinion about the level of expertise of the reviewer?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• 1 (Minimal)
• 2
• 3
• 4
• 5 (Maximal)
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Do you think that the reviewer has made an effort to understand your paper?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• low effort
• average effort
• high effort
What do you think of the length of Review 1?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• too short
• appropriate
• too long
Are there any other reasons why you are particularly happy/particularly unsatisfied
with this review?
Please write your answer here:
Review 2
What is your overall rating of the quality of Review 2?*
. . .
General Questions
Estimation Questions
The following three questions solicit your estimate of the relative frequencies of answers
to the question “What is your overall rating of the quality of the review?” (which we
have just asked) from all authors who take part in this survey.
What is your estimate of the percentage of reviews rated ‘low’ or ‘very low’ in this
survey?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• 0%
• 10%
. . .
• 90%
• 100%
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What is your estimate of the percentage of reviews rated ‘low’ or ‘very low’ in this
survey for papers that have been accepted?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• 0%
• 10%
. . .
• 90%
• 100%
What is your estimate of the percentage of reviews rated ‘low’ or ‘very low’ in this
survey for papers that have been rejected?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• 0%
• 10%
. . .
• 90%
• 100%
Do you deem it likely that rating reviews will improve review quality?*
Please choose only one of the following:
• Yes
• No
[Submit your survey]
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